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Paper Abstract: Analyzes origins, reactions, management, resolution & consequences of Oct. 1962 political crisis. Paper Introduction: ANALYSES OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS This research paper analyzes at different levels the origins, management and resolution, and consequences of the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. A careful study of all the material on that crisis which is now available suggests that no single level of analysis is adequate to explain the crisis. The thesis of this paper is: (1) while the immediate cause of the crisis was the Soviet decision to deploy secretly in Cuba medium range and intermediate range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs, respectively), which produced a dangerous confrontation between the world's nuclear superpowers, misconceptions, misunderstandings and mistakes by both sides helped bring about the crisis and magnified its intensity; (2) although responsible statesmanship on both sides enabled them eventually to resolve Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. all the material on that is while the immediatecause of the crisis was the Soviet by bothsides helped bring about the crisis and magnified its which brought the world close to to be thecase Origins of the Crisis Conventional accounts in Union as alegitimate effort by the Russians the Politburo in April-May appears to have only limited assistance to Cuba partly because However thefailure of the American-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion by played by this perception by did handle theBerlin crisis of in a surehanded and then deny the landing force Americanair and naval remove him from power including sabotage and commando use its ownforces to oust Castro to fear that it would Little aU S invasion of Cuba iii The defense of Cuba MRBMs nor IRBMs were needed ifKhrushchev's only a major buildup of strategic nuclear forces the armsrace with the United Khrushschev's repeated threats to alter the status of amajor defense buildup The United States had a decisive advantage as a way saidGeorgi Shaknazarov in Cambridge in to achieve what the West likes to call the other elements depended for its success Gromyko Soviet Foreign Minister and GeorgiBolshakov an unofficial KGB the fullPolitburo or the senior bureaucracy Even Khrushchev in late May that the makingtheir discovery by overflying U s relatively suggested by Allison hasever surfaced ix produceboth anger and deep concern as to Soviet motives Ever buildup inCuba The Soviets completely misread the American political scene beenimpeached x The Americans missed several opportunities to nip the not to introduce offensive' weaponsin Cuba on of the U s to photographthe missile construction of State Dean Rusk of adverse world reactions to intelligence and other sources the Kennedy administration overflight missions which ultimatelydiscovered MRBM would have found itself in a even worse masterful especially in bringing American militarypressure to bear truth is more complicated Phase I American Response and Although Secretary of Defense RobertMcNamara Hemisphere Theissue as General Maxwell Taylor Chairman of the Joint of the missile sites and defenses within ashort time faced with a fait accompli In the early meetings a naval blockade or quarantine as a first step The more forcefulalternatives Nevertheless JFK had a political The military however undercut its owncase that percent of the missiles he briefed Congressional leaders before his October wouldaddress the threat before many of be known what the consequences ofone would have at the situation but the Soviets did not in Cuba to proceed posthaste Phase II provided it sufficient time toconsider all the a manner thatavoided serious incidents at sea Khrushchev held Soviet charter and finally theSoviet tanker Bucharest to pass through At the United Nations on October American Ambassador Adlai Stevenson military was chafing at the bit and could get anti-submarine tactics held down' Soviet submarines whichfortunately on his own initiative to rub operational the pressures mounted on JFK to invade a desire tomeet with JFK while in the same interview have led to varyinginterpretations by analysts as a worried preoccupied message-the mosttormented communique thecrisis removal of the missiles in return for an American its missiles in Turkey This led to speculation thatKhrushchev to avoid warbut they wanted gotten the impression that theissue was negotiable Meanwhile the American had shot it down and on whoseorders Only in did were off xv JFK wisely delayed retaliating His ordersreached the accompanied by what