Origins of Containment   Term Paper ID:27914 Click to get this paper

Essay Subject: Analysis of US policy of communist containment. Looks at ideology, politics, & people responsible for formulating policy. Focus is on Reinhold Niebugr, George Kennan, & the Truman administration.... More...

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Paper Abstract: Analysis of US policy of communist containment. Looks at ideology, politics, & people responsible for formulating policy. Focus is on Reinhold Niebugr, George Kennan, & the Truman administration. Paper Introduction: Origins of Containment Introduction The policy of containment that was created and articulated in the U.S. during the late 1940's was based on both ideological assumptions and concrete political actions. The analysis which follows will explore both dimensions of this process, focusing on the thoughts of Reinhold Niebuhr and George Kennan as well as the political decisions of the Truman administration. Ideology In January of 1947 a group of liberals met in Washington D.C. to form the Americans for Democratic Action. This group pledged to continue working within the Democratic Party and to fight Communism both at home and over Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. It all depends on the circumstances. Kennan also saw a danger in indiscriminate opposition to communism.Opportunist and illegitimate regimes would come to the United Statesdemanding support simply because they were anti-communist. forces. More specifically, Kennan argued, the United States oughtto concern itself primarily with the five centers of industrial power whichdominated the world, and so, most seriously affected its security. Also, as Kennan pointed out, it violated thetradition of American foreign behavior to intervene in the affairs of otherstates. A democracy could not use the threat of force or shows offorce as an instrument of foreign policy as a matter of principle. involvement in domesticand civil wars around the world, to the detriment of America's prestige,credibility and moral principles. Whetherthis was true or not, such thinking became obsolete in short order. "To avoid destruction,"Kennan wrote in his anonymous article, "the United States need only measureup to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as agreat nation. But Kennan argued that China wouldrepresent more of a threat to Russia than to America, and, besides, Chinawould lack an industrial capacity for many years to come. Taken altogether, these events seemed to signal Russian aggression onthree fronts at once: in Europe, in Asia and in redressing the balance ofmilitary force in the world. In July of 1947, using the pseudonym "Mr.X," Kennan argued that Soviet aggressiveness would have to be contained bythe adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series ofconstantly shifting geographical and political points (Gaddis, 1982). That such a policy was necessary and effective seemed to be proved bythe war in Korea. As such they could still be dealt with constructively by theUnited States. (Gaddis, p. La Feber (1967) has maintained that Niebuhr's ideas provided importantpoints of departure for condemning communism, formulating a Europe-firstpolicy and rebuilding Germany. There were two other facets of Kennan's views which shaped his overallstrategy towards the Soviet Union. New York: Oxford.La Feber, W. Containment, then, implied a powerful reliance upon self-determination, and a willingness to support it for its own internal valuesand strength, not simply because it masqueraded as anti-communist. For him it was a question of culture versusideology, in which culture was the more enduring, more deeply rooted value. That Kennan appreciated the importance of force is clear, but it isequally clear that he understood that force in a democracy must berestrained. 41)For him, the reality of a communist government in power was quite differentfrom the threat of a takeover by Moscow. Thus, a naturalconcomitant of Kennan's view was the system of joint recovery, which wasspearheaded by the Marshall Plan, and other overseas economic assistancepacts. At thetime of Kennan's writing, only one center was hostile to the United States:the Soviet Union. & James, K. 174-175). Within three years of its promulgation,then, containment had shifted from a policy of careful cultivation ofindigenous resistance to communism to a policy of massive military might. These ideas, in large part, determined Kennan's concept ofcontainment. Surely, there was never a fairer test of national qualitythan this "(Gaddis, p. commitment to the independence of Greece andTurkey were the first direct challenges to Soviet expansion, the need forwhich was driven home by the fall of the Czechoslovak democracy in 1948.To preserve the integrity of Europe in the early terrible postwar years, itwas necessary to rebuild Germany, reinforce French democracy and sustainBritain. Boston, MA: Little Brown.Quester, G. These included Europe,North and West Africa, Northern South America, the Middle East, Japan andthe Philippines. (1982). Theyoverlooked what Niebuhr called the will-to-power. Once again, America could not do this alone. Principle in its conduct had always guided the United States,and it was this quality which had marked out its foreign policy as unique,and uniquely effective. Strategies of containment. Finally, such interference was by no means easy nor sure ofsuccess, and Kennan insisted that only the gravest and most direct threatto the security of the United States could justify it. This is far from the imposition of a pax Americana, or from Americanmilitary adventurism or intervention across the globe. Containment meant, first of all, developing throughout theworld, centers of independent nations which would have the internalstrength and psychological confidence to resist Russian expansionism.These centers, of course, were most important in the critical fivestrategic areas. De facto,this implied the hemming in of Russia with states