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Paper Abstract: Discusses Otto von Bismark's political goals. German nationalism and Prussian hegemony over the German states. His brilliant statesmanship. His early ambitions and principles. His role as Prussia's minister president and minister of foreign affairs. Impact of his "iron and blood" speech. His domestic and external concerns. Difficulties of unification. Paper Introduction: Otto von Bismarck (1815-98) became Prussia's minister president and minister of foreign affairs in 1862. At the time he undoubtedly seemed like one of the last men who would preside over the unification of the German states--a goal associated with liberalism and nationalism but not with Junker aristocrats. But by 1871, due primarily to his diplomacy and his overwhelming pragmatism, this is what had happened. The "Iron Chancellor" was, however, famously difficult to read and it has long been debated whether he had any interest in German nationalism or if the entire effort simply disguised the desire for Prussian hegemony over the German states. Bismarck managed to cut off the Austrian rulers' hopes for leadership of a unified Great Germany and ensured that a "Bismarckian (Prusso-Little German) version of unification" won out (Hobsbawm 273). Did Bismarck have a grand Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. As one scholarsummarized it, the new minister president felt called upon "to challengethe status quo in central Europe, if necessary at the price of war with theHapsburg Empire and its friends in the Bund; to create a nation-state underthe Hohenzollerns [and] to prepare for all eventualities by strengtheningthe Army" (Gooch 28 ). But, as Kollander notes, there is much evidence to showthat Bismarck "did not regard the completion of the unification project asinevitable" (171). In 1862 Bismarck was a man filled with enormous ambition, immenseskills that had barely been tested, and a devotion to principles thathardly seemed likely to produce a unified German state. He had warned the Diet that he wouldmake war even without its consent and used loopholes in the law to obtainthe necessary revenues for Roon's improvements to the army. P. Austria's involvement in the war served to allay the fears ofRussia and France regarding Bismarck's intentions as far as the smallerGerman states were concerned. The earlier versionof the Reich was also meant to reassure the rest of Europe about the greatpower a new Germany would have and to encourage the unifying trend tocontinue. The unification tookplace, however, under Prussian leadership. P. In 1862 Bismarck had a clear sense of his mission. Austria presented a more complex problem since Bismarck may haveassumed that a war with that empire was all but inevitable. He possessed neither political nor moral inhibitionsand "talked with equal scorn of the 'nationality swindle' of the liberalsand the 'sovereignty swindle' of the rulers of the smaller states" (Joll511). Bismarck did not, it seems, believe that any particular party, otherthan the King, could thwart his plans completely. butby iron and blood" (quoted in Hollyday 18). London: Longmans, Green, 1954.Hobsbawm, Eric. Petersburg as a diplomatand his well-known conservatism, "had already made him a figure trusted bythe Russian government" (Joll 513). . Prussian dominance was ensured by the form taken by unificationbut, perhaps just as important to the always ambitious Bismarck, it wasalso a system in which the Chancellor himself was practicallyindispensable. Bismarck understood, as few of his aristocraticallies seemed to, that the bourgeois liberals "could not be conquered byrepression"--that merely seemed like a road to revolution--and he felt thatin the parliament their "ideological errors and the political futility ofmodern democracy" could be exposed by word and deed (Holborn 162). A morelikely interpretation of the speech is offered by Crankshaw who holds thatBismarck probably had no more "specific or distant aim than reducingAustria's pretensions to the leadership of Germany, and setting up somesort of a North German union dominated by Prussia" (134). The events of 1848 had certainly shown, for example, thatthe bourgeoisie "were as afraid of the masses as the aristocracy" and hespeculated that this could be used to frighten them into acquiescence fromtime to time (Feuchtwanger 17). From this point Bismarck had decided that the unification of Germanyshould proceed. M. Indeed, asCrankshaw says, Bismarck "pretended so many things on so very manyoccasions" that it is unlikely that fully satisfactory answers exist at all(134). Therefore Bismarck devised extremelyclever strategies to undermine Austria. But by 1871, due primarily to his diplomacy andhis overwhelming pragmatism, this is what had happened. This was both astrength and a weakness--as he discovered when dealing with such entitiesas the Catholic party in later years. He immediatelyevoked the opposition between Prussia and Austria and, for the smallerGerman states, the appeal inherent in this early strategy was primarily theopportunity to escape Austrian domination. But he realized that itwas necessary to keep an array of options open. The power of Prussia would notbe as likely to threaten these states because their interests and those ofPrussia were much closer. