AMERICAN-IRAQI FOREIGN POLICY.   Term Paper ID:30698 Click to get this paper

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Paper Abstract: Covers the post-Gulf War to 2000 time period. Argues that the Clinton Administration had no clear goals in Iraq, and pursued a reactionary policy. American foreign policy objectives; difficulties facing U.S. policy. Issue of sanctions on Iraq. Saddam Hussein's actions in weakening United Nations sanctions. Weakness of U.S. policy toward Iraq. Paper Introduction: Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has pursued a consensus foreign policy of global engagement aimed at providing a stable international security environment, while promoting free markets and democracy in the international community. The difficulties facing US policy arise from three sources: The actions of other countries, the inherent conflicts between American objectives, and domestic disagreements over the proper ends and means of American foreign policy. More difficult, however, for the United States are the ensuing conflicts between American objectives and political expedience. For example, the American interest between promoting democracy and human rights often conflicts with Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. Indeed,this was the case, because one month later, a politically weakened Clintondecided to finally launch a punitive attack against Iraq, in cooperationwith the British.[xiv] It was in mid-December 1998, just after the Republican-dominatedHouse Judiciary Committee voted from an impeachment indictment againstClinton, the President approved US military action against Iraq, citingUNSCOM Chairman Richard Butler's report that the Iraqis had again seriouslyinterfered with the activities of the inspectors, and voicing concern, withthe Islamic holy month of Ramadan coming in a few days, which would meanthat the US would have to postpone any attack for more than a month, givingSaddam time to hide his WMD equipment. In June 1993, following an abortive Iraqi attempt toassassinate former US President George Bush during a visit to Kuwait, theUS bombed an intelligence center in Baghdad, In October 1994, Saddam movedhis army toward Kuwait, and the US responded by airlifting military forcesto Kuwait and warning Iraq not to invade, a threat that achieved itspurpose. Saddam Hussein and the Crisis in the Gulf. The UScommander in the Persian Gulf, General Anthony Zinni, claimed that theattacks might have set back Iraq's missile development program by twoyears. The US also neglected its ally Turnkey, animportant pillar to contain Iraq, and failed to provide any kind of supportfor the Iraqi opposition. Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.Bengio, Ofra. Iraqi opposition leaders reportedly warned US officials in May 1996that the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan was deteriorating and required urgentattention from the United States. Cordesman andAhmed Hashim (1997), Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond (Boulder, CO: WestviewPress):114ff. (1999). The Modern History of Iraq. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.Clawson, Patrick. Earlier she had announced the names ofsix specific opposition groups who were eligible for $97 million in US aidunder the Iraq Liberation Act. in Kuwaitin April 1993, the Clinton administration equivocated before retaliatingwith cruise missile attacks against the Baghdad headquarters of Iraq'ssecret police on June 17, 1993. Forexample, the American interest between promoting democracy and human rightsoften conflicts with the interest in promoting stability when astrategically important country has a friendly, yet authoritarian ruler.The interest in promoting economic liberalization may conflict with theinterest in promoting democracy when, for example, the United States mustdecide whether to allow free trade, or whether to impose or maintainsanctions on a country on like Iraq. (February 25, 1998). The Clinton administration initially softened policy toward Iraq anddropped the Bush Sr. (1998). "Kofi Annan's Flawed Agreement." The New York Times: 29.Marr, Phebe. But more importantly, this method of negotiation served togreatly embolden Iraq's interlocutors on the Security Council, especiallyRussia and France (as well as significantly increasing the prestige ofAnnan and the UN as an independent force). Saddam's Word: Political Discourse in Iraq. Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World. On the other hand, the continualpostponement of action by the United States seriously eroded US credibilityand influence. This gave him time not only to hide his weapons programs, butalso to play out his diplomatic games.[xxv] Lastly, Clinton should not have let the UN negotiate on behalf of theUnited States. On October31, 1998, Hussein ended all Iraqi cooperation with UNSCOM, precipitatingyet another unanimous Security Council vote condemning Iraq and demandingthat the ban on cooperation with UNSCOM be ended. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Graham-Brown, Sarah. (2 ). Furthermore, theArab world viewed the limited US cruise missile attacks as worse thanuseless, stirring up Arab popular anger while not threatening the bases ofSaddam's power.