THE GERMAN NAVY.   Term Paper ID:29808 Click to get this paper

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Paper Abstract: Sea power in World War I and World War II. Germany as primarily a land power. Compares with British dependency on its fleet. German U-boats; commerce raiding and warfare. Development of German pocket battleships and heavy cruisers. Errors on Hitler's part re: German naval power. Lack of concern for sea power. His strategic mistakes. Paper Introduction: STYMIED BY THE SEA Hitler and the German Navy in World War II In order to understand the German naval problem of World War II, it is useful to briefly examine the naval experience of World War I from the German perspective. Before that war, Germany had built a powerful fleet of battleships, the Hochseeflotte or High Seas Fleet. It was described as a "risk fleet." The strategic concept behind it was that Germany, primarily a land power, could ultimately take risks with its battlefleet that maritime dependent Britain could not. In principle, Germany could lose the fleet and still win the war. In contrast, a major loss of the Royal Navy would force Britain to sue for peace. In a war, moreover, Britain was certain to blockade German ports, as it had blockaded France's ports in the Napoleonic Wars. The British fleet woul Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. Commerce-raiding, in turn, divided into two potentially complementary options. The resources that went into these under-utilizedships would easily have paid for a large fleet of U-boats. U-boats could not safely follow the conventions of merchantraiding, warning civilian ships before attacking. In allowing Hermann Goering to assumethe role of courtier rather than military subordinate, Hitler ceded theshaping of German air power to Goering's prejudices. AdmiralDoenitz estimated he would need at least 1 would be required to fullycarry out an Atlantic commerce war (Hoyt, 1984, p. Meanwhile, as the war dragged on, the Germans were forced toimprovise. In spite of German industrial might it could never hope tooutbuild an equally mighty Britain, not when Germany required a verypowerful army as well, while Britain did not. The ships were as heavily armored as many battleships, as fastas the aging British battlecruisers, and again had very long cruisingrange. Nevertheless, it greatly increased the potential of thesubmarine. Infact, however, they were full-size battlecruisers. STYMIED BY THE SEA Hitler and the German Navy in World War II In order to understand the German naval problem of World War II, itis useful to briefly examine the naval experience of World War I from theGerman perspective. This failure, inturn, contributed greatly to the ultimate defeat of Hitler and of Germany. Any smaller fleet, no matterhow powerful its individual ships, could not by itself expect to defeat theRoyal Navy in a Jutland-like battle. Germany, however,suffered this common problem in particularly acute form. The British lost threebattlecruisers - fast but inadequately protected cousins of thebattleships. Hermann Goering,in addition to being the chief of the Luftwaffe, was one of Hitler's mostpowerful and influential courtiers -- and was utterly indifferent to navalaviation and to sea power in general. The strategicconception of these surface raiders was that the intermediate-size raiderswould compel the British to provide battleship escorts to convoys, insteadof concentrating the battleships as in the Grand Fleet of the previous war. As a result of these poor decisions, the German Navy -- in spite ofthe excellent quality of its ships and men -- never fully lived up to itspotential as an instrument of national war strategy. The submarine of World War II wasessentially an improved version of those used in World War I. Themore obvious one was the U-boat. The loss of Bismarck, even after sinking the long-time prideof the Royal Navy, HMS Hood, reawakened the same risk aversion that hadlimited the German "risk fleet" of World War I. Germany wouldeventually build many more than that, but it began in 1939 with only 57 inservice (Martienssen, 1949, p. New York: Doubleday, 1973.Hoyt, Edwin P. They discovered that submarines -- U-boats -- were extremelypotent commerce raiders. The responsibilityfor this failure can only be attributed to Hitler. D. But if the risks of U-boat warfare were to be accepted, the logical course was to engage in itwith full vigor. In a war, moreover, Britain was certain to blockade German ports, asit had blockaded France's ports in the Napoleonic Wars. Avoiding