impervious to itspressure or influence. By 195 , Kennan's concept of a long, patient political andeconomic challenge to Russia was being transformed into a resolution toapply American power anywhere it was needed to preserve American securityagainst the threat of communism (Nathan, 1984, pp. New York: Praeger.Ransom, H. The North's attack appeared predicated on the assumptionthat the West would not resist. Worse, according toNiebuhr, was the fact that Communism historically sought to accomplish itspurposes by centralizing power in one or several men instead of working outa balance of power within the society. Thus, independent and resistant power centers would haveto be developed in Central Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Korea was a lesson which would not be lost on eithersuperpower. United States foreign policy and world order. Further, Kennan insisted that Russia was not so mucha military as a political threat, and must be met primarily with politicalopposition. By that time, Kennan was considered to be the leading Soviet expert inthe government, and he had been called upon to help design long-termstrategies for dealing with postwar Russia. Kennan saw a need to reinforce theconfidence of strategic nations in their own institutions, histories andcultures, so as to resist Russian expansion, while helping to build them upeconomically and militarily against future Soviet might. Kennan argues that Communists,once in power in states beyond Russia would tend to be governed by theactual circumstances confronting them not so much as by the dictates of theKremlin. Further, a system of military alliances was needed to strengthenthe security ties of the principal centers of power. The Soviets responded with the division of Berlin, which was topresent a potential flashpoint for years, and with the consolidation oftheir hold on Czechoslovakia. Indoing so, we must prepare to admit to much diversity in the world, indeed,we should learn to welcome it as a sign of international health. All of these considerations led Kennan to a curious lack ofinterest in China. In essence Niebuhr's ideological message seemed to form animportant part of the rationale for the doctrine of containment. The concept was at once political andpsychological. Nonetheless,American policy makers became increasingly unwilling to allow Moscow tomake such experiments, which they viewed as direct threats to Americansecurity. (1982). The analysis which follows will explore bothdimensions of this process, focusing on the thoughts of Reinhold Niebuhrand George Kennan as well as the political decisions of the Trumanadministration.Ideology In January of 1947 a group of liberals met in Washington D.C. Kennan clearly understood and argued for the power of nationalism as aresponse to communism. Thus a new element was introducedinto the equation of containment a new variable, namely, the limited warcalculated to expand communism without escalating into a generalconflagration. New York: John Wiley & Sons.Nathan, J., Oliver, A. (1984). U. This began with NATO,linking the states of Europe, was extended through the Middle East withCENTO, and completed through the Pacific with SEATO (Gaddis, 1982). Despite its great power, Kennan wrote, America alone could not imposeboth conditions on the world. We are not necessarily always against the expansion of communism, and certainly not always against it to the same degree in every area. If this was Moscow's intention in urging war on Korea withChinese support, it may have marked a point of demarcation for containment.Clearly, the United States was prepared to defend its interests militarilyeven in remote areas, yet clearly it would not do so at the price ofgeneral war. 36).Policy The United States began to implement the policy of containment shortlyafter World War II. We maynot, as dictators do, rattle the sword where and when it pleases us, heargued, but, rather, we must retain sufficient latent force to make ourdiplomacy respected. American force could best be employed bystrategic moves toward areas in which communist intervention was apparent.If, Kennan argued, communist interference in a region tended to drawAmerican power toward that region, in the form naval task forces, forexample, then Moscow would be induced to curtail the interference in orderto rid the region of U.S. A primary spokesman for this group was Reinhold Niebuhr atheologian, philosopher and historian. H. In Kennan's view, thetwo main goals of American foreign policy should be (a) to protect thesecurity of the nation from external interference, and (b) to advance thewelfare of the people by ensuring a peaceful world order (Gaddis, 1982, p.27). Rather, it would have to act in the world soas to maintain international power balances while reducing antagonisms.Further, America should concentrate its foreign policy efforts only onthose areas of the world vital to its security. In this way, Soviet security would takeprecedence over communist internationalism, to the detriment of Sovietprestige, credibility and influence. Niebuhr also believed that theWest's only hope lay in creating the best possible balance-of-powersituation. to formthe Americans for Democratic Action. In the immediate aftermath of the war, Russia was unable toimpose its will by force, she was weakened internally. Kennan published thecontroversial article anonymously, so as to avoid the impression that itwas a statement of official policy, but the passionate reaction it evokedsoon brought about the revelation of his authorship. But perhaps most importantly, Niebuhr'sthoughts provided a historical basis and a rationale for the tone, theoutlook, the unsaid and perhaps even the unconscious assumptions of theperiod. Therefore, underthe principles of non-intervention diversity and containment Kennanpublicly washed his hands of China. American foreign policy: The lost consensus. (1967). Thus, Kennan saw containment as thesystematic application of pressure, both through local centers of power,and through American manipulation of its own latent force. But subservientcommunist parties could labor throughout the world to spread Moscow'sinfluence far beyond its borders. As Kennan wrote: Our opposition to communist expansion is not an absolute factor. BibliographyGaddis, J. 32). An American foreign policy reader. S. We mustnever, in Kennan's view, attempt to impose our culture upon others in orderto save them from communism, but, rather, encourage them to retain theirintegrity. 