The Cuban Missile Crisis & Presidential War Powers   Term Paper ID:27258 Click to get this paper

Essay Subject: Two essays. The first analyzes Kennedy's decision to use a blockade during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The second examines the historical background & legal questions surrounding Presidential use of war-making power.... More...

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Paper Abstract: Two essays. The first analyzes Kennedy's decision to use a blockade during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The second examines the historical background & legal questions surrounding Presidential use of war-making power. Paper Introduction: Kennedy's Decision to Use a Blockade in the Cuban Missile Crisis During fifty years of the Cold War between the United States and Cuba, the single incident which brought the world closest to nuclear conflict was the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. In the decades since that missile confrontation, historians and political scientists have debated whether the tactics employed by President Kennedy to resolve this dangerous crisis were the most beneficial for the United States in the long run. One of the most controversial tactics used by Kennedy was an air and naval blockade in the waters surrounding the Cuban island. In the short term, it is difficult to argue that this tactic was not the most effective means of resolving the crisis. After all, Soviet cargo ships carrying missiles and components turned back before challenging the US Navy's quarantine line, thus opening the door Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. Thus, Congress duly supported these military actions as withthe Tonkin Gulf Resolution and the financing of the Korean "conflict," orby looking the other way as in President Eisenhower's decision to sendmilitary advisers to Vietnam. Fortunately, President Kennedy eventually chose the blockade option.This was the best option available for a number of reasons. On October 14, 1962,American U2 spy planes flying over Cuba discovered these sights. Ineffect, the law is outdated for today's tactics and weaponry. The most obvious example up to the time of the Kennedy Administrationwas President Truman's decision to commit American troops to the Koreanpeninsula for four years of warfare in order to keep Southern Korea fromfalling into the hands of Communist Northern Korea. Finally, the military brass argued that a blockade would onlyencourage the Soviet Union to retaliate with a blockade of their own aroundBerlin. New York:. President Kennedy's tactic of employing a blockade in order to forcethe Soviet Union to remove nuclear missiles from Cuba capable of hitting UScities anywhere on the east coast was logically and historically correct.This essay has detailed why any other response could only have resulted innuclear war. In terms of limited information, the President must be very carefulwhen making decisions. Sorenson (1964) wrote a book entitled, Decision-Making inthe White House , in which he mentions several obstacles or limitsPresidents deal with every time they make a decision: limits ofpermissibility, available resources, and available information (Sorenson,1964, 23). If successive Administrations had bothered reveal the information theyhad regarding the Vietnam conflict and had given Congress more of a voicein making foreign policy, the United States probably would not have pursuedseventeen years of conflict at a cost of 55, American lives. New York: W.W. Congressmen will also always approach political issues with their ownagenda. Congressmen wereappalled to learn that Nixon had hidden from Congress, the American public,and the rest of the world, his decision ordering the invasion of these twonations after a series of devastating and massive bombing campaigns. In his brief reign as President, Kennedy employed this presidentialtrick on various occasions. Theodore C. By appearing to rationally and resolutely approach theCuban Missile Crisis through a blockade, the United States built a strongcoalition of support among her traditional European allies such as; France,Germany, and England as well as attracted the support of traditionallyneutral nations (Kennedy, 1971, 3 ). The generals warned that a blockade around Berlin would simplydrag the conflict out longer and weaken America's bargaining position,especially if the Soviet Union demanded the removal of American missilesfacing Russia as a condition for releasing the strangle hold on the Germancity (Kennedy, 1971, 13). Furthermore, a blockade represented an appropriate response underinternational law. However,an aggressive air attack or invasion of Cuba would have left the UnitedStates in the role of an aggressor who was picking on a small neighborwhile allowing the Soviet Union to appear as the champion of small, LatinAmerican states. The law stipulates that troops may be committed to a hostile situationfor up to 9 days but that Congress has the right to demand immediatewithdrawal of those troops within the last 3 days of that time frame(Patterson, 4 8). William Fulbright (Arkansas) (Kennedy, 1971, 3). The first option was amilitary air strike, labeled a "Surgical Strike" by the Pentagon, whichwould probably need to be followed up by a massive invasion of Cuba(Kennedy, 1971, 12). (1971). In the short term, it is difficult toargue that this tactic was not the most effective means of resolving thecrisis. In fact, ablockade would not preclude the use of an all out invasion should thesituation deteriorate (Kennedy, 1971, 12). However, by the early 197 s, as it became clearer that the UnitedStates was losing the "conflict" in Vietnam, and as popular support by theAmerican public rapidly eroded, Congress increasingly felt compelled to actin order to restrict this powerful loophole Presidents were using to committroops. Thisoption was strongly supported by Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, andPresident Kennedy's brother, Robert. (1964). The War Powers Act of 1973 was a direct response by Congress torevelations regarding deliberate efforts to misguide Congress concerningthe military's activities in Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia, underthe Johnson and Nixon administrations (Patterson, 1995, 4 6). He argues that this occurs because the President issurrounded by people who owe their jobs to him and will often tell him whatthey want him to hear or what they think he wants to hear (Sorenson, 1964,37). However,there are certain conditions in the law which allow the President tocircumvent its spirit and use troops as he deems necessary. This tactic representsa dangerous twisting of the spirit of the Constitution which has cost tensof thousands of American lives. In fact, the US didnot have the technology to perform a surgical strike at that time whichmeant any attack would have involved the loss of substantial civilianlives. The law stipulates that Congress must be informed about the use oftroops within 48 hours of their initial use in an emergency situation(Patterson, 4 8). One can only wish he had chosen the better advice anddenied permission to the CIA to initiate a secret invasion of Cuba at theBay of Pigs. These legal maneuvers made it even moredifficult for the Soviet Union to justify its actions, for allies tosupport it, and for neutral nations to support its actions or look theother way during this crisis. This option was heavily supported by the Joint Chiefsof Staff, and after news of the Missile Crisis became public, by a powerfulSenator, J. The blockade was by far the most effective solution available toKennedy at that time. Patterson, T. When Franklin D. On September 6, 1962, the Soviet Union secretly deployed a number ofintermediate ballistic nuclear missiles in launchers on the island of Cubaas a response to intermediate nuclear missile launch sites controlled bythe United States in Turkey (Kennedy, 1971, 112). A closer examination of these three limitations is useful forunderstanding why stricter controls on the uses of American forces by thePresident are necessary. The second option considered by the Kennedy Administration for dealingwith the Cuban missile crisis was an air and naval blockade of Cuba. However, the law as written still gives the President 48 hours ofunmonitored use of combat troops for raids or any other purpose. It takes time for ships to sail fromRussian to Cuban ports. However, when Congress passes legislation, debatesinvolving a wider body of interests are made and a consensus is createdregarding what acceptable costs shall be incurred by a particular decisionor policy. (1995). Theyfretted that while US navy ships floated harmlessly around Cuba, themissile sights would become fully operational. One of the mostcontroversial tactics used by Kennedy was an air and naval blockade in thewaters surrounding the Cuban island. Truman avoidedinterference in his policy by calling the Korean affair a "conflict" ratherthan allowing Congress to declare it a war. F. However, the President has means of circumventing thisportion of the law as in the case of committing troops to peacekeepingmissions (with Congressional approval) and if he declares a nationalemergency. He allowed the CIA to plot and carry out theinfamous (and incompetent) invasion of Cuba known as the Bay of Pigs.President Kennedy also used the power to unilaterally make decisionsregarding war by continuing a policy first engaged in by the EisenhowerAdministration. A military invasion of Cubawould have failed for the very same reasons. Supporters ofthe military attack option argued that other choices (such as the blockade)would not force the Soviet Union and Cuba to remove the missiles. After careful examination of both the military and blockade options,as well as a careful analysis of the reasoning the Kennedy administrationemployed when opting for the blockade, it can be concluded that thePresident made the right decision-the decision in the best interest of theAmerican people and the world. E. The Act wasmeant to ensure Congress would have a hand in all future attempts to commitAmerican troops "in harms way" for extended periods of time. After all, Soviet cargo ships carrying missiles and componentsturned back before challenging the US Navy's quarantine line, thus openingthe door for the eventual dismantling of the missiles already on Cubansoil. Somehistorians have seized upon this issue of direct military intervention topoint out that in the long term, this tactic left a thorny problem in theUnited States' side by leaving Castro in power and free to meddle ininternational affairs throughout the western hemisphere for decades tocome. Kennedy commissioned his advisers to meet separately to develop variousoptions for dealing with the missile crisis. Additionally,these men argued that a blockade would offer the President a flexible meansof ratcheting up pressure on the Russians if necessary. We the people: A concise introduction toAmerican politics. By gaining the unanimous support of the OAS, the UnitedStates convinced them to pass a resolution calling for a blockade until themissiles were removed from the western hemisphere (Kennedy, 1971, 38).European allies of the US supported similar legislature before the UnitedNation's Security Council. Obviously, if all the missiles were not destroyed, the Cubans andRussians would see no other option but an immediate, retaliatory strike:plunging the world into a nuclear holocaust. Two options emerged almost immediately as the most viable means ofresponding to the Soviet Union's provocation. By the time Kennedy took office, there had beenplenty of precedence set by previous Administrations who decided to useAmerican troops without interference from Congress. By drawing "a line in the ocean" with the blockade,the United States appeared in the world's eyes as strong and determined,yet rational and constrained. This valuable time could be used for intensediplomatic maneuvers with the Soviet Union, for pressure to mount on theSoviet Union to turn ships back from other United Nations members as wellas the Soviet Union's allies (who didn't want to be destroyed in a nuclearwar any more than the Soviet Union's enemies did), and for breathing spacefor the Russian and American leaders to reflect on the dangerous cat andmouse game they were playing. At the initialmeeting, Kennedy and his advisors ruled out the option of doing nothing(allowing work to continue on the launch sights unchallenged) and agreedthat some form of action must