[iii] Russian's relations with Iraq would prove to be a continuingcomplicating factor, since Russia had its own agenda in the region. (1998). .. During Clinton's second term in office, the US "dual containment"policy toward Iran and Iraq, which he inherited from the Bush, Sr.administration and then intensified during his first term, failedcompletely. In the strengthened political position, Clinton decided to launch amajor military attack against Iraq - only to call it off at the very lastminute, after receiving information that Iraq, under the imminent threat ofattack, had agreed to allow the UNSCOM inspectors to resume their work.While Clinton claimed the Iraqis had "backed down," and threatened toinitiate attacks if Iraq failed to fully cooperate with UNSCOM, Clintonclearly lost a golden opportunity, now that he had both the Arab world anda united Security Council behind him, to destroy the bases of Saddam'spower including the Republican Guard, the suspected sites of weapons ofmass destruction, and Iraq's remaining military capability. During this process,Saddam learned that his strategy of openly confronting the US and thenretreating at the last hour, wore down, isolated, and undermined the UnitedStates; also it divided the coalition ranged against him, and even raisedhis stature in the Arab world. Gingrich further attackedClinton by stating that if Ritter's accusations were true, "Youradministration's tough rhetoric on Iraq has been a deception masking a realpolicy of weakness and concession." In response, Secretary of StateAlbright, citing the unanimous UN Security Council vote against Iraq,asserted that the administration's policy would be more effective incurbing Saddam than that of Scott Ritter, although few Republicans appearedconvinced.[xi] The Clinton administration did score a success in its Iraq policy,albeit a small one, in September 1998 when it persuaded the Kurdishfactions of Masud Barzani and Jallal Talabani, whose internecine conflicthad facilitated the capture of Irbil by Saddam's forces two years earlier,to work together and share power in northern Iraq. . Beset by monumental economic crisis, having defaulted on its foreignloans, and now having to virtually beg the US and Europe for food to getthrough the winter, Russia was in no position to try to block a US militarystrike on Iraq. In fact, it can be categorically stated that the US is notfinished with Saddam, and Saddam is not finished with challenging theUnited States. Saddam,meanwhile, clearly saw the weakness of US policy: One that was grounded inindecision in defense and foreign policy matters, particularly in regard toIraq. At the peakof the crisis, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov met with USSecretary of State Madeline Albright in Geneva on November 2 , 1997. These conflicts between objectivesoften give rise to the most serious problems that American foreign policyfaces. In August 1996, Iraqi military forces invadedthe Kurdish enclave and seized the city of Irbil, executing hundreds ofIraqi opposition members and forcing the United States to evacuate hundredsmore.[xxiii] Saddam probed for US weakness aggressively and repeatedly, and theClinton administration supplied it by showing too much restraint. New York: Random House.Mufti, Malik. Second, after Clinton concluded the Wye Agreement between Israel andthe Palestinians in October 1998, which involved a further Israeliterritorial withdrawal, the Arab reaction was far less hostile to USpressure against Iraq. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).Helms, Christine. Threeweeks later, the chief US inspector on the UNSCOM team, Scott Ritter,resigned in protect at what he said were deliberate US efforts led bySecretary of State Albright to derail inspections in order to avoid anothermilitary confrontation with Iraq.[ix] Since the Iraqi leader had long tried to hide evidence of Iraq'sefforts to construct weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the US, underRitter, had been successful in ferreting out the WMD information primarilyby surprise inspections (although the information released by Iraq afterthe defection of 1995 of Saddam's son-in-law, Hussein Kamal, was alsohelpful), Saddam's barring of surprise inspections meant the effective endof UN monitoring of Iraq's weapons programs.[x] It was the US failure toreact to the Iraqi move, which Ritter (and many others) saw as in directcontravention of UN Security Council Resolution 687, which precipitated hisresignation. With these interests in mind, it is easy toexplain Russian behavior during the crises with Iraq in 1997 and 1998.