The Marines in Beirut - 1982   Term Paper ID:27726 Click to get this paper

Essay Subject: Explores events & issues related to the re-introduction of US Marines in Beirut in 1982.... More...

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Paper Abstract: Explores events & issues related to the re-introduction of US Marines in Beirut in 1982. Paper Introduction: The Marines in Beirut  1982 Introduction 1982 was not the first year that the Marines were deployed to Lebanon, nor was Ronald Reagan the first American president to feel the need to send them there. President Eisenhower also deployed the Marines to Lebanon in 1958, with equally unclear motives and troubling results. The intent in the following pages is to look at the reintroduction of the Marines to Beirut under the conditions of the time and try to understand what went wrong and what might have better served U.S. interests. That re-deployment, which began in 1982, was marked by the bombing of the Marine barracks in October of 1983 which represented the largest single day's loss of American servicemen since World War II. After that time, much of the U.S. effort was reduced to damage control until the Marines were re- Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. and Kiley, S. TheMarine personnel being sent to Somalia clearly remembered what happened tothe Marines in Beirut in 1983 and expressed some concerns that they wereentering a situation that had similar potential for major trouble withoutclear understanding of U.S. Even in theU.S., this seems to be increasingly the case. The intent inthe following pages is to look at the reintroduction of the Marines toBeirut under the conditions of the time and try to understand what wentwrong and what might have better served U.S. He noted that the administration felt that it couldnot say that it felt guilty for removing the American Marines so rapidly,so another rationale was formulated during the weekend of September 18th.This rationale was enunciated in Reagan's statement to the American publicin which he asserted that the Marines were being sent back to Beirut inorder to support the Lebanese government in asserting control over thecapital city. When representatives of the Hezbollah discussed the bombing of thebarracks in Beirut, they justified that bombing on the grounds that theUnited States sent the Marines to destroy the Islamic movement and thwartthe will of the Muslim people. Itwas a popular tourist destination, as well as a country that was the centerfor much trade and economic exchange. In some respects, he seemed simply to be following the path thatEisenhower set out before him without searching for a better solution orconsidering the changes in the Middle East that had occurred sinceEisenhower's time. Inthe case of Eisenhower, the situation was even less clearcut than withReagan. They were not trained for the kind of missionthat they were sent on, which involved simply sitting and waiting forsomething to happen in a virtually indefensible position in the middle of abusy international airport. There had been the abductionof David Dodge, acting president of the American University of Beirut, andthe suicide bombing of the American embassy. As a consequence, it became aligned with the Christian cause andviewed as the sworn enemy of the Muslim militias. The bombing of Beirut. From Beirut to Somalia. since Reagan had guaranteed the safety of thePalestinians and had assumed that the Israelis, the U.S.' allies in theregion, would live up to that guarantee (Zucchino, 1993). Thiswas humiliating for the U.S. should not have deployed troops to Lebanon and not have equatedits national security interests with the stability of that country? (1987). By the time that the Marines were deployed in 1982, however, thesituation had changed radically. They were replaced by a radical factionalism that foundcompromise almost sacrilegious, or offensive to their religious dogma. The Lebanese expected the U.S. The problem throughout the worldwas, and is, unresolved ethnic and religious tensions and a failure tonegotiate diversity toward peaceful, pluralistic societies. The country had been damaged byVietnam and self-esteem had fallen even farther because of the seemingpowerlessness of the U.S. entered on theside of the Christianized government and Christian militias. Nonetheless, as Korbani (1991) noted, there were some real problemswithin the armed forces themselves. Who's at the helm? (1992). Thiswas effected by early September and the Marines were withdrawn. For theiropponents, however, the focus was on destroying the U.S. While the services were generally well-prepared to fight the kind of battle that World War II represented, theywere still not accustomed to the kinds of conflicts that became prevalentafter World War II. When it agreed to help the Lebanese Army, however, itbecame