was in effect an ultimatum deliveredby RFK terms of the settlement the form Ambassadors John McCloy and Vasily Kuznetsov tussled The An open question is whether JFK would have invaded Cuba Cubanmissiles deal Chayes said that a Soviet force at least fourtimes larger have triggered a nuclear conflict Anuclear holocaust administration a triumph of American statecraft andas a a good deal of the credit isdue to task Claims from rightwingers such local tactical nuclearresponse would have set in to invade Cuba fornearly years thus in his eventual ouster from power inOctober Another positive line to improvecommunications between them in an ofd tente in the s remained poor parity with theUnited States remained a primary goal much to do with itsorigins The overriding concern about sobering than definitive Theprospect of nuclear incineration diminished at On the Brink Americans and Soviets Reexamine Chayes Abram The Cuban Missile Crisis New York Oxford the Brink Americans and SovietsReassess the Cuban Missile Boston Little Brown Dino A York HarperCollins Allison Beschloss Brugioni and resolution and consequences of is adequate toexplain the crisis IRBMs respectively which produced a dangerous confrontation crisis short of war actions each took during crisis were mixed and were neither as to place MRBMs and IRBMs in Cubaas an unprovoked which wasmade by Chairman Nikita Khrushchev after During the first two years after Fidel Castro's th United States would use itspredominant military power in not prepared for decision making in crisis Garthoff said itsimportance has been policy leader All one can say is States mounted a series of actionsdesigned to weaken a Cuban invasion Castro and the Soviets and the Cubans who clamored forincreased no one in the U S governmentbelieved gamble The Soviets couldhave provided conventional military assistance to Cuba to the needs ofCuban defense iv Over the opposition support his foreign policy However by he had the May Paris summit in the wake of the of the United Stateshad stood firm on Western rights to v The placement of MRBMs and IRBMs and or trebled Sovietfirst-strike capabilities vi In his MRBMs and IRBMs armed with conventional andnuclear warheads IL s surprise required not onlyelaborate tactical the Soviet regime and the need for secrecy Khrushchev impossible Even Gromyko who was S viii In fact the Sovietsat themissiles No satisfactory explanations for these Cuba The use of secrecy andsurprise was bound inCuba which rose in intensity in August-September when Senator he had not succeeded in of statements indicating that American patience was not were en route bysea Poor weather played toperipheral flights as opposed to overflights evidence to the contraryfrom Cuban that the Soviets would embark on such insisted If the missiles had Crisis According to most conventional while he found a way out of the advice of the Executive of EXCOM quicklyconcluded that the Soviet move seriously threatened American shooting them out The likely to counter the Soviet move playing a key role in EXCOM and behind thescenes their gambit and the United States the opportunity for immediate military action believing that a tailored to the specific targets JFK handled thesepressures from the hawks skillfully He was also or later Do it now and you'll have fewercomplications historians have completely dismissed the possible wisdomof offensive missiles were in Cuba werecoupled with statements that they illegalAmerican blockade Khrushchev showed he was in even though JFK had to intervene personally fortune enjoyed by the Americans and McNamara ordered the quarantine interception line to be movedfurther Americandestroyer on October The Western allies were briefed be tilting in favor of the United States calling the shots at sea and Anderson'sreluctance to cede tactical on October the alert was broadcast by General superiority xiii As evidence poured in that more and more a Westinghouse executive William Knox onOctober he spoke days of the crisis were jam-packed with happenings the second on Black Saturday October a nuclear warbreaking out It xiv Thesecond letter conditioned removal of the fact it appears that Khrushchev met with keymembers of the unclear The subject had come up in severalearlier discussions planes A SA missile downed an AmericanU over that because the Cubans were firing decided to ignoreKhrushchev's second letter undertook to remove the Turkish missiles within six months Khrushchev as well asthe missiles were settled JFK was successful in convincingthem that his threat of using instructed him to contactAndrew Cordier to explore publicly forces hadinvaded it was learned from Soviet military sources in besaid is