U-boat warfare wouldmake sense only as a response to the diplomatic consequences it had had inthe previous war. The Z Plan called for some 25 U-boats. The other German innovation, however, was the schnorkel, whichdrew in air from the surface and permitted the U-boat's diesel engines tooperate underwater (Puleston, 197 , p. U-boats, however, were the first "stealth" weapon. In the event this did not drive the United States toward war; theworld of 1939 was a harsher place than in 1915-1917. The Germans, in fact, discovered that their "riskfleet" could not so easily be risked. In principle, Germany could lose the fleetand still win the war. U-boats were cheap, and could have been provided in largenumbers with no major strain on German industry. These were not quite the super-ships of popular imagination.In particular, their protective armor, though very heavy, was arranged inan outdated fashion, and did not provide as much protection against theheaviest enemy shells as it might have. The pocket battleships had been built to meet treaty restrictions,but the same new naval treaty with Britain that permitted U-boats alsoremoved the Versailles limits. U-boatwarfare, however, also exacted a heavy and ultimately decisive diplomaticprice. Finally, it may be argued that Hitler erred in building the Bismarckand Tirpitz. This was a fatal defect in a war leader whosepolicies were bound to bring him into conflict with a great sea power suchas Britain. Hitler was also fascinated by secret weapons such as the V-1 and V-2. It was described as a"risk fleet." The strategic concept behind it was that Germany, primarilya land power, could ultimately take risks with its battlefleet thatmaritime-dependent Britain could not. Unrestricted U-boatwarfare was authorized from the outset, and the liner Athenia was sunkwithin hours of the outbreak of war. These battleship escorts would thus be subject to attack by the mostpowerful German ships, operating as a strike force (Hughes and Costello,1977, p. 293ff). He was (sometimes) fascinatedby enormous battleships for their prestige value, but had no focusedconception of their use. This was a major factor inwithdrawing Scharnhorst and Gneisenau from Brest, and generally indiverting the German Navy from offensive Atlantic operations into adefenseive crouch along the Norwegian coast (Martienssen, 1949, p. This failure is unaccountable. Hitler was not willing totake chances with ships in which so much national symbolism was invested.After the loss of Bismarck, Tirpitz spent the rest of her war slipping fromone Norwegian fjord to another, never exposed to risk -- and never able toperform her mission. In 1942, a few small-scale British commando raids into Norway led Hitler into an obsession witha theory that the Allies were planning an invasion of Norway, upon whichSweden would enter the war on the Allied side. In fact, allsubmarines of the time were "submersibles," not true undersea craft (Vander Porten, 1969, p. Battleships and Battle Cruisers: 19 5-197 . Now, however, theGerman Navy considered the possibilities of fast, powerful ships with longrange, designed specifically for commerce raiding. A third error on Hitler's part was to fail to exploit the potentialof naval air power, whether land-based or sea-based. The German Navy in World War II. Building another HighSeas Fleet to match the British battle fleet ship for ship was neverconsidered. In 1937, Hitler told hisadmirals to prepare for an outbreak of war by 1945, and the so-called Z-plan was scheduled with this in view (Martienssen, 1949, p. This approach was implementedin the Type XXI U-boat design (Hoyt, 1984, p. Only a handful entered servicenear the end of the war, far too little and too late have any importantimpact (Hoyt, 1984, p. The German navyalso had its own secret weapon projects. He could not know in advance when British and French patience wouldbe pushed to the breaking point, but in general his policy carried theimplication of war sooner rather than later. It couldoperate underwater only on electric batteries with very limited power.This meant low speed and underwater limited duration. (The German term means simply "armored ship.")These had been built under the Versailles Treaty restrictions, albeit withsome cheating on displacement. 