U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN BOSNIA IN 1990S.   Term Paper ID:27026 Click to get this paper

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Paper Abstract: Examines evolution of Amer. diplomatic, political & military action, strategies, alliances, role of Presidents. Paper Introduction: U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN BOSNIA DURING THE 1990S This research paper traces the evolution of American involvement in and international strategy toward Bosnia during the period beginning with the outbreak of war among indigenous forces there in early 1992 and continuing to the present time. Outline 1. 1991-1992. The United States failed to develop an effective international strategy for coping with the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the war in Bosnia in large part because after the Cold War, its senior policy makers during the Bush administration did not view the United States as having any vital national interests involved in that conflict and, was therefore, determined to leave the diplomatic initiative for its Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. WallStreet Journal, p. . . 7). It remained content to follow the lead ofthe Europeans (and the UN) in resolving those conflicts. -The Croatian army ejected the Serbs from western Slavonia andKrajina areas of Croatia and Bosnian Muslim forces went on the offensive inparts of Bosnia, but not before the Bosnian Serbs captured Srebenica onJuly 12, 1995 and committed further atrocities which inflamed Westernopinion. 23 ). The American military commitment in Bosnia (PFOR) wasextended indefinitely, but also scaled down. (1998, March). (1998, January/February). Later, that force was downsized to 31, in July 1996 and renamed SFOR. The United States provided leadership of, andparticipated in, the NATO IFOR ground force which implemented successfullythe military provisions of the Dayton Accords. (1998). Dayton settled in principle most issues ofmilitary significance, cease-fire lines, separation of forces,demobilization, arms levels of the combatants, secure land corridors to cutoff areas such as Gorazde and other territorial questions. 1991-1992. yet no one familiar with Bosnia believes that peace will endure ...ifthe coalition force is withdrawn" (p. This resulted in thearrest of a few war criminals, but not the principal culprits, Karadzic andthe Bosnian Serb military chief, Ratko Mladic, who remain at large, acommon currency and other indicia of a modern state. A 18. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina ethnicconflict and international intervention. The reluctant superpower United States policy inBosnia, 1991-1995. Outline 1. Whose Bosnia? Holbrooke, R. Western fortunes and American prestige reached a new low ebbwhen Christopher was rebuffed by the Europeans in May 1993 when he tried topersuade them to support Clinton's 'lift and strike' policy, the threat toarm the Bosnian Muslims prevented from legally obtaining arms under theSeptember 1991 UN arms embargo for which the United States had voted and tohave NATO bomb the Bosnian Serbs if they continued to refuse to negotiatealong the lines of the Vance-Owen plan. 211). 255). 171). . 4). . G. Bert characterized Bush's policy toward Bosnia as"one of strict non-intervention based on the premise that no important U.S.interest was at stake there" but that it was accompanied by rhetoric whichincluded "a stinging rhetoric of Serbian aggression and a promise it wouldnot be tolerated" (p. Non-aligned nations could play off the superpowers againsteach other within limits, but Bert said "order and peace was oftenmaintained at the expense of the smaller powers, which had theirsovereignty abridged and their freedom of action limited" (p. International Strategy After the End of the Cold War (199 -1992) The international strategy of any nation contains three elements: itsforeign policy (ends or goals) and the means used to achieve those goals(foreign policy means, including the use of diplomacy, the threat of or useof military power, and economic tools, such as foreign aid, trade, etc.),as permitted or constrained by foreign policy resources (including thesinews of national economic and military capacity and strength, andintangible sources of national power, such as international prestige andreputation, national will and public support). Even today, four years after the signing of the DaytonAccords, legitimate questions can be raised as to whether American policymakers, the Congress or the American public sufficiently appreciate thelong-term nature of the commitments they have undertaken in Bosnia andwhether they are prepared to stay the course long enough to complete them. Until the Bosnians,Serbs and Croats decide to stop killing each other, there is nothing theoutside world can do about it" (Holbrooke, 1998, p. 1998 Congressional Quarterly Vol. 2 1). Implementation of the