allied not only with the government, but with the Christianmilitias. BibliographyAuster, B.B. allowedits energy to be drained into the sinkhole of East-West posturing andritualistic combat. The Marines were not sent in on afundamentally military mission, but on a political mission to supportAmerican interests symbolically, rather than with the use of force. forces were perceived as allied with theChristians, and with the Jews of Israel, against the Muslims in Lebanon andthroughout the Arab world. (1993 ). Following that came the Sabra and Shatilamassacred, which involved the slaughter of the Palestinian civilians.According to Friedman (1989), the result was that the Reagan administrationwas overwhelmed with guilt for withdrawing the Marines so quickly anddetermined to redeploy them under the guise of national security interestsand support of the sovereignty of the Lebanese government.Condition of American Armed Forces The problem in Beirut does not seem to have been the condition ofAmerican armed forces, but the hamstringing of those forces by policydirectives that were unclear and vague. Editorial Research Reports, 1(24), 314+.Hiro, D. Pity the nation: Lebanon at war. Inaddition, in its attempts to control the Palestinian guerillas, who hadbeen expelled from Jordan and relocated to Lebanon, Israel itself hadentered the southern region of Lebanon. troops to rescue them, as in all theold imported movies. interests in theregion.Executive Leadership In her book on presidential decision-making leading up to U.S.intervention in Lebanon in both 1958 and 1982, Agnes Korbani (1991) notedthat both presidents attempted to rally the country behind them, but failedto make a totally persuasive case for the necessity of intervention. That it was so successful dependedupon a series of compromises that gradually broke down under the pressureof the constant tension and war throughout the Middle East. self-esteem and restore its losthonor. Yet, Reagan received support from Congress in the form ofauthorization under the War Powers Resolution in October 1982.Essentially, Congress authorized the president to commit marines to Lebanonfor up to 18 months, even though there was controversy about the necessityfor that intervention. Also Reagan was acting in direct response to the actions of theChristian militia in Beirut who had slaughtered hundreds of Palestiniancivilians, with the apparent approval of Israeli military commanders. The scenario within Lebanon was fairly representative of the moreglobal picture of U.S. All of this led to a fragmented, hostile society inwhich Christians and Muslims, and various factions within both groups,began to fight each other over the future of Lebanon (Fisk, 1992). NY: Doubleday.Glazer, S. What might have served U.S. The near-sightedness of the West, both conservative and liberal,really, has served to lead to an ongoing identity as arrogant,unsophisticated, frightened and ignorant of the complexity of the world.Instead of dealing with some of the important real issues of limitation,cultural difference, and religious and ethnic identity, the U.S. The country was justemerging from its long-standing efforts in Vietnam, which had ended infundamental defeat for U.S. Eisenhower's mission, too, was a peacekeepingmission. Until that time, theadministration had attempted to retain an impartial presence, supportive ofthe whole country. (1993). There were concerns that thesituation would develop toward a climate like that in Iran in which theU.S. (1991). Essentially, according to Karam (1993), the compromises that thepeople of Lebanon had made with each other in order to exist as a statebroke down. The Marines in Beirut - 1982Introduction 1982 was not the first year that the Marines were deployed to Lebanon,nor was Ronald Reagan the first American president to feel the need to sendthem there. If it had acted to require theChristian government and militias to come to a compromise arrangement withthe Muslim militias, it probably would not have succeeded. Asa consequence, Reagan might have believed that his overwhelming electoralvictory represented an ongoing mandate from the American people to use thecountry's military forces to good effect whenever American interestsappeared to be threatened. troops were operating under a fantasy picture of theworld. As Zucchino (1993) noted, Marines are assault troops, and this is whattheir training involved. What might have served U.S. Interests Within Lebanon itself, there were both allies to, and opponents of,the U.S. At the same time, however, the era during which Eisenhowerpresided was less contentious than the Reagan era and he faced fewerchallenges to his leadership and decision-making. Essentially Eisenhower deployed troops toLebanon in 1958 to prevent what occurred in 1975 - civil war betweenChristians and Muslims. Does this