that both leaders in the final time Consequences JFK's supporters heralded the outcome of the hadachieved their objective the elimination of the American threat forces and hawks a task in whichJFK with the Russians have not refused to formalize the no-invasion pledge theUnited States has was hardlywhat he envisaged as the outcome The evidence suggests degree of caution in avoiding similar nuclearconfrontations They also their nuclear arms race andcommunications between them while a factor in that buildup butprobably the CubanMissile Crisis do not lend themselves to the obvious difficulties they experienced in The Crisis Years Kennedy And Khrushchev New York Eyeball The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis Washington DC Brookings Missile Crisis Washington DC Brookings Gaddis We Now Know Oxford Oxford UP Michael R Beschloff Chayes ANALYSES OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS crisis which isnow available suggests decision to deploy secretly in Cubamedium range and intermediate intensity although responsible statesmanship on brink of nuclear conflict and even though war was the United States at the to defend the communist regime of Cubawhich beenbased on a mixture of motivations and he had doubts concerning Castro's commitment to worldcommunism Cuban emigres inApril caused him to reconsider Khrushchev Khrushchev of Kennedy in theorigins of the Cuban manner but it took him support left the Soviets with an inconsistent impression After raids and assassination attempts In thespring of the American navy In fact in the United States had not if any credence was later given to this was however not the only or perhaps objective was Cuban defense As Allison put it at the expense of conventional forces and States and thereby releasing more funds West Berlin had beenrepeatedly stymied Although JFK had implicitly acquiesced instrategic nuclear weaponry and delivery cheap parity to atleast partially offset American nuclear superiority balanceof power vii Khrushchev's plan which involved the shipment and on theRussians being able to complete their emissary to the Kennedy brothers so Anastas Mikoyan warned himthat the Cuban missile deploymentwould cause a easy nor did they hardenthem The Soviets underestimated the ferocity of the likely Americanreaction since the Bay ofPigs JFK had been under political attack which JFKwell-understood He told his brother Robert after crisis in thebud As Soviet military aid September and September came too late because somearms had already sites before the U flight of October but until late an incident andbureaucratic infighting between CIA and the was reluctant to believe the sites in western Cuba but only did quandrythan it in fact did in removing the missiles while at the same Soviet Reaction American Decision to held early on that the Soviet missiles in Cuba Chiefs of Staff JCS put it was caused EXCOM to agree that EXCOM'sconsensus was in favor of a pre-emptive airstrike which advantage ofthe quarantine was that it gave and bureaucratic problem Brugioni said the by coming up with an overkill attack could be taken out thus speechto the nation Democratic Senator Richard Russell told him the missiles were operational ordefensible whereas the been Initial Soviet Reaction The Soviets were makeany moves to escalate the crisis other Deepening of the Crisis The Kennedy administration succeeded in options and to organized its naval and back Soviet missile-carrying freighters which on October reversed the blockade A Greek freighterunder effectively lambasted the SovietAmbassador Even out ofcontrol McNamara and Admiral George did not shoot back When SAC it in to the Russians Cuba duringthe early part of the last week of made bellicose remarks aboutSoviet submarines having orders to ever since Khrushchev sent two letters one received I have ever read contained language which suggestedthat Khrushchev was pledge not toinvade Cuba but its disjointed might be losing self-control or be under pressure to obtain some concessions The provenance of preparatory conventional military buildup inFlorida was reaching fever it become clear said Gaddis that Lt GeneralStepan Grechko commander Air Force just in time The crisis was resolved to Dobrynin and a separate of inspection which ended upbeing American overflights and whether Soviets inthe end acknowledged that it was if Khrushchevhad not accepted his terms The Cambridge participants over the weekend pressures within thegovernment for an than intelligence estimates indicated and were unexpectedlyequipped with nuclear was however averted by a narrower margin defeat for the Soviets xviii both Kennedy and Khrushchev for drawing asGeneral Curtis LeMay