Dayton Accords To enforce the Dayton accords, a new international military force of6 , , 1/3 American, the rest European, with 2, Russians, all underNATO command, called IFOR, was established under Security CouncilResolution 1 31. The American Equipand Train program had what Boyd called "a spectacular impact," improvingthe self-defense capabilities of the Bosnian Muslims considerably. with almost no casualties" (p. Boyd said "the peace is holding... However, Bert said "the new, brutalized conflicts inthe world would appeal to citizens' humanitarian instincts and seemed tocall for intervention, especially when receiving high visibility in theelectronic media" (p. LIV, p. It looked at the timevery much as though, as Burg & Shoup put it, "the international communitypreserved a largely fictional Bosnian state while allowing Serbs and Croatsto partition it" (p. After some fighting betweenBosnian Serbs and Croatians broke out around Mostar in early March 1992,broader fighting, eventually involving the JNA as well as local BosnianSerb militia and Bosnian government forces, erupted in early April. U.S. 6 ). 7). Sharpe. Before the war was over, over3 , casualties had resulted and about 2.5 million internal and externalrefugees, over half the population, a humanitarian disaster on a colossalscale which had not been seen in Europe since World War II (Holbrooke, p.xv; and Burg & Shoup, p. Martin's Press. In returnfor their co-operation in this system, deals were struck between thesuperpowers and non-aligned nations, even those whose political systemswere antithetical to those of their superpower sponsor. 9). According to Bert, theAmericans were increasingly moving toward a larger role, and they had theirfirst big success when Muslims and Croats were prevailed upon to sign anagreement creating a Federation in March, but the net effect of efforts in1994 were inadequate, as the increasing boldness of the Bosnian Serbs inthe face of Great Power weakness led to the taking of hostages amongUNPROFOR troops, [and] the fall of the 'safe areas' of Srebenica, and Zepa(p. During the first year and a half of the Clintonadministration, policy confusion characterized American strategy toward thewar in Bosnia; however, the United States became increasingly more deeplyinvolved in an attempt to achieve a diplomatic solution and was impelled toconsider more forceful measures to end the fighting and associatedhumanitarian disasters. Boyd called the Dayton Accords which were finally reached after threeweeks of tough bargaining among FRY President Slobodan Milosevic, CroatianPresident Franz Tudjman and Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic as "abrilliantly negotiated agreement to support a dubious objective: thecreation of a nation where no common sense of national community existed"(1998, January/February, p. S. . Bush's Strategy Vis-a-Vis Bosnia (1991-1992) The Bush administration took a hands-off stance toward the fightingin Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. 61.----------------------- 1 Thenew President, however, was inexperienced in foreign affairs andessentially during his first year pursued what Bert called a "deliberatepolicy of inaction on Bosnia" (p. 2-3 . Conclusion American international strategy moved slowly and fitfully towardeventually assuming responsibility for ending the war in Bosnia through acombination of diplomacy and military (air) action and the deployment foran indefinite period of a NATO-led ground force to keep the peace. However, each bloc intervened in thirdcountries as necessary to maintain a balance between the superpowers,sometimes with military force as in Korea, Vietnam and elsewhere, and byother means. 5). 2-3 ). The civilaspects of Dayton were sketched only in the vaguest terms, a new multi-ethnic Bosnian state, a three party Presidency, elections supervised by theOrganization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE), guarantees of humanrights, the return of refugees and the authority of the International WarCrimes Tribunal in the Hague to try war criminals. Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Colin Powell was vocal in his opposition toAmerican military involvement in Bosnia. Perry and Shalikashvili told Congress that the Americancontingent would "complete its mission in twelve months and [then] bewithdrawn" (Holbrooke, p. In December 1997, Clinton extended theAmerican military commitment to SFOR indefinitely. There was alsoagreement that the dual key arrangement under which the UN had to endorseair strikes had proved cumbersome and unwieldy. 