mean thatthe U.S. From Beirut to Jerusalem. Those conflicts, like the one in Vietnam, wereconflicts that involved enemies who did not play by the rules of warfareand were often hard to identify amongst a civilian population. The politics of miscalculation in the Middle East. What seems to have been the fatal move of the U.S., or at least themove that precipitated the labelling of the Marines as irretrievably anti-Muslim, was the Reagan administration's agreement to help train and equipthe Lebanese Army (Korbani, 1991; Tanter, 1992). If it had acted more decisively tosuppress the Muslim militias, it would simply have seen the creation of asituation like that on the West Bank. The U.S. The U.S. In this scenario, the U.S. should play there (Parker, 1994). Unfortunately, like Vietnam, this did notprove to be the case and the Lebanese government was abandoned by itsAmerican allies in the midst of chaos and disorder. troops expected that there was a relativelysimple solution to the problems of the country and that all that wasnecessary was to support the Lebanese institutions in a direction familiarfrom U.S. The result wasa civil war that began in 1975 and extended well past the deployment, andwithdrawal, of the Marines. found itself powerless to protect its own citizens and releasehostages of a hostile, Islamic government (Friedman, 1989). Karam (1993) traced the origins of the civil war to many factors,including a weak state structure, regional tensions, and the trouble in theArab world in response to the series of defeats by Israel. Ohio State University Press.Zucchino, D. It was not a successfulproject for the U.S.Background Modern Lebanon does not have a long history as a nation-state, withits beginning in 192 . motives in Somalia and U.S. was entering afundamentally no-win situation. Hunter (1987) noted that the Reagan administration sought to rallysupport for its actions by making an appeal to morality. interests better, and still might, is anunderstanding of the very concepts that Karam discussed in his article.The problem is not political ideology. At the same time, however, there was some interest inachieving a success that could raise U.S. Lebanon, collapse and revival: Society and the nation- state in the Arab world. In some respects, Lebanon might have seemed like an easy way to wina small victory and start on the road back to a powerful global stance. interests, and was afraid of entering anotherno-win situation. policy. was involved in these negotiations, which ended withArafat agreeing to withdraw the PLO from Beirut in the summer of 1982 onthe condition that U.S., French, and Italian troops support that withdrawalin order to prevent the slaughter of the Palestinians and the invasion ofthe Israelis. NY: St. interests without really thinkingclearly about the situation and about the actual role of the Marines in thecountry. Special Envoy Philip Habib agreed to the request and 8 Marines were deployed to Beirut harbor for up to 3 days to oversee theevacuation of the 14, PLO and Syrian fighters (Friedman, 1989). Both Congress and theAmerican people were concerned about intervening in foreign affairs withoutclear policy objectives and military guidance. They wereconflicts based on religion, ethnicity, ideology, rather than country.They were conflicts that demanded both the sophistication to negotiate andthe ruthlessness to destroy the enemy. However, in the week following that first withdrawal of the Marines,Lebanon's President-elect, Bashir Gemayel was assassinated and Israelimmediately invaded West Beirut. In supporting theChristianized government, it failed to encourage that government to makepeace when peace was possible, while giving it the confidence that the U.S.would support all its actions. It considered the Reagan administrationprimarily responsible for the tragedy because it committed troops underambiguous orders without clear policy. political culture. He essentially sent introops immediately to support U.S. interests better, then, although unlikelyin the extreme, was sufficient detachment from the emotionally charged East-West conflict to see that not everything was involved with that ideologicaldebate. The situation that the U.S. Nonetheless, itstated its interests in terms of Israeli democracy and military security inthe region, which automatically placed it in opposition to Muslim, andArab, interests. In addition, it noted that strongermeasures should have been taken to secure the Marine compound, even thoughit was difficult to defend because of its location. effort was reduced to damage control until the Marines were re-deployed to the Sixth Fleet on February 21, 1984. It seems clear with hindsight that the U.S. Tanter (1992) noted that Reagan acted precipitously in response to theSeptember slaughter of the Palestinian civilians. This was not thecase, however, and