[iv] In the fall of 1997, US weapons inspectors, in Iraq as part of the UNinspection team (UNSCOM), checking on Iraq's development of weapons of massdestruction, were prohibited by Iraq from carrying out their mission andleft the country, followed by the other UN inspectors. The very idea ofdispatching a UN envoy to Baghdad under these circumstances was a sign (toSaddam) that something was about to give. Also, by allowing the UN to negotiate on behalf of the United Statesin this manner, Clinton set a president that may come back to haunt futureUS Presidents. New York: Pantheon Books.Kay, David A. First,the Russian leadership sought to demonstrate to the world and to an oftenhostile Duma (Russia's parliament) that Russia remained an important actorin world affairs, one both willing and bale to oppose the United States.Second, Russia was seeking the repayment of $7 billion owed by Iraq to theformer Soviet Union, which could only occur after the lifting of sanctionson Iraq. (1998). In his November15 news conference, Clinton asserted that the "return of the inspectors, ifthey can operate in an unfettered way, is the best outcome, because theyhave been and remain the most effective tool to uncover, destroy, andprevent Iraq from rebuilding its weapons of mass destruction." However,Clinton had lost a crucial domestic and diplomatic situation, which wouldhave enabled him to launch a major military attacked against Iraq. But Clinton hadlittle choice but to accept what was on the table. More difficult, however, for the United States are the ensuingconflicts between American objectives and political expedience. By approving the trip to Baghdad of Secretary General Annan,Clinton lost control of the negotiating process. Yet, theClinton administration did little but pass the problem off to the listlessUN Security Council.[xxii] In effect, the Clinton administration put Iraq on the back burner andallowed itself to be distracted by interventions (motivated by humanitarianconcerns rather than vital strategic interests) - in strategic backwaterslike Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti. Kay (February 25, 1998), "Kofi Annan's Flawed Agreement," TheNew York Times:29.[xii] Amatzia Baram (1998), Building Toward Crisis: Saddam Husayn'sStrategy for Survival (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for NearEast Policy):56.[xiii] Patrick Clawson (1998), Iraq Strategy Review (Washington, DC: TheWashington Institute for Near East Policy):7 .[xiv] Sarah Graham-Brown (1999), Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics ofIntervention in Iraq (London and New York: I.B. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. (1998). For dual containment to be effective, the US had to be willing tosupport large US military forces in the Persian Gulf, and to have the willto use them if either Iran or Iraq got out of line - rather than use theone to check the other, as the US had done in the 197 s and 198 s.Furthermore, Iran and Iraq had to be kept isolated from countries in theirimmediate region and be prevented from receiving support from the outsideworld.[i] Iraq, which had long been a pariah in most of the Arab world becauseof its invasion of Kuwait in 199 , had, by 1997, acquired increased supportfrom Arab countries, such as Egypt and Syria, while enjoying support fromRussia, as far back as 1993.[ii] During his first term, Saddam Hussein had challenged Clinton on anumber of occasions. .I have ordered a strong sustained series of air strikes againstIraq. Withthe help of France, which was also pursuing lucrative arms and businessdeals in Iraq, Primakov put together an agreement under which the weaponsinspectors would be let back into Iraq in return for a vague promise aboutlifting the sanctions. On the other hand, it becomesvery clear that the Iraqi dictator had a very definite agenda - that ofprovocation and then retreat, which served to weaken the Clintonadministration, to undermine its influence, and to force US allies toquestion the very framework upon which the United States dealt with Iraq.In that regard, Iraq was certainly engaged in a focused strategy to weakenthe coalition against him and to win sympathy from other Arab states - aimsthat Iraq visibly won during the Clinton reign. While the US was subsequently to get a unanimous Security Councilcondemnation of the Iraqi leader's action (following Saddam's decision tointerfere with routine UNSCOM monitoring), along with a deferment of anydecision on lifting sanctions, Iraq was relatively free to engage in acrash program to rebuild weapons of mass destruction, although thecontinuation of sanctions appeared to limit Iraq's ability to do so. Yet, the Clinton administration did little except tolaunch symbolic pinprick air strikes against Iraqi air defense facilitiesin southern Iraq and extend the southern no-fly zone a few miles to thenorth. (199 ). This led US and Britain to mass forces in the Persian Gulfand conflict appeared imminent.[v] Several factors, however, prevented the outbreak of war. What wasat stake in the August 1996 crisis was not just the future of Iraq's Kurds,but also the ability of the United States and its allies to deter futureIraqi aggression. In thefirst place, Clinton was greatly strengthened by the US midterm elections,which were seen as a public repudiation of Republican attempts to impeachhim. The pressure onClinton to accept a way out was enormous. Thus, he wasalready in violation of UN resolutions. In the words of Clinton: "This iswhy . Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.Cockburn, Andrew. Indeed, the Arab Gulf coalition that had foughtagainst Iraq (Egypt, Syria, and the Gulf Cooperation Council), issued astrongly-worded warning to Iraq on November 12, stating: "Iraq must heed UNSecurity Council resolutions and abide by them to avoid militaryconfrontation . In his dealings with Iraq, Clinton miscalculated and was negligent,thus giving rise to a crisis that might have been avoidable. The standoff between Iraq and the United States resulted in Clinton'sfailure to obtain any satisfactory resolution of a crisis provoked bySaddam in October 1998, when he barred Americans from UNSCOM inspectionteams. London and New York: I.B. A third factor wasa clear lack of support from America's Arab allies, who appeared to respondto Saddam's portrayal of his people suffering. Theresult was not merely an agreement that was less than satisfactory; it wasalso a significant diminishment of US influence, independence and prestige.Annan's agreement showed that the UN could negotiate as an independentagent on behalf of a US administration, and that it could do so even todetriment of US interests and policy. Such a failure was clearlyapparent in the handling of Iraq by the administration of the formerPresident William Clinton. First,Clinton was now beset by the Lewinsky affair, which had just become publicand which eroded his political position. But the political situation in November 1998 was far different fromwhat it had been during the November 1997 and February 1998 crisis. Clinton chose to preserve a lowest-common-denominator consensus in the UN Security Council that stretched outthe crisis and dissipated any momentum for forcefully rebuffing Saddam'sprovocations. Even some Clinton administrationofficials were losing confidence in the military option. Second, domestic support for anattack on Iraq proved not as strong as the Clinton administration hadhoped. (1999). Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute.Makiya, Kanan. They are designed to degrade Saddam's capacity to develop and deliverweapons of mass destruction and to degrade his ability to threaten hisneighbors."[xv] Even before the US launched the attack, National Security AdviserSamuel Berger articulated the administration's strategy toward Iraq in aspeech at Stanford University on December 8, 1998. The difficulties facing US policyarise from three sources: The actions of other countries, the inherentconflicts between American objectives, and domestic disagreements over theproper ends and means of American foreign policy. Saddam's aim was to gut the UNSCOM inspection regime and eventuallysecure the lifting of UN economic sanctions, without surrendering hischerished weapons of mass destruction. But the Clinton administration was asleepat the switch and failed to act diplomatically to resolve the growingtensions between Kurdish factions that erupted in open warfare that summer.One of these factions, the Kurdish Democratic Party, in despair over itsfailure to receive significant material or diplomatic support fromWashington, went so far as to ally itself with Saddam, who had already thedeaths of thousands of Kurds. Following Ritter's resignation, Congressional Republicans heldhearings on what they called a reversal of US policy toward Iraq, with thenHouse Speaker Newt Gingrich saying that what was involved suggested a"secret shift from confrontation to appeasement" that was in directconflict with the government's public rhetoric. Once the issue was defined ascompliance, Saddam could decide when and under what circumstances to endthe crisis. (1984). Tauris):93.[xv] Graham-Brown (1999):95.[xvi] Graham-Brown (1999):97.[xvii] Andrew Cockburn (1999), Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of SaddamHusayn (New York: Harper Collins):1 2.[xviii] Cockburn (1999):1 7.[xix] Cockburn (1999):1 9.[xx] See for example, Judith Miller and Laurie Mylroie (199 ), SaddamHussein and the Crisis in the Gulf (New York: Random House):27ff.[xxi] Cockburn (1999):128.[xxii] See, for example, Ofra Bengio (1998), Saddam's Word: PoliticalDiscourse in Iraq (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press):74ff.[xxiii] Haselkorn (1999):99ff.[xxiv] Mylroie (2 ):1 5.[xxv] For more on Saddam's delaying tactics, see Anthony H. In fact, Clinton was not pleasedwith the fine print of the agreement brought back by Annan. Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Intervention in Iraq. BIBLIOGRAPHYBaram, Amatzia. As the Egyptian newspaper,Al-Ahram noted, despite US support for the "oil for food" agreement thatallowed Iraq to import substantial amounts of food and medicine, "theAmerican position toward Iraq cannot be described as anything but coercive,aggressive, unwise and uncaring about the lives of Iraqis, who areunnecessarily subject to sanctions and humiliations."[vi] Arab criticism ofthe US continued in February 1998, when Saudi Arabia announced it would notpermit the US to use bases on its soil to attack Iraq, reportedly becauseof the US "inability to push forward the quest for a broader peace betweenthe Arabs and Israelis."