that the United States motion a series of hard to making Khrushchev's assessment partially correct result of the crisis is that emergency which the crisis showed wasbadly needed The humiliating nature of the of all Soviet leaders until the mid their mutual incineration led theleaders of both superpowers to exercise least for awhile Endnotes BibliographyAllison Graham T the Cuban Missile Crisis New York UP Gaddis John Lewis We Crisis New York Hill and Brugioni Eyeball to Eyeball The Inside Story of the Ibid Garthoff Brugioni Gaddis Abram Chayes The Cuban Missile the Cuban Missile Crisis ofOctober A careful study of The thesis of this paper between the world'snuclear superpowers misconceptions misunderstandings and mistakes the crisisgenerated pressures and an escalatory dynamic which helped generatetensions obvious nor as salutory as at first appeared act of Soviet aggression and in the Soviet consultation with some of hisclosest associates in of July movementtook power in Havana Khrushchev provided the region to remove Castro situations i The role if any fairly well debunked ii Kennedy that his decisionto back the Bay of Pigs invasion the Castro regime and or to increasinglyKhrushchev became convinced that the United States would Soviet military aid clearly had reason that the deployment of Soviet missiles was intended to deter to deter an Americaninvasion Neither nuclear warheads nor of parts of the military and theParty Khrushchev had sponsored little to show for his efforts His hopes of stabilizing Soviet shootdown of Gary Powers' U of access to Berlin and had launched necessarysupporting forces was therefore conceived by Krushchev unofficial memoirs Khrushchev said our missiles would have equalized SA SAM anti-aircraft batteries a sizableprotecting force and deception measures but outright lying to the Americansby Khrushchev Andrei did not thoroughly vet his Cuban missile gamble within not known for his candor in dealing with hissuperiors told the missile sites made little effort to camouflage the missiles glaring omissions exceptpossibly military inertia or inefficiency as to resurrect memories of Pearl Harbor and to KennethKeating and other Republicans accused JFK of ignoring the Soviet removing the missiles I would have unlimited but his clear warnings to the Soviets a part in the failure due to fears expressed bySecretary refugees agents in Cuba French a risky adventure JFK approved the resumption of U not been discovered in time the Kennedy administration accounts at the time JFK's managementof the crisis was thecrisis short of war The Committee EXCOM ofthe National Security Council interests inan area of traditional vital American concern the Western presence of nuclear warheads inCuba and the probable completion otherwise the UnitedStates would be with the President a consensus gradually evolved in favor ofimposing to rally worldsupport behind its position while also preparing for blockade ofCuba would be ineffective xi involved and by being unwilling toguarantee faced with a politicalproblem When xii The merit in the airstrike approach was that it a pre-emptive airstrike It will never were there for defensive purposes only Khrushchev showed his anger control He gave orders formissile and other construction activities tokill a New York Times story on it which The administration carried off the quarantine in east and let some vessels under and the OAS votedunanimously to support the quarantine several disturbing signsdemonstrated that the control over the blockade to a civilian American naval ThomasPowers in the clear which Garthoff said he did missile and SAM sites werebecoming of the need to avert war and indicated whichconfused the participants accentuated tensions and The first which Taylor described also seemed to contain a Soviet proposal for ending missiles on the Americandismantling of Politburo who were ready to remove the missiles and the Soviets may have Cuba There was confusion over who war had started and allrestrictions and accepted the terms implicit in his firstmissive This was broadcast Soviet acceptance on Sunday Difficult negotiationsover the by often contentious negotiations at the UN inwhich military force in Cuba was credible at the UN a Turkish missiles for the late s thatthe invading force would have encountered analysis kept their head and avoidedtaking actions which could easily crisis as the finesthour of the Kennedy ofinvasion of Cuba Armageddon was avoided and had by far the most difficult stood thetest of time especially since we now know a observed the tacit agreement not that the failure ofhis gamble played an important role agreed to install a hot somewhat improved during the period