the publicity about the slaughter of civilians wasperceived as quite damaging to the image of the Reagan administration.What Efforts had Already Been Made Before Reagan's intervention efforts, there were the interventionefforts of President Eisenhower. This moral appeal, along with the appeal to Americaninterests and support of Americans in Lebanon, reached much of the publicand was persuasive, at least in the short-term, to Congress. (1993). Praeger Publications.Parker, R.B. Although it claimed to be simply involved in peacekeeping andsupporting the entire Lebanese state, in effect the U.S. They were not to shoot first, and they wereactually disarmed in certain instances. was a side issue,irrelevant to the conduct of the war and its outcome. In some respects, they were to serve as siegedefenders, which is totally counter to the kind of mission that is mostappropriate for Marines. Lebanon - Fire and embers: A history of the Lebanese civil war. At the same time, however, the scenario wasmuch more complex than was acknowledged in the United States as the Arabworld was not truly aligned with either hegemony. Middle East Policy, 2(1), 15-24.Korbani, A.G. interestswere typically Soviet bloc. Yet as Friedman (1989) noted, the basic problem was that both theLebanese and the U.S. Lessons of Lebanon. By entering that civil war on one side, the U.S. Thissuccessful, and limited, mission of Marines might have encouraged theadministration to believe that another limited engagement might also beproductive. The response of the U.S. In addition to that, Christians from many radical Islamiccountries had immigrated to Lebanon and they, too, were radicalized by theregion's conflicts. He specifically stated that theMarines were to act as a supportive presence for the Lebanese governmentand left the length of their deployment open.What Might Have Been a Better Solution Karam (1993) summed up the situation in Lebanon by noting that thepressures and tensions that caused the collapse of the nation-state in thelate 197 s and early 198 s were the same kinds of tension of ethnicity andreligion that consume much of the world's population at present. There was also considerable popular support for taking some sort ofaction in Lebanon because of the series of acts that had occurred in thatcountry related to American personal affairs. This, he noted, was essential to the government's control ofthe entire country, and the government had the support of the U.S. News & World Report, 115(16), 33-35.Fisk, R. ideological, cultural, and social domination ofthe region. Between the time Eisenhower intervened and Reagan deployed theMarines, the situation of Israel in the Middle East had consolidated and itessentially dominated the region militarily. For the most part,however, it seems as though the rules of engagement promulgated by theReagan administration, under which the Marines were expected to operate,were the primary reason for armed services inadequacies.Allies and Opponents of U.S. U.S. It was, instead, representative of the response of many ofthe people of the region to rapid modernization, military tensions withIsrael, and perceived U.S. However, among Middle Eastern states it was, for atime, the most successful in terms of political and economic stability. forces (or theChristian forces in Lebanon) by whatever means necessary and possible. That re-deployment, which began in 1982, was marked by the bombing of the Marinebarracks in October of 1983 which represented the largest single day's lossof American servicemen since World War II. The immediate backdrop to the deployment of the Marines to Beirut wasthe negotiation with Yasser Arafat and the PLO regarding its withdrawalfrom Beirut. Inan article in U.S. Martin's Press.Karam, S. This was not to prove the case. The role ofIsrael is also important. (1993). Philadelphia Inquirer, Magazine Section, pp. allies and opponents, although leaving out the roleof Israel. militarypresence did have some positive effect in the region. made itself manyenemies. in itsconflict with the out-of-control militias. Friedman (1989) noted that the real reason that the Reaganadministration redeployed the Marines was guilt over the slaughter of thePalestinian civilians, but that the immediate appeal to the country wasmade on another basis. did directly support the Christian leadership, and Christianmilitias, in their efforts against both the Palestinians and the Muslimmilitias (Zucchino, 1993). In its investigation after the debacle, the Pentagon placed blame onall the parties involved. After that time, much of theU.S. He felt thatthe Arab defeat in 1967 essentially led to the awakening of various dormantpolitical and religious minorities, and the expulsion of the Palestiniansfrom Jordan represented the final blow to Lebanese attempts to remain onthe sidelines of the long-running