214). Thus, the only German aircraft carrier, the Graf Zeppelin sufferedfrom low priority and repeated delays, and in fact was never completed.The potential of projecting German tactical airpower into the Atlantic,both to attack Allied ships and to protect surface raiders and U-boatsagainst Allied air attack, went unrealized. The Germans had not attempted a repeat of his exploit in the earlierwar, in part because their own battlecruisers, while fast and powerful,were built for short-range operations in the North Sea. The sinking of the ocean liner Lusitania in 1915 caused an uproar inthe United States. 2). The Battle of the Atlantic. A second error on Hitler's part was to fail to permit Doenitz tobuild enough U-boats. The German shipsproved very resilient and hard to sink -- a persisting quality of Germanships -- and only one capital ship was lost. The German naval staff shouldhave been advised as early as possible to anticipate war in the relativelynear future, perhaps by 194 , and to plan developments accordingly. 21 ). This permitted remarkableunderwater speed, but still only limited duration. In 1917 the United States entered thewar against Germany, giving the flagging Allies a new surge of strengththat finally wore Germany down to defeat. German surface raiders that ran the blockadecould be hunted down by the larger British fleet, as had happened early inthe war. Thegeography of the North Sea allowed Britain to employ "distant blockade."The Grand Fleet made frequent sweeps in the North Sea, but did not sit infront of German ports, constantly vulnerable to attack. Bythe late 193 s, aircraft range had grown to the point where aircraft basedin Germany (and after 194 in occupied France) could potentially range farout into the Atlantic, bombing Allied shipping and providing vitalintelligence to U-boats and surface raiders. One was a submarinepowered underwater by hydrogen peroxide. British strategy was the mirror image of Germanstrategy. Since World War I, airpower enthusiasts everywheresaw airpower as the primary force in its own right, defeating the enemy byshattering either his army, as the Luftwaffe intended with attack aircraftlike the Stuka, or his industry and cities, as the British RAF intended. 1 ). 1 ). It was an important warning for the future. New York: Thomas Y. Thus, consideration was given to thepotential of surface raiders. Like other navies' heavy cruisers these mounted 8" guns,but they were much larger than their listed 1 , ton displacement, theextra size and weight going largely to superior protection. The U-Boat War. Only in the US and Japan, where naval aviation was under navalcommand, was full attention paid to the potential of naval airpower. Other decisions -- such as the total failure to develop thepotential of naval air power -- were not made by Hitler himself, butstemmed from his overall judgment. It did not interest Hitler as the V-weapons did, however. (These losses, long attributed to their weak armor, may infact have been due to poor ammunition and handling procedures.) The Germans claimed "Skaggerak," as they called Jutland, as avictory. Hitler and His Admirals. Direct attack on British commerce played no important role in thisplan. 35). 299ff). Early in World War I, a German raidingcruiser squadron under Graf von Spee had carried out a spectacularlysuccessful cruise, raiding British commerce from the Indian Ocean to theAtlantic. 12 ). However, as durable as the German ships were, they had taken aterrible pounding. The potential of land-based naval aviation was likewise ignored. The British fleetwould thus be constantly at sea, exposed to attack by mines and submarines(then regarded as a coast defense weapon, not a commerce raider), as wellas the High Seas Fleet, while the Germans could choose the time and placeof attack, otherwise staying safe in port. 15). The latter was a technological marvel, the ancestor of both American andSoviet space rockets, but had no major impact on the war. This infact happened when Germany signed a naval treaty with Britain in 1938. The only German aircraft usedwidely in this role was the Condor, a modified airliner design. Such was the experience, and implied lessons, that German navalplanning absorbed in the years before World War II. In addition to these the German navy had powerful heavy cruisers ofthe Hipper class. New York: Arbor House.Hughes, Terry; and Costello, John (1977). Crowell.----------------------- 12 Had Hitler's attentions been directed entirely to the east,against the Soviet Union, his lack of concern for sea power might not havebeen crippling. It wasgreatly feared by British seamen, indicating what a more potent long-rangemaritime patrol bomber might have achieved. Nevertheless they were formidableships, fast and powerful, and both proved extremely difficult to sink. 14). 