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 197 . This action, combined with his time in St. He wasunsympathetic to the rising bourgeois element in society that spawned somuch liberal thought and his "affinities lay with the existing socialsystem, with rural Prussia ruled by the king and administered by the noblesand the upper middle class" (Hollyday 2). "Practitioner of Realpolitik." Bismarck. The Liberals in thePrussian parliament, as well as those in other countries, were shocked bythis arrangement and it made them "more hostile to Bismarck and hispolicies than ever" (Joll 513). In early 1863 a revolt in Polandprovided Bismarck with a fine opportunity to make himself even more usefulto the Russians. The increased power of the Prussian state wouldalso, Bismarck argued, serve the rest of the German states. By means of his superb diplomacy and the power of thePrussian army and "against all odds and in defiance of the spirit of theage, a semi-authoritarian system was perpetuated and foisted upon the wholeof Germany" and Bismarck was "the only man who could master the system"(Feuchtwanger 17). New York: G. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1984. Among the difficulties were the overwhelming hostilityof France toward the project and the unpredictability of some of theparticularist rulers in the South. Ed. If thiswas the case, it certainly backfired since liberals, nationalists, andparticularists (holders of states' rights views) were outraged by theimplication that Bismarck would apply force to achieve this end. He believed that Austria's designson Great German leadership had to be contained and the empire renderedineffective as a rival. Some scholars have argued that Bismarck "meant to say that if Prussiawas to fulfill her role in leading Germany towards greater unity" thiscould not be done without a more efficient army (Feuchtwanger 16). 1 : The Zenith of European Power, 183 -7 . But he sawvery clearly that, on the one hand, it afforded conservatives just as muchof a platform for their views as it did the liberals and if the need aroseto oppose the King the conservatives could use this forum. On the otherhand, he valued the parliament because it was an arena in which he couldbattle with the liberals. "Prussia and the German Problem, 183 -66." The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. The speech was only recorded through a combination ofparaphrase and quotation by a journalist, but Bismarck said, roughly, that"Germany does not look to Prussia's liberalism, but to its power; Bavaria,Württemberg, and Baden may indulge in liberalism; no one will assign themPrussia's role because of that" (quoted in Hollyday 17-8). In dealingwith Austria his fellow conservatives understood the threat inherent in astrong empire. First he persuaded William torefuse to participate in the Frankfurt Congress of the German states whereAustria took the lead while everyone realized that it was still impossibleto take any important steps without the participation of the Prussian king. Inaddition, of course, Bismarck assumed that there was a strong possibilitythat the liberals could be won over to support his positions in a number ofdifferent ways. The clearest glimpse that might be available fromthis period of his life is recorded in the diary of a Prussian diplomat,Kurt von Schlözer, who dined alone with Bismarck the evening after his'iron and blood' meeting with William I. Thus in his famous "iron and blood" speech(later changed to the more euphonious 'blood and iron'), which he madealmost immediately upon assuming his new office, Bismarck included anappeal to this idea. The many ways in which this speech has been interpreted point up thegreat difficulty of knowing exactly what Bismarck intended. And if "within eight years of making thatspeech he has personally manoeuvred his country into three brilliantlysuccessful wars" it seems fair to say in retrospect that the probability ofwar and the increase in Prussian power "was in the forefront of his mindfrom the beginning" (133). "Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 187 -1914." The Invention of Tradition. That is to say,since Bismarck was ideologically opposed to certain measures--such asuniversal male suffrage in a unified Germany--and since his control overmost German military and political matters was quite tight, the fact thatuniversal suffrage, for example, was instituted meant that it served apurpose of his own (either a reason of state or a personal reason). The King, Bismarck said, couldsee the end "out there in the Opernplatz under my windows they will cut offyour head and soon afterwards mine" (quoted in Crankshaw 135). In his memoirs Bismarck said that the King protested that hewould provoke a revolution with such words. But they were also "legitimists, believing in the divineright of monarchs to rule, whether they were Prussian, Austrian, or minorGerman princes" (Feuchtwanger 17). . 493-511.Kollander, Patricia. 