3. The Europeans continued to pursuediplomatic initiatives, principally the Vance-Owen plan, which envisaged ade facto partition of Bosnia along ethnic lines. One of the strongestactions taken by the High Representative who represents the alliedcoalition and the UN, Carlos Westendorp, was his dismissal from office inMarch, 1998 of Nikola Poplasen, a radical nationalist Bosnian Serb whodefeated in the September 1997 elections for the presidency of theRepublika Srpska the more moderate Biljana Plavsic (Two, 1998, March 13, p.61). . E. 41). The United States eventually asserted foreignpolicy leadership in seeking a negotiated end to the war which involved theuse of coercive diplomacy and NATO airpower against the Bosnian Serbs andtheir allies in Belgrade, which culminated in the Dayton Accords of lateNovember 1995; 4. Later, the United States accorded them, Bosnia and Macedoniarecognition, but Baker also said: "our vital national interests were not atstake. 43). Reassertion of American Leadership (1994-1995) In the spring of 1994, after the Vance-Owen plan and its successor,the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, failed, the United States took the lead informing the Contact Group consisting of the US, Britain, France, Germanyand Russia to re-energize Bosnian negotiations. A case in point wasJozef Tito's Yugoslavia, which broke with the Soviet Union in 1948, and"thereafter received considerable aid from the West" and which continued toenjoy friendly relations with the United States for a decade after Tito'sdeath in 198 (Bert, p. In Serb-held areas, ethnic cleansing, the forcible removal ofCroats and their murder, rape and robbery by Serb para-military forces withthe assistance of JNA, and some atrocities by Croats against Serbs inCroatia, and among Muslims, Croats and Serbs in Bosnia, began. (1997). peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity againstaggression, reduced and controlled arsenals and just treatment of allpeoples," suggesting an expanded interventionist role for the United Statesin the ethnic and religious conflicts which began to erupt as Cold Wartensions eased (Bert, p. References Bert, W. 1998-1999. Clinton Administration Non-Strategy (1993-1994) During the 1992 presidential campaign, Clinton had criticized Bush"for turning his back on human rights violations in Bosnia" and urged thatair strikes be launched against the Bosnian Serbs (Holbrooke, p. The Clinton administration had paid lip service to a new foreignpolicy for handling conflicts in the Third World under which the UnitedStates would intervene to help strengthen democratic forces and rebuildsocieties torn by civil war. The breakup of Yugoslavia and the war in Bosnia.Westport: Greenwood Press. Armonk: M. Burg, S., & P. It failed, however, to match its moreinterventionist rhetoric with appropriate actions. Mid-1994-1995. helped to create a crisis atmosphere forpolicy makers" (p. Economist, p. During the Cold War, a broad consensus existed in the United Statesthat its national interest would be served by containing the expansion ofSoviet power and communist ideology, provided this could be done withoutprovoking a nuclear holocaust. The United States has accepted responsibility forundertakings in Bosnia of indefinite duration and uncertain prospects forsuccess.War in Bosnia and U.S. Supplemental defense bill includes boosts for anti-missile systems,intelligence. Rogel, C. Current History, 97, 1 3-112. As the Cold Warended, the United States had intervened decisively to repel Iraq's invasionof Kuwait because clear national interests were involved, the protection ofthe West's crude oil supplies and the preservation of conservative Arabregimes in the region threatened by Saddam Hussein and Muslim radicalism.In justifying American intervention in the Persian Gulf War, Bush said: "anew world order" was at hand which entailed "new ways of working with othernations . If military force was to beused in Bosnia, NATO had to have command authority to deploy it as it sawfit. However, in reference to the war in Bosnia,Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger said: "this tragedy is notsomething that can be settled from the outside . Thecurrent defense budget for FY 1999 includes $1.9 billion for Bosnia, a dropin the bucket compared with the $1 billion estimated to have been spent onthe 1999 air war in Kosovo (Supplemental, 1998, p. This is a formidable task ofuncertain dimensions. New York: St. This produced,according to Bert, "a public backlash against the Somalia operation in theUS," which inhibited more forceful US action in Bosnia in 1993-1994 (p. When it became apparent that Croatia andSlovenia were gaining their independence, the Muslim parties which had wona plurality in the 199 parliamentary elections in Bosnia sponsored areferendum in late February 1992 in which 62.68 percent voted forindependence (Burg & Shoup, 1999, p. A 18). Holbrooke said "theEuropeans chose not to take a strong stand, restricting themselves todispatching UN 'peacekeepers' to a country where there was no peace tokeep" (p. Congress hasreluctantly approved the administration's requests for funds. TheUnited States has spent more than $1 million on military aid to Bosniaand other Muslim nations such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and theUnited Arab Emirates another $4 million (Burg & Shoup, p. The independence movement first erupted in theprovince of Kosovo where it was suppressed by the Serb-dominated FRY, butin 199 , Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence. Burg & Shoup said that in 1993-1994, "U.S.policymakers seemed enamored of airstrikes, but unsure as to when and howto use them" (p. American public opinion polls showed that as late as 1995 more than7 percent were opposed to American military intervention in Bosnia(Holbrooke, p. The politics of nationbuilding. 