be taken to oppose this unprecedented threat. Regarding limits of permissibility, Sorenson writes that a Presidentoften must deal with dissent, inertia, incompetence, or impotence among hisown advisors and appointees in order to formulate a coherent, effectiveforeign or domestic policy decision (Sorenson, 1964, 25). The United States would incurhuge military losses, there would be tremendous loss as far as innocent,civilian lives, and the Russians at the missile sites would be alertedearly and have plenty of time to launch their missiles. First, therewas little guarantee that the military hardware available in 1962 wascapable of successfully destroying the Cuban missiles. However, Congress provides a platform for all of the differentoptions and opinions to be heard and carefully weighed, thus, supposedlyproviding a more informed, supported decision. New York: Columbia University Press. Some of the best reasons for choosing the blockade were those putforth by McNamara and Robert Kennedy. Recently, Congress has comeclose to balking when asked to pass legislation supporting PresidentClinton's use of troops in Haiti. This tenet of the law was included as a result ofPresident Nixon's secret war in Laos and Cambodia. Today, Congress tends to support Presidential decisions regardingmilitary action out of fear of appearing weak on foreign policy orunsupportive of American troops in the eyes of the voting, American public. The blockade put the Soviet Union in theuncomfortable position of the party willing to push the world into nuclearwar if they crossed the quarantine line. In the decades since that missileconfrontation, historians and political scientists have debated whether thetactics employed by President Kennedy to resolve this dangerous crisis werethe most beneficial for the United States in the long run. While Thomas Patterson correctly argues that every President from Nixon toClinton has claimed the War Powers Act infringes on their Constitutionalpowers (and they are correct), no Congress has gone against Presidentialaction since the Vietnam War (Patterson, 4 9). The pro-blockade faction argued thatthis tactic offered limited response instead of immediate, total war (whichsooner rather than later would involve nuclear warheads). Kennedy's Decision to Use a Blockade in the Cuban Missile Crisis During fifty years of the Cold War between the United States and Cuba,the single incident which brought the world closest to nuclear conflict wasthe Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The second limit on Presidential decision-making is limits ofavailability of resources. This was a power enjoyed by every President before him sincethe Constitution stipulated that the President conducts war while Congressalone had the power to declare it (and finance it). However, at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, many militaryleaders and critics outside the government pushed for direct militaryintervention in the form of air attacks or outright invasion. When one realizes that the Soviet Union and the United Stateseach possessed more than 11, nuclear warheads, with each one 1 timesthe strength of the bomb which exploded over Hiroshima, then one realizesthat the US could not have possibly survived a military action against Cubain October of 1962. Presidents hadcommitted American troops simply by declaring situations as military,peace, or police actions. At the height of this sham, 15 , United States troops were fighting in Vietnam in what was supposedly a"limited police action." In the past Congress has rather meekly gone along with thePresidential interpretation primarily due to fear of appearing in theAmerican public's eyes as unsupportive of American boys carrying the flaginto battle. Furthermore, a blockade put theUnited States in the position of defender of the western hemisphere thusallowing them to build coalitions with western nations such as the membersof the Organization of American States (OAS) (Kennedy, 1971, 29). Thirteen days: a memoir of the Cuban missilecrisis. Sorenson correctly warns that Presidents who relyon information from official channels run the risk of being mislead ormisinformed. Limits on the President's Ability to Wage War At the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy had thepower to commit American forces to military action virtually at his owndiscretion. Sorenson points out that the resources at aPresident's disposal when trying to make a decision are often limited interms of manpower, time, credibility, and patronage (Sorenson, 1964, 28).Thus, Presidential decisions will usually be colored by material andpolitical costs. It isimperative that the restrictions on Presidential use of military force bestrengthened and Congress given a stronger voice in deciding where troopsare sent. Sorenson T.C. This was the use of United States military advisers inVietnam. Alertedimmediately, President Kennedy convened an emergency meeting of his topadvisors, military leaders, and intelligence officers. In their minds, a blockadeplaced around Cuban waters after the missiles were already operational wasa little like, "closing the door after the horse had left the barn"(Kennedy, 1971, 12). In the case ofthe Cuban Missile Crisis, the President received conflicting advice fromhis advisers: good advice in support of a blockade, bad advice supporting amilitary strike. References Kennedy, R. Decision-making in the White House: The olivebranch or the arrows. Roosevelt went before Congress and asked themto declare war, the costs and political ramifications were weighed andagreed upon by virtually all members of the Legislative body, rather thanconsidered by a small circle of friends and advisers who owe their jobs tothe President. Thousands of American men andwomen paid with their lives for this decision. Norton & Company. Theimpressive air campaign by allied and American aircraft in the Gulf War of1991 showed that a colossal amount of damage can be done by bombers andmissiles within a 48 hour period even when using conventional weapons. In fact Kennedy and his successor Johnson both used theirinterpretations of the Constitution, as a means of escalating USinvolvement in the Vietnam Civil War. If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.