263-3 7.Holborn, Hajo. He also had to remain alertto the possibility of French intervention, since no other nation was sodeeply concerned with the possibility of a united German state, and a warbetween Prussia and Austria would provide an excuse for the French tobecome involved. At the time he undoubtedly seemedlike one of the last men who would preside over the unification of theGerman states--a goal associated with liberalism and nationalism but notwith Junker aristocrats. And, as a necessary corollary of this and all ofhis Prussian plans, he knew that Russia had to be placated at all times.The fear that either empire would interfere if conflict was necessary--andespecially that Russia would interfere in the coming struggle with Austria--made this one of Bismarck's principal goals. This,for example, is what Crankshaw does in assessing the meaning behind theiron and blood speech. Bismarck managed to cut off the Austrian rulers' hopes forleadership of a unified Great Germany and ensured that a "Bismarckian(Prusso-Little German) version of unification" won out (Hobsbawm 273). In any event, Bismarck was quite scornfulof ideology and "skeptical of all idealism" so that he assumed anyone couldbe manipulated for his own ends (Feuchtwanger 17). To other conservativesBismarck's willingness to work with the parliament--so long as they did notblock important plans such as Roon's reforms--was a mystery. This practically forced theKing to appoint Bismarck, whom he mistrusted, since he was clearly "theonly man with the strength of character and political skill to governwithout the parliamentary support required by the constitution" (Joll 511). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- Hall, 197 .Joll, James. Putnam's Sons, 1965. While Bismarck undoubtedly had a general plan of action--and some important goals--in mind it does not seem that the unification ofthe German states was one of these goals. His foreign policy from this period makes it appearthat he believed that external opposition to the increase in Prussian powerhad to be carefully controlled first. Thus--despite his avid devotion to Prussia, its kings, and thestatus quo--Bismarck pursued a course that often alienated otherconservative Prussians who were hard-pressed to see the value of giving into apparently liberal notions relating to the state. He then used Austrian cooperation in the war against Denmark (over thepossession of Schleswig-Holstein) to bring about the end of the empire'sinfluence in northern Germany and, simultaneously, acquire theseterritories. An accord was signed with the Tsar in which Prussia notonly promised to exchange information about the Polish situation withRussia but promised armed assistance, if it was needed, and granted Russiathe right to pursue fugitives into Prussian territory. Bismarck boasted that he wouldbring the King around to his way of thinking and then explained that, aftermaking common cause with the King, [he was] making all the parties believe that he was really one of them: to the Upper Chamber he presented himself as a reactionary so black, he declared, that the reactionaries themselves were horrified at the lengths he pretended he was prepared to go; to the Lower House he showed himself now very rigid, now as a man honestly in search of compromise; while, to the German states he put it about that the king had the utmost difficulty in restraining his "Cavourism" (quoted in Crankshaw 135). But even if this was the case the speech was nearly a disaster forBismarck since it not only outraged the liberals it also seriously alarmedKing William. This was also the first explanation he had offered to theking and when it was not accepted he devised the more convincing (toWilliam) alternative. Hollyday. As he says, when a prime minister makes militarypower the subject of his second speech in office and connects it with theinjustice of the treaty governing his country's borders there is no reasonnot to take him seriously. 16 -63.Hollyday, Frederic B. But Bismarck's domestic strategy in pursuingthis war was just as significant.. T. When thatmoment came Prussia would set aside the debilitating terms of the treatiesof Vienna and move toward "a healthy state life" and the great questions ofthe day would be decided not by "speeches and majority decisions . This happened first with theNorth German Federation in 1867 and finally (after the North and theSouthern states combined to win the Franco-German War) with theproclamation of the Prussian king as emperor of most of modern Germany andthe establishment of the German Constitution in 1871. Bismarck. Ed. Frederic B. Bismarck. Bismarck. "Bismarck, Prussia & German Nationalism." History Review no. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger. M. In his management of the controversyBismarck treated it as a project that "afforded him not one choice butmany" and so, like many of his undertakings, the Hohenzollern candidacy"was risky, but at the same time it enabled the chancellor to do what hedid best--it enabled him to keep his options in the coming Franco-Prussianshowdown open" (Kollander 183). (ed.). This made himextremely unpopular, but the victory over Denmark was a success for Prussiaand it greatly "strengthened the feeling that national unity under Prussianleadership was the only possible solution" of Germany's problems (515).This feeling was confirmed with the defeat of Austria in the next of the"wars of unification," as they have been called, and the foundation of theNorth German Federation (Gooch 28 ). Bury. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1971. As regentWilliam I had appointed General von Roon, an ally of Bismarck's, as warminister and his recommendations for improving the army, aside from beingvery expensive, also included placing the Reserve Army (Landwehr), an upper-middle-class preserve, under the army's control. The "IronChancellor" was, however, famously difficult to read and it has long beendebated whether he had any interest in German nationalism or if the entireeffort simply disguised the desire for Prussian hegemony over the Germanstates. Trans. But the explanation Bismarck offered in his memoirs was that with'iron and blood' he had simply been referring to the need for more guns andmore soldiers. 39 (2 1): 14-19.Gooch, G. Part of the difficulty derives from the nature of Bismarck'spersonality and methods. Not surprisingly, therefore, this new state was nothing like theGermany envisioned by liberals and nationalists. There are those historians who accept thisexplanation. In order to ensure Russian neutrality Bismarck took measures such asthe trade-off implied in his promotion of neutrality during the CrimeanWar. New York: Viking, 1981.Feuchtwanger, Edgar. DidBismarck have a grand strategy in mind in the 186 s for such a newpolitical order? Instead, and this is certainlythe mark of Bismarck's brilliant statesmanship, it appears that as thedecade progressed this objective simply emerged as the single mostpromising solution to the difficulties he faced in achieving goals thatmight have been served by other means but not, as he came to see, quite sowell as they were served by unification. Bismarckmet William, who was hurrying back to Berlin, and persuaded him (again,according to Bismarck's account) that there was no better way to die thanin "fighting for the cause of my king and Your Majesty, in sealing yourroyal prerogative by the Grace of God with your own blood" (quoted inCrankshaw 135). In his ruthlessness Bismarck was unmoved by almost any considerationsother than his own goals and interests which were, more or less, those ofthe state he served. When one adviser offered the opinionthat unification could only be completed by violent measures against theSouth, however, Bismarck said that while he agreed that violence would benecessary, the more pertinent question had to do with "the precipitation ofa powerful catastrophe and the responsibility of choosing the time for it"(Kollander 172). This was a serioussetback both to "the liberal ideal of a nation in arms and to the membersof the middle class whose highest social ambition was to become officers inthe Reserve" (Joll 5 9). Brian Battershaw. The question can best be judged, it seems, by comparing the resultswith what is known of Bismarck's personal inclinations. Works CitedCrankshaw, Edward. One of his biographers, for instance, argued that the"somewhat unfortunate" speech was merely the result, "in a thoughtlessmoment [of] relap[sing] into his old and careless way of speaking" and,quite unfairly, this "slip of the tongue [was] to adhere to his name likepitch" (Richter 88). Catherine the Great and Other Studies. Ed. Because it was Bismarck'snotion of the merging of German territory that dominated the process the1867 constitution (essentially the same constitution was adopted in 1871 aswell) was "framed to maintain the monarchy, the army, and the existingsystem and to win over liberal opinion" (Hollyday 4). Otto von Bismarck (1815-98) became Prussia's minister president andminister of foreign affairs in 1862. In the early 186 s Bismarck's external concerns were more importantthan domestic matters or even the increase in Prussian power within thefuture federation. Bismarck was called to officespecifically in order to strengthen the position of the Prussian king bydefeating the liberals' attempts to exert control over the army. J. Prussian powermust be, he argued, patiently husbanded for the right moment. P. "Bismarck, Crown Prince Frederick William, and the Hohenzollern Candidacy Revisited." European Review of History 3.2 (1996): 171-85.Richter, Werner. Whether, as in the early 186 s, Germanunification was merely one of many possibilities or, as in 1868, it was thepreferred solution, Bismarck was consistent in allowing situations todevelop until he was certain which action would meet his goals of a greaterPrussia and a great Bismarck. Bismarck's strategy consisted of supporting theHohenzollern candidacy for the Spanish throne--a matter that, even thoughSpain itself was a minor power at the time, aroused French fears of Germanattempts to dominate all of Europe--and allowing the crisis to develop whenhe felt that most of the population of the future unified Reich wereprepared to pursue war with France. Following William's succession to the throne theProgressive party was repeatedly very successful in parliamentary electionsand the Diet had a majority determined to refuse approval of the budgetaryrequest needed to fund Roon's reform plans. If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.