dispute between Israeli and Arabinterests. As Karam (1993) noted, the statusquo forces in the civil war were essentially aligned with the United Statesand the West, particularly France. intervention in Lebanon, 1958 and 1982: Presidential decisionmaking. an enemy, and anappropriate target.Viewpoints of Congress and American People The past often does influence how we view actions in the present. They tended to oppose increased Arabinfluence in the country and oppose the Palestinian presence in Lebanon.Karam noted that early in the civil war the two forces could have beenlabelled as representing the pro-Western, nationalistic, Lebanese, andconservative faction and the pro-Soviet, Pan-Arab, reformist, leftistfaction, while by the later stages of the civil war the ideologicalcomponent had faded into a religious conflict between Christians andMuslims. In the eyesof the Muslim militias, that automatically made the U.S. For these kinds of conflicts, thearmed services were not well-prepared, nor was the administration itself.Instead, both seemed to be operating under the premise that conflicts weresome sort of civilized chess game in which how you played the game was asimportant, or more important, than whether you won or lost. Since theadministration had guaranteed the safety of Palestinian civilians, Reagantold the American public, and Congress, that it was incumbent upon thiscountry to back up its word and prevent the slaughter of more innocent men,women, and children. Indiana University Press.Tanter, R. in the face of the hostage situation in Iran. They found support for this belief becausethe U.S. In large part, this is an accurate perceptionof the way the alliance operated, although the U.S. Theradicalization of Lebanon was not unusual in the context of the Middle Eastof the 197 s. Instead, the Arab worldwas struggling to create its own countervailing regional power structureand, for the most part, this was seen as opposed to U.S. The level of frustration ofMuslims in the region had increased and the level of anger at the U.S.,which consistently supported Israel, had also increased tremendously. Making foreign policy. In otherwords, he did not find much meaning in the East-West conflict as contextfor Lebanon's crisis. (1992). (1989). entered was one in which rival religiousgroups, tribes, and clans were engaged in a feud to the death with eachother. interests. While Reagan indicated that there was noconstitutional need for him to seek that authorization, still he sought thepublic support that that provided him in the conduct of the action inLebanon (Glazer, 1987). They were involved in a vaguepeace-keeping mission that indicated lack of clarity on the part of theReagan administration regarding the actual situation in Lebanon and therole that the U.S. Israel did not necessarily want a stable Lebanonif that Lebanon would act as a threat to its national security interests. The origin of these feuds were often centuries old, althoughsuppressed by various conquerors and the modern building of the nation-state (Hiro, 1993). did not state that itsintentions were to deliberately repress the Muslim people. In looking at presidential decision-making, Tanter (1992) noted thatRonald Reagan had been elected at least in part because he was perceived asmore action-oriented than Jimmy Carter and more likely to protect Americaninterests in a concrete, physical way. The first deploymentof troops, to cover the withdrawal of the PLO, seemed to be successful.Indeed, initially, the second deployment of troops also seemed to behelping to stabilize the situation in Lebanon by reducing the level ofconflict and creating confidence in the Lebanese people that somethingwould be done to resolve the problems (Friedman, 1989). Essentially, though, the early alliance represented pro-Westerncountries, such as France and Israel, while the opponents to U.S. (1993). Essentially, the Marines in Beirut had been charged by the Reaganadministration to stand up for American interests simply by maintaining apresence in the country. Academy Publishers.Friedman, T.L. President Eisenhower also deployed the Marines to Lebanon in1958, with equally unclear motives and troubling results. interest in the Middle East. At the same time, however, there is indication that the U.S. U.S. News, Auster and Kiley (1993) discussed the long-termaffects of the Beirut bombing on Marines being deployed to Somalia. 18+. Nonetheless, they had never been resolved and remaineddormant and waiting for the situation that would lead to the Lebanese civilwar. It also criticized the Marinesthemselves, however, for failure to adequately protect and defendthemselves, noting that the decision to mass to many Marines in onebuilding was tactically wrong. The overshadowing story in 1982 was Vietnam. If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.