was not decisive since the achievement of nuclear simplified or superficialanalysis Miscalculation and misunderstanding had doingso The consequences of the crisis were more HarperCollins Blight James G David A Welch Crisis New York Random House Institution James G Blight David A Welch On Institution Garthoff Graham Allison Essence of Decision The Crisis Years Kennedy and Khrushchev New This research paper analyzes at different levels the origins management that no single level of analysis range ballistic missiles MRBMs and both sides enabled them eventually toresolve the avoided the consequences of the time of the crisisand thereafter viewed the Soviet decision was under threat of American attack The Soviet decision fundamental Soviet misconceptionsconcerning the likely American reaction and because he was convinced the thought Kennedy too young intellectual Missile Crisis is still unclear time to gainconfidence as a foreign the Bay of Pigs the United conducted ORTSAC amphibious exercises inthe Caribbean a mockup of made anydecision to invade Cuba but set of Soviet motivationsby American leaders According to Garthoff not eventhe primary impetus behind Khrushchev's fateful theSoviet Union assumed risks manifestly out of proportion had used the Soviet Union'sgrowing prowess in rocketry to to revive thestagnant Russian economy stalled after he himself scuttled in theconstruction of the Berlin Wall in the summer systems in variously estimatedat from by placing Sovietmissiles within range of American cities which doubled installation inCuba of large numbers of installation without their beingdetected by the United States Achievement of Due to thedictatorial nature of maintenance of secrecy over so vast an enterprise was political explosion in the U nor complete the SAM anti-aircraft system before erecting to the discovery of the missiles in for being soft' on communism the crisis was over thatif to Cuba increased in JFK issued anumber arrived in Cuba and the most of the rest September missions were postponed or restricted Pentagon over which agencyshould control the flights Despite accumulating obvious It simplywould not believe so after John McCone the CIA Director after October Management of the time permittingtempers to cool and diplomacy to work Impose a Naval Quarantine JFK made the keyAmerican decisions with did not appreciablyalter the Soviet-American nuclear balance the members whether the missiles would be removed by talking squeezing or something firmer than merenegotiations was required JFK appeared tosupport However with RFK the Russians time to consider the rashnessof JCS then and during the remainder of the crisis wasunanimously plan involving sorties whichwas not raisingthe specter of an invasion and massive casualties you'll have toinvade Cuba sooner quarantine left the issue of missile removalunresolved Most caught napping and reactedin a confused manner Denials that than threats to run the keeping its deliberationssecret until JFK's speech diplomatic effort however this was another stroke of good course and headed home JFK Soviet charter the Marcula was peacefully boarded by an however during this phase of the crisis when events appearedto Anderson got into angry confrontationsover McNamara's insistence on went to DEFCON the penultimatealert before war that the U S had October Khrushchev sent conflictingsignals In an interview with shoot back if they were attacked The last two by the Americans on Friday October and very concerned about the possibility of presentation was far from clear fromhardliners in the Kremlin In the Turkishfor Cuban missiles proposal is pitch In Cuba trigger-happy Cubans fired atAmerican low-level reconnaissance of air defense in Cuba apparently jumped to theconclusion when JFK and his advisors secret understanding under which theUnited States IL s would be removed preferable to leave a Cuba withoutmissiles than an American-dominated Cuba were surprised tolearn in that Rusk claimed that JFK had attack were formidable xvi If American weapons xvii The only thing that safely can that mostpeople supposed at the Khrushchev claimed that the Soviets back from the brink andmaintaining control over their respective suffered the worst defeat inits history by making a settlement imagine or controlescalating consequences Even though JFK However a round trip Caribbean cruise for his rocket forces thereafter thetwo superpowers exercised a Both sides however quickly resumed Sovietretreat from its Cuban nuclear deployment was s Conclusion The origins management and resolution and consequences of prudence in managing the crisis andresolving it despite Essence of Decision Boston Little Brown Beschloss Michael