165). ReferencesBreyer, Siegfried (1973). Alfred Kurti, trans. It isno surprise that both had modern and powerful carrier aircraft, while evenBritain was still using biplanes on its carriers. Thus theplan was very far from ready when war actually broke out in 1939. But in planning conquests, such as of France, that wouldinevitably make Britain an active enemy, Hitler committed Germany to amaritime war, the requirements of which he never grasped. Their guns were lighterthan the 14" to 16" caliber of typical battleship guns, but were verypowerful. It was effectively afalse lead. Westport, CN: Greenwood Press. Superficially theseresembled larger pocket battleships, with nine 11" guns instead of six. (1969). New York: Dial Press.Martienssen, Anthony (1949). Commerce raiding had been denigrated by the seapower doctrine ofAlfred Thayer Mahan. Freed of this limit, Hitler cancelled thelast two pocket battleships, and instead built the battlecruisersScharnhorst and Gneisenau (Breyer, 1973, pp. With guns more powerful than any cruiser,they were faster than any existing battleship, and used diesel engines forvery long cruising range of 21,5 miles (Van der Porten, 1969, p. Effortexpended on planning for giant ships that could not be ready in wartime waseffort doubly wasted, when the same effort could have been put into forcesthat would be available when needed. When at last a major fleet battle took place, off Jutland in 1916,the results were ambiguous (Puleston, 197 , p. U-boat warfare, however, had political risks -- it might draw theUnited States into another war. The British were thus given preciousbreathing room to build up their own antisubmarine escort forces inresponse. In general, Hitler emerges as having no comprehension of thestrategic role or importance of sea power. The Influence of Sea Power in World War II. Misdirected effort continued through the war. The schnorkel did not make the diesel submarine an equivalent to anuclear submarine, since it could be spotted from the surface or air by asharp lookout. In the event, the war did not work out as either side expected. "Unrestricted" U-boat warfare was temporarily halted,then resumed as the war dragged on. The major fleetbattle that both sides expected in the first weeks of the war did not takeplace. This was common amongair forces at the time. (Original publication 1947).Van der Porten, Edward P. That left the option of commerce raiding, which had proven soeffective -- in fact, nearly successful -- in the previous war. Once the British battle fleet, the Grand Fleet, wasdefeated, Britain could be blockaded and its commerce cut off entirely,bringing it to its knees. 5).Only a handful of British battlecruisers could catch them. German research developed two alternatives. Itwas not ready in 1943, as originally planned, when it could have had amajor impact on the Battle of the Atlantic. The Versailles Treaty had forbiddenGermany to possess submarines, but between the wars, Admiral Karl Doenitzused S-boats, small, fast surface torpedo boats, to practice possible new U-boat tactics in case U-boat construction was allowed to resume. His ships destroyed a British cruiser squadron, only to be sunkin turn by much more powerful British battlecruisers off the FalklandIslands in early 1915. The huge battleships had become apowerful symbol of pride and power; losing large numbers in battle would beunbearable. (1984). In contrast, a major loss of the Royal Navy wouldforce Britain to sue for peace. Even more and larger ships were planned. This wasthe first obvious strategic error on Hitler's part. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were followed in turn by two even largerbattleships, Bismarck and Tirpitz, each with eight 15" guns (Breyer, 1973,pp. Hitler, however, did not avoid it. The U-boats nearly achieved what the High Seas Fleet could not,pushing Britain close to its limits (Puleston, 197 , p. 12). The prototypes of these were the famous "panzerschiffe," better knownas pocket battleships. The Grand Fleet would blockade Germany, bottling up both theGerman Navy and German commerce in port. New York: Dutton.Puleston, W. Before that war, Germany had built a powerful fleet ofbattleships, the Hochseeflotte or High Seas Fleet. (197 ). It is not simply thathe was ultimately responsible for all German policy, but that he madenumerous decisions, as outlined above, that contributed specifically tofailure. They slippedthrough the blockade easily, and were elusive and difficult to attack. If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.