8). 164). -French troops in Bosnia had suffered the heaviest casualties. The primarythesis of this paper is that the United States failed for at least fouryears to develop and, therefore, implement through appropriate use ofdiplomacy and military force an effective international strategy fordealing with the Bosnian war because it suffered from confusion as to itsbasic objectives there and a lack of conviction that its vital interestswere involved. (1998). (1998). NATO's new mission: A 'values'enforcer. Little progress was made during the first two years after Dayton onthe civilian side, because of a lack of enforcement mechanisms, wholesalegovernment corruption, outright Bosnian Serb defiance, persistent Croatianfoot dragging and widespread distrust among all three former combatants.Under prodding from Albright, especially at a meeting of the PeaceImplementation Council's steering committee in Sintra, Portugal in May1997, "some limited steps' [were taken] to reinigorate the badly stalledefforts in Bosnia" (Cohen, 1998, March, p. 11). 23). The Yugoslav conflict had the potential to be intractable, but itwas nonetheless a regional dispute . Nevertheless, Cohen said "the reality today is a country that isregionally fractured, ethnically divided, and strongly dependent on foreignaid," [$5.1 billion since 1995] (p. What is clear is that the United States has enteredupon a fairly open-ended and long-term undertaking to underwrite politicalstability in Bosnia and elsewhere in the Balkan peninsula. ForeignAffairs, 77, 42-58. . Bert said that after the Cold War ended, "the collapse of the Sovietthreat led to a kind of indifference to many global developments on thepart of the United States" and "Third World conflicts were no longer givenhigh priority" (p. MadeleineAlbright at the UN, Lake and Holbrooke did their best to stiffenChristopher's spine. Cohen, L. The United States failed to develop an effectiveinternational strategy for coping with the disintegration of Yugoslavia andthe war in Bosnia in large part because after the Cold War, its seniorpolicy makers during the Bush administration did not view the United Statesas having any vital national interests involved in that conflict and, wastherefore, determined to leave the diplomatic initiative for its resolutionto the Europeans and to avoid at all costs any use of American militaryforce; 2. 3). . America took the initiative insupport of a somewhat more forceful and comprehensive international effortsto remold the Bosnian state and its institutions in a multi-ethnic mold,but many problems remain. Shoup. Bert said that during this period, the "Clinton administration'sdecisions on the war were made by a group of advisors divided on whatshould be done on Bosnia and by a President who could not make up his mind.The decision-making process was unstructured and undisciplined, evenchaotic" (p. (1999, April 11). (1999). 1996-1997. To end a war. 1 5). Garthoff, R. . New York: Random House. . 1993-mid-1994. Lyon, J. Bosnian Serbs led by RadovanKaradzic and Bosnian Croatians opposed a Muslim-dominated Bosnia. Under the pressures of a faltering economy and demands forindependence by its multi-ethnic components, the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia (FRY) began to breakup in the late 198 s, just before the SovietUnion itself imploded. Fearful after the Vietnam War ofbecoming involved in murky foreign political situations or wars withoutclearly defined military objectives and exit strategies, Powell "viewed thesituation in Bosnia as too complex to be susceptible to the kind ofmilitary approach he favored," sharp, decisive employment of American powerto achieve victory within a reasonable period of time (Bert, p. His predecessor,James Baker, had originally in 1991 sought to preserve the unity of FRY andopposed the recognition by Germany and later EU of Slovenian and Croatianindependence. xv). 31). The world wasdivided into two major power blocs, communist and non-communist, with manynon-aligned nations in between. 197). 211). 