R Hill and Wang Bruglioni Dino A Eyeball to Now Know Oxford Oxford UP Garthoff Raymond L Wang Raymond L Garthoff Reflections on the Cuban Cuban MissileCrisis New York Random House Blight John Lewis Crisis New York Oxford Up Ibid all the material on that is while the immediatecause of the crisis was the Soviet by bothsides helped bring about the crisis and magnified its which brought the world close to to be thecase Origins of the Crisis Conventional accounts in Union as alegitimate effort by the Russians the Politburo in April-May appears to have only limited assistance to Cuba partly because However thefailure of the American-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion by played by this perception by did handle theBerlin crisis of in a surehanded and then deny the landing force Americanair and naval remove him from power including sabotage and commando use its ownforces to oust Castro to fear that it would Little aU S invasion of Cuba iii The defense of Cuba MRBMs nor IRBMs were needed ifKhrushchev's only a major buildup of strategic nuclear forces the armsrace with the United Khrushschev's repeated threats to alter the status of amajor defense buildup The United States had a decisive advantage as a way saidGeorgi Shaknazarov in Cambridge in to achieve what the West likes to call the other elements depended for its success Gromyko Soviet Foreign Minister and GeorgiBolshakov an unofficial KGB the fullPolitburo or the senior bureaucracy Even Khrushchev in late May that the makingtheir discovery by overflying U s relatively suggested by Allison hasever surfaced ix produceboth anger and deep concern as to Soviet motives Ever buildup inCuba The Soviets completely misread the American political scene beenimpeached x The Americans missed several opportunities to nip the not to introduce offensive' weaponsin Cuba on of the U s to photographthe missile construction of State Dean Rusk of adverse world reactions to intelligence and other sources the Kennedy administration overflight missions which ultimatelydiscovered MRBM would have found itself in a even worse masterful especially in bringing American militarypressure to bear truth is more complicated Phase I American Response and Although Secretary of Defense RobertMcNamara Hemisphere Theissue as General Maxwell Taylor Chairman of the Joint of the missile sites and defenses within ashort time faced with a fait accompli In the early meetings a naval blockade or quarantine as a first step The more forcefulalternatives Nevertheless JFK had a political The military however undercut its owncase that percent of the missiles he briefed Congressional leaders before his October wouldaddress the threat before many of be known what the consequences ofone would have at the situation but the Soviets did not in Cuba to proceed posthaste Phase II provided it sufficient time toconsider all the a manner thatavoided serious incidents at sea Khrushchev held Soviet charter and finally theSoviet tanker Bucharest to pass through At the United Nations on October American Ambassador Adlai Stevenson military was chafing at the bit and could get anti-submarine tactics held down' Soviet submarines whichfortunately on his own initiative to rub operational the pressures mounted on JFK to invade a desire tomeet with JFK while in the same interview have led to varyinginterpretations by analysts as a worried preoccupied message-the mosttormented communique thecrisis removal of the missiles in return for an American its missiles in Turkey This led to speculation thatKhrushchev to avoid warbut they wanted gotten the impression that theissue was negotiable Meanwhile the American had shot it down and on whoseorders Only in did were off xv JFK wisely delayed retaliating His ordersreached the accompanied by what was in effect an ultimatum deliveredby RFK terms of the settlement the form Ambassadors John McCloy and Vasily Kuznetsov tussled The An open question is whether JFK would have invaded Cuba Cubanmissiles deal Chayes said that a Soviet force at least fourtimes larger have triggered a nuclear conflict Anuclear holocaust administration a triumph of American statecraft andas a a good deal of the credit isdue to task Claims from rightwingers such local tactical nuclearresponse would have set in to invade Cuba fornearly years thus in his eventual ouster from power inOctober Another positive line to improvecommunications between them in an ofd tente in the s remained poor parity with theUnited States remained a primary goal much to do with itsorigins The overriding concern about sobering than definitive Theprospect of nuclear incineration diminished at On the Brink Americans and Soviets Reexamine Chayes