[vii] In the face of these constraints, as well as opposition from Russiaand France to a US military attack, Clinton chose a diplomatic way out ofthe impasse with the help of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, who extracteda promise from Saddam that the Iraqi leader would not interfere with UNSCOMinspections. This was a serious error.The United States (the country that would be the main enforcer of any UNagreement Annan reached) was reduced to waiting passively for word from aUN official on whether Americans would or would not have to go to war. ENDNOTES-----------------------[i] Christine Helms (1984), Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute): 25; Phebe Marr (1985), ModernHistory of Iraq (Boulder, CO: Westview Press): 79; and Oles Smolansky(1991): The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence (Durham, NC: DukeUniversity):95.[ii] Malik Mufti (1996), Sovereign Creations: Pan-Arabism and PoliticalOrder in Syria and Iraq (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press):47ff.[iii] Laurie Mylroie (2 ), Study of Revenge: Saddam Hussein's UnfinishedWar Against America (Washington, DC: American Enterprise InstitutePress):43ff.[iv] Kanan Makiya (1998), Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq(New York: Pantheon Press):77.[v] Mylroie (2 ):52.[vi] Avigdor Haselkorn (1999), The Continuing Storm: Iraq, PoisonousWeapons, and Deterrence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press):74.[vii] Haselkorn (1999):79.[viii] Mylroie (2 ):83.[ix] Mylroie (2 ):83.[x] Martin Sieff (February 24, 1998), "Allies get maneuvering room, butSaddam looks the winner," The Washington Times:A14.[xi] David A. (1996). (1999). Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq. The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence. United States defense officials estimated that between6 and 16 members of the Iraqi Republican Guard, a main prop of theIraqi government, had been killed in the US attack, which also targeted theheadquarters of Iraqi military intelligence, the special Republican Guard,and the special security organization, while leaving regular army unitsalone in the hope of encouraging a future coup from those units. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has pursued aconsensus foreign policy of global engagement aimed at providing a stableinternational security environment, while promoting free markets anddemocracy in the international community. When Iraq refused tochange its policy, the UNSCOM inspectors left Iraq, and Clinton again beganto mobilize US forces for a possible strike against the Iraqi leader. The Continuing Storm: Iraq, Poisonous Weapons, and Deterrence. This attack was a mere insignificantpunishment for such a brazen terrorist plot against a former US President.The limited size and symbolic nature of the US reprisal (24 missiles firedat an empty building in the middle of the night) did little to strengthenUS deterrence against Saddam's aggression.[xxi] Further, the Clinton administration responded feebly to other Iraqiprovocations. France,which had hitherto cooperated with the US in maintaining the "no-fly" zone,did not cooperate in the newly extended part of the zone. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Miller, Judith and Laurie Mylroie. The US threatenedmilitary action against Iraq and began to mobilize its forces. In conclusion, therefore, we see that the Clinton administration hadno clear goals in Iraq, and it merely pursued a policy that was reactionaryat best, in that it sought to appease the various demands, and underplaythe many provocations, of Saddam Hussein. Study of Revenge: Saddam Hussein's Unfinished War Against America. (1997). This failure has meant that Iraq, under itsleader, Saddam Hussein, deployed a strategy of focused engagement to weakenthe collation that had ejected him from Kuwait, with an eye to eliminatingUnited Nations (UN) sanctions. By turning over the negotiating process to Annan, Clinton showed verypoor political judgment. In other words, he played right into the hands ofSaddam. The lack of determined US leadership left a vacuum thatRussia and France sought to fill.[xxiv] Further, Clinton framed the entire Iraq issue merely as one ofcompliance with UN resolutions. Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam Husayn. Iraq Strategic Review. On February 18, 1998, Secretary of State Albright encountered ahostile reception during a town hall meeting at Ohio State University on USpolicy toward Iraq that was broadcast worldwide by CNN. Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond. Sovereign Creations: Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq. Third, Russian arms manufacturers and oil and gas companies soughtcontracts in Iraq, even though they cannot actually begin operations untilafter sanctions are lifted. The issue should have been how topunish Saddam for these transgressions and how to ensure the destruction ofhis weapons capability - not whether he should be allowed to establish newterms for the re-entry of UN inspectors. Because of these conflicts, foreign policy often fails in thatobjectives and political exigency are far apart. The agreement proved short-lived, however, and inJanuary 1998, Saddam backtracked on the agreement by prohibitinginspections of his "presidential palaces," which were suspected as weaponsdepositories. By making the entire goal of diplomacyIraqi compliance with UN resolutions, Clinton surrendered the initiative inthe crisis to Saddam, who had already broken his pledges to the UN byinterfering with inspectors and by refusing further access. This strategy becomes apparent when weexamine the events that took place before Operation Desert Fox. Bergeralso stated that the US now had an open-ended commitment to use militaryforce to block the rebuilding of Iraq's WMD capabilities and was preparedto devote resources to "practical and effective" efforts to build anopposition to Saddam.