219). INVOLVEMENT IN BOSNIA DURING THE 199 S This research paper traces the evolution of American involvement inand international strategy toward Bosnia during the period beginning withthe outbreak of war among indigenous forces there in early 1992 andcontinuing to the present time. Baker and others sharply criticized the Serbs fortheir atrocities in Bosnia as reports of ethnic cleansing and attacks onSarajevo and other urban areas were widely reported. In late July, the United Statesunder Clinton's leadership finally persuaded the Europeans to issue anultimatum to the Serbs which led to a succession of sustained NATO airstrikes and coercive diplomacy led by Richard Holbrooke which finally ledto the opening of the Dayton talks on November 1, 1995. (1998, March 13). In 1999 on theeve of the Kosovo war, Madeleine Albright said that "a new and better NATO"was committed to acting "to ensure stability, freedom and peace in and forthe entire transatlantic area," which Clinton has defined to include theBalkans (Garthoff, 1999, April 11, p. 158). Whetherthis experiment in building a multi-ethnic democratic state in Bosnia willsucceed is unknown. The Bush administration had dispatched USforces under UN command to Somalia on primarily a humanitarian mission, butin 1993 they had then become involved in 'nation building,' a project whichterminated tragically with the death of a number of American rangers inMogadishu when they were opposed by local warlords. Boyd, C. 5).During this period, Holbrooke said "Bosnia continued to deteriorate,raising serious questions about the nature of America's post-Cold Warcommitment to Europe" (p. In May 1995, NATO conducted its first air strikes against BosnianSerb positions to relieve their siege of Sarajevo, but Holbrooke said theywere not "serious or sustained" (p. Sarajevo was unified andthe combatants were separated and partially disarmed. According to Bert (1997), "the Cold Warinternational system had two superpowers of roughly equal power, locked ina struggle for power and spheres of influence" (p. Burg & Shoup said"intense media coverage . M 1 and M 6. 2). He said "the US found itself without a clear missionfor its armed forces, and with a realization that the military would seefew crises jeopardizing its vital interests and requiring a quick responsethat would automatically be supported by the public" (p. 62). TheBosnian Serbs demanded their independence. 43). 378). Making Bosnia work. Undernewly elected President Jacques Chirac, France strongly supported thetougher American stance and helped bring the British and Germans around.All the Western allies were forced by Serbian advances and hostage takingto consider complete withdrawal of UN forces from Bosnia, which would havebeen humiliating and threatening to the cohesion of NATO. 12). In 1991, the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia) was 4,364,574of whom 43.7 percent were Muslim, 31.4 percent Serbian and 17.3 percentCroatian (Rogel, 1998, p. Los Angeles Times, pp. William Perry replaced Aspin at Defenseand General John Shalikashvili became Chairman of the JCS. During its first phase (1996-1997), Bert said "IFOR forces have keptorder . Two on the chin. JNA thenadvanced into eastern Slavonia, the Serb-dominated portion of Croatia, andat one point threatened the Croatian capital, Zagreb, before an armisticewas negotiated by Cyrus Vance for the UN and Lord Carrington for the EU inJanuary 1992. M 1). International strategyconsists of three basic elements or components: global strategy, regionalstrategy and strategy toward a particular nation or state. 63). 117). (1999, July 3 ). there was an undercurrent inWashington, felt but seldom spoken, that it was time to make the Europeansstep up to the plate and show they could act as a unified power" (Burg &Shoup, 1999, p. Advocates of more forceful action included VicePresident Al Gore and National Security Adviser Tony Lake; more cautiouswere Powell, Defense Secretary Les Aspin and Secretary of State WarrenChristopher. 11). What Dayton's failures teach the West. However, asBurg & Shoup pointed out, "the Bosnian Serbs engaged in ethnic cleansing ona scale greater than the rest" (p. The UNPROFOR force in Bosnia, which grew eventually tonumber 23, , was severely handicapped by the restrictive terms of itsmission under which, according to Rogel, "it had no authority to useweapons even to defend its own troops, much less to defend the localinhabitants" (p. The YugoslavArmy (JNA) withdrew from Slovenia after a six weeks' war which ended inAugust 1991 under a truce brokered by the European Union (EU). Several factorsaccounted for this change in American (and Western policy): -Public and GOP congressional pressure to lift the arms embargoagainst the Bosnian Muslims, who had been arming themselves surreptitiouslyfor some time with at least American acquiescence; -Changes in key personnel. Lyon (1999, July 3 ) said that"Dayton can only succeed if donor aid remains at current levels [$1 billionper annum plus NATO costs] for the next 2 years" (p. Little progress, however,was then made in reshaping Bosnian civil society into a viable multi-ethnicstate; 5. 1 3). If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.