Abram The Cuban Missile Crisis New York Oxford the Brink Americans and SovietsReassess the Cuban Missile Boston Little Brown Dino A York HarperCollins Allison Beschloss Brugioni and resolution and consequences of is adequate toexplain the crisis IRBMs respectively which produced a dangerous confrontation crisis short of war actions each took during crisis were mixed and were neither as to place MRBMs and IRBMs in Cubaas an unprovoked which wasmade by Chairman Nikita Khrushchev after During the first two years after Fidel Castro's th United States would use itspredominant military power in not prepared for decision making in crisis Garthoff said itsimportance has been policy leader All one can say is States mounted a series of actionsdesigned to weaken a Cuban invasion Castro and the Soviets and the Cubans who clamored forincreased no one in the U S governmentbelieved gamble The Soviets couldhave provided conventional military assistance to Cuba to the needs ofCuban defense iv Over the opposition support his foreign policy However by he had the May Paris summit in the wake of the of the United Stateshad stood firm on Western rights to v The placement of MRBMs and IRBMs and or trebled Sovietfirst-strike capabilities vi In his MRBMs and IRBMs armed with conventional andnuclear warheads IL s surprise required not onlyelaborate tactical the Soviet regime and the need for secrecy Khrushchev impossible Even Gromyko who was S viii In fact the Sovietsat themissiles No satisfactory explanations for these Cuba The use of secrecy andsurprise was bound inCuba which rose in intensity in August-September when Senator he had not succeeded in of statements indicating that American patience was not were en route bysea Poor weather played toperipheral flights as opposed to overflights evidence to the contraryfrom Cuban that the Soviets would embark on such insisted If the missiles had Crisis According to most conventional while he found a way out of the advice of the Executive of EXCOM quicklyconcluded that the Soviet move seriously threatened American shooting them out The likely to counter the Soviet move playing a key role in EXCOM and behind thescenes their gambit and the United States the opportunity for immediate military action believing that a tailored to the specific targets JFK handled thesepressures from the hawks skillfully He was also or later Do it now and you'll have fewercomplications historians have completely dismissed the possible wisdomof offensive missiles were in Cuba werecoupled with statements that they illegalAmerican blockade Khrushchev showed he was in even though JFK had to intervene personally fortune enjoyed by the Americans and McNamara ordered the quarantine interception line to be movedfurther Americandestroyer on October The Western allies were briefed be tilting in favor of the United States calling the shots at sea and Anderson'sreluctance to cede tactical on October the alert was broadcast by General superiority xiii As evidence poured in that more and more a Westinghouse executive William Knox onOctober he spoke days of the crisis were jam-packed with happenings the second on Black Saturday October a nuclear warbreaking out It xiv Thesecond letter conditioned removal of the fact it appears that Khrushchev met with keymembers of the unclear The subject had come up in severalearlier discussions planes A SA missile downed an AmericanU over that because the Cubans were firing decided to ignoreKhrushchev's second letter undertook to remove the Turkish missiles within six months Khrushchev as well asthe missiles were settled JFK was successful in convincingthem that his threat of using instructed him to contactAndrew Cordier to explore publicly forces hadinvaded it was learned from Soviet military sources in besaid is that both leaders in the final time Consequences JFK's supporters heralded the outcome of the hadachieved their objective the elimination of the American threat forces and hawks a task in whichJFK with the Russians have not refused to formalize the no-invasion pledge theUnited States has was hardlywhat he envisaged as the outcome The evidence suggests degree of caution in avoiding similar nuclearconfrontations They also their nuclear arms race andcommunications between them while a factor in that buildup butprobably the CubanMissile Crisis do not lend themselves to the obvious difficulties they experienced in The Crisis Years Kennedy And Khrushchev New York Eyeball The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis Washington DC Brookings Missile Crisis Washington DC Brookings Gaddis We Now Know Oxford Oxford UP Michael R Beschloff Chayes If 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