[xviii] To this end, on January 21, 1999, US Secretary of State Albrightappointed Frank Ricciardone as special representative to the oppositiongroups working to overthrow Saddam. (1991). The Iraqi government will be solely responsible forall repercussions resulting from its decision to block UNSCOM from carryingout its inspections."[xiii] The problem of Russian opposition, which had hampered US actionagainst Iraq in the previous crisis, had all but evaporated by November1998. Zinni also asserted that the 3 ship-launched cruise missiles wereparticularly effective, hitting more than 85 percent of their targets,while overall, 75 percent of the strikes were rated "fullysuccessful."[xvii] After the bombing campaign, Samuel Berger explained that there wereonly two possible outcomes to US policy toward Iraq: Total Iraqi compliancewith UN Security Council demands (which Berger felt were "unlikely"), orthe downfall of Saddam Hussein (which he said was "inevitable"). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Mylroie, Laurie. The causes of this debacle are deep-rooted, as we haveindicated above.[xx] Let us now turn to examine a few of these root causes. He noted that the USwould be working "step-by-step, in a practical way and effective way" toundermine and eventually oust Saddam Hussein, and Berger linked that goalwith a pledge "to use effective force if necessary." His statement wascoupled with incentives for people in the center of power in Baghdad tooverthrow Saddam, as he promised, "to ease economic sanctions: against anew Iraqi regime and also to "work to relieve Iraq's massive economicdebts."[xvi] In this light, the military attack itself, which lasted 7 hours, wasaimed not only at weakening Saddam's capacity to make weapons of massdestruction and threaten Iraq's neighbors, but also at weakening the verybasis of his regime. The agreement, however, was strongly criticized by Republicanleaders in Congress, such as Trent Lott, Jesse Helms, and John McCain, who,as Clinton weakened politically, became increasingly assertive spokesmen onUS foreign policy.[viii] On August 5, 1998, Saddam barred surprise UN inspections and said hewould only allow remote monitoring and repeat visits to known sites. (February 24, 1998). When Iraq launched a failed attempt to assassinate Bush Sr. Senate Majority LeaderTrent Lott and House International Relations Committee Chairman BenjaminGilman introduced legislation in September 1998 that would authorize theClinton administration to select one or more Iraqi opposition groups toreceive up to $97 million in US Defense Department equipment and militarytraining "to seek to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein in Iraq andpromote the emergence of a democratic government." While the Clintonadministration initially opposed the measure (though Clinton was later tosign it) because it limited its flexibility of action over Iraq, itappeared that the Congressional Republicans, unhappy with Clinton'shandling of Iraq, were offering an alternative policy.[xii] Fortunately for Clinton, Saddam again overreached himself. No matter how tough the US ambassador to the UN (Bill Richardson)may have been in outlining the limits of US policy, once Clinton endorsedAnnan's trip, he signaled his willingness for a compromise. administration's insistence that Saddam must be oustedbefore the United States would agree to lift the UN embargo on trade withIraq. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute Press.Sieff, Martin. Building Toward Crisis: Saddam Husayn's Strategy for Survival. (1985). However, General Zinni, testifying beforethe Senate Armed Forces Services Committee concluded that the process ofoverthrowing Saddam was "not going to be easy or short term effort."[xix] This entire process of dealing with Saddam served to fully highlightthe Clinton administration's utter failure to come to grips with Saddam'strue agenda - that of survival by all and any means. New York: Harper Collins.Cordesman, Anthony and Ahmed Hashim. Tauris.Haselkorn, Avigdor. Since 1991, Baghdad repeatedly blocked the efforts of UN armsinspectors to monitor compliance with Iraq's obligations to dismantle itsnuclear, chemical, biological, and long-range missile programs. "Allies get maneuvering room, but Saddam looks the winner." The Washington Times. A14.Smolansky, Oles. The US was less successful in August 1996, however, when Iraqitroops, in cooperation with the KDP (the Masud Barzani faction of theKurdish opposition), attacked the rival PUK faction of Jallal Talabani,which had been aided by Iran, and drove it from Irbil, thus severelydamaging US efforts to force a united opposition against the Iraqi regime.The US responded by expanding its "no-fly" zone in southern Iraq to the33rd parallel, and by bombarding Iraqi air defense installations. . If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.