U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD CHINA.   Term Paper ID:26758 Click to get this paper

Essay Subject: History since 18th Cent. Chinese regional relations, Korean & Vietnam wars, Nixon-Kissinger rapprochement, Taiwan, trade & investment, Tiananmen Square, human rights, recommendations.... More...

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Paper Abstract: History since 18th Cent. Chinese regional relations, Korean & Vietnam wars, Nixon-Kissinger rapprochement, Taiwan, trade & investment, Tiananmen Square, human rights, recommendations. Paper Introduction: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND CHINA This research paper summarizes the historical background of American foreign policy toward China, the present state of relations between the United States and China and recommendations for the future. China and the United States have dealt with each other for more than two centuries. American foreign policy has fairly consistently supported the emergence of a stable, less impoverished, less authoritarian and friendly China. Often, those policy hopes were not firmly grounded in Chinese reality, but rather reflected a peculiarly American view of how China should conduct its affairs. In the 20th century, they were repeatedly dashed -- by the Japanese invasion in the 1930s, the Chinese civil war, the Chinese military intervention in Korea, the internal convulsion of the Cultural Revolution, the Tiananmen Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. Tensionsbetween the United States and China were acute during the escalatory phaseof the American involvement in the Vietnam War, 1965-1967, which might wellhave, but did not, trigger a Chinese military response. . New York:xW.W. . Economist, 13. Any chance for normalizing relations was lostfollowing China's decision to intervene militarily in the Korean War in thefall of 195 . After the attack by the North Koreans on South Korea on June25, 195 and the successful American landing at Inchon, Chinese PremierZhou Enlai warned the United States indirectly that China would interveneif American forces crossed the 38th parallel. As Kissinger put it, "if . Isaacson, Walter. [15]Ibid. . The way was opened to full normalization of relations by the rise topower in the PRC of Deng Xiaoping (Deng) after 1977 as the dominant, later(1982) undisputed, leader of the PRC. After Vietnam was divided at the 17thparallel, the United States replaced the French as the principal supporterof the non-communist regime of Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam. as a condition to WTO membership. The United States againrecognized there was only one China, and finally abrogated the 1954 defensetreaty with Taiwan, but said "within this context, the people of the UnitedStates will maintain cultural, commercial and other unofficialrelationships with the people of Taiwan."[16] In March 1979, Congress tiedthe president's hands by passing the Taiwan Relations Act which declaredthat a non-peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue would be "a threat to thepeace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern" [tothe U.S.] and provided for American defense assistance to Taiwan. "Clinton's Muddled China Policy."Current History 97: 243-249.----------------------- [1]John King Fairbanks, The United States and China (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1971), 145. Deng'soverriding priority was to modernize the Chinese economy which requiredaccess to Western technology and trade, especially to the huge potentialAmerican market for Chinese exports. Tucker said, however, "once inthe White House, Clinton bowed to commercial pressures and Chineseintransigence," and renewed the PRC's MFN status in the spring of 1993,thus decoupling economic from human rights policies[2 ]. As aresult of the great strides China has taken in the 198 s and 199 s tomodernize its economy and governing structure, China is becoming a greatpower, a development which is troubling to many Americans, fearful of whatto expect from a well-armed communist state with a population of 1.3billion people and revisionist territorial and possibly expansionist aimsin East Asia. In 199 , Bush renewed Most Favored Nation(MFN) trading status for the PRC, which he had briefly suspended, and whichhad otherwise been in effect since 198 . The major development of the administration of Ronald Reagan was thebroadening and deepening of Sino-American trade and investment ties, whichby 1988 had produced bilateral trade of $13 billion and American privateforeign investment (FDI) in the PRC of $3 billion[17]. The challenge for the United States is to adapt itsChina policy to reflect the reality of China's growing economic andmilitary power while not sacrificing vital American political, economic andmilitary interests. American foreign policy toward China is subject to domesticpolitical attacks from both extremes of the political spectrum. On the eve of the Taiwan elections in December 1995and March 1996, the PLA applied military pressure on Taiwan by conductingnaval, air and amphibious exercises off the China coast opposite Taiwan.In March 1996, it fired three live intermediate range missiles into waterswithin 22 miles of Taiwan's northeastern coast. Kissinger. [12]Kissinger, 722-723. If the United States wishes tosupport democracy in Asia, it should begin planning seriously to defendTaiwan, "Asia's most vibrant democracy," against an armed takeover by thePRC.[25] Conclusion America's foreign policy toward China has slowly and irregularlyapproached the point where it is dealing with China on a more realisticbasis rather than letting its policy be unnecessarily hobbled byunrealistic expectations or exaggerated fears of the PRC. Nationalist China under Chiang Kai-Shek proved to be a fractiouswartime ally. Countering the Soviet threat was uppermostin their minds, but Spence said Mao "had grown deeply worried . As the American Navy's island-hopping campaign inthe Pacific succeeded, the importance of China as a base for the invasionof Japan receded. Neither is it a likely strategic partner, a termClinton has loosely thrown about. The Chineseeconomy slowed somewhat in 1998-1999 because of the Asian financialmeltdown. References Ambrose, Stephen E. TheTaiwanese elected anti-unification candidates. In the police terrorwhich followed, many more dissidents were rounded up and imprisoned. . [14]Stephen E. The Soviets withdrew all support. C. The key features of asuccessful future China policy will be maintaining policy on a fairly evenkeel and avoiding emotionally-driven extremes. The Search for Modern China. (September 1998). (1951). (199 ). In the joint ShanghaiCommunique of February 26, 1972, the United States and PRC acknowledged"there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China."[14] TheUnited States, which had acquiesced in the expulsion of Taiwan from, andthe admission of the PRC to, the United Nations in October 1971, agreed towithdraw eventually all its military forces and installations in Taiwan butsaid "it reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwanquestion by the Chinese themselves."[15] During 1972-1976, Congressionalsentiment in America and among Chinese leaders hardened over Taiwan. Tuchman, Barbara W. (1991). Tomlinson, Richard. Diplomacy. U.S. New York: Random House. . [17]Hsu, 867; and