39). (198 ). This would tend to make them independent of Moscow for reasons ofrealpolitik. Indiversity there was strength, Kennan seemed to be saying, and, conversely,in the imposition of unity there was great danger. Theseincluded North America, Britain, Central Europe, Russia and Japan. This moremilitant definition of containment seemed to parallel more closely theoriginal ideological assumption of Niebuhr. It would best bedone, in his view, by strengthening the forces of opposition surroundingRussia, and so halting expansionism. America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966. This dependence on nationalism applied not only to the nations which layat the borders of Soviet expansion, but to the United States as well. Origins of ContainmentIntroduction The policy of containment that was created and articulated in the U.S.during the late 194 's was based on both ideological assumptions andconcrete political actions. Theprocess was a dual one, and the challenge both inward and outward looking.The United States must remain true to its own traditions and principles,while at the same time helping other nations to remain true to theirs. 1 4-1 5). Another part of the foundation for the containment policy can be foundin the ideas of George Kennan. In Kennan's view, then, it followed that America oughtto devote the bulk of its foreign policy activity toward Russia as a matterof national security priority. In delineating how such a strengthening might be implemented, Kennansketched out three criteria to be applied. By 195 , then, Kennan's doctrine ofcontainment had taken on an entirely new emphasis. In1949, the Soviets detonated their first atomic bomb, several years beforeexpected, and in 195 , North Korea invaded the South. America, he said in effect, should do nothing aboutChina; this at a time when the imminent communist takeover had Washingtonpolicy experts in near hysterics. In the minds of American foreign policymakers, so long as the United States held a monopoly on nuclear weapons,Russian ambitions could be held in check by the sheer threat of total war.Such war, they assumed, would be the only form of war possible, given theexisting balance of power in the world (Spanier, 198 , p. These were, first, whetherthere existed a sufficient force within the country that might besupported, second, whether the country were of strategic importance to U.S.security, and third, the cost to the United States of helping the countryto resist. Moscow would continue support for local "wars of liberation",profiting by them when possible, and withdrawing from them when the riskseemed too high. It may have been a test case for a newstrategy by Moscow using limited conventional warfare in regions which theUnited States had not pledged to resist. This group pledged to continueworking within the Democratic Party and to fight Communism both at home andoverseas. defense strategy was undertaken late in 1949, resulting in thelandmark National Security Council study 68, which called for a massiverebuilding of Western security forces in order to meet the Soviet challenge(Quester, 1982, pp. He supported the goal of a spiritual, political and economicunity of the Atlantic Community with a powerful Germany leading Europe (LaFeber, 1967). He argued the Communism was at once the worst and most aggressive ofsocieties because its followers believed they could find a perfect unionamong sinful men simply by minimizing the drive for property. As Cold War tensions increasedafter World War II, Niebuhr stood ready with an explanation for thisevolving situation and a solution based on important themes he haddeveloped in a series of books and lectures (La Feber, 1967). American foreign policy since World War II. A sweeping reappraisalof U.S. (1965). The second, and related corollary to Kennan's world view was theimportance of America acting from principle rather than simple powerinterests. It was as Kennan had said, a question of Russiannationalism backing communist internationalism only up to the point wherethe communist ideals endangered the Russian nationalism. Given a consistent policy of building up stabilityand confidence, even communist governments could be made to break fromMoscow, thus contributing to global diversity and stability. Kennan pointed to Yugoslavia as an example of what heexpected to be a trend. He favored assisting independent statesto contribute to a stable balance of power and forces throughout the world. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. It must be noted, however, that Kennan did not prescribe thesemeasures, nor did he feel that containment ought to be predominantly, noreven strongly military in nature. America wouldthus find itself entangled with scoundrels, demagogues and dictators aroundthe world whose sole recommending feature what that they were notcommunist. The first was his belief that foreignpolicy should avoid interference in the internal affairs of other nations.This was important because diversity in world political affairs wasdesirable and healthy. New York: Crowell.Spanier, J. L. On the other hand, Kennan was quite clear about the folly of directAmerican military intervention to prevent or reverse communist takeovers.This Kennan saw as presenting the specter of U.S. It must be taken in relation to American security and American objectives. To sacrifice principle for sheer self-interest,Kennan said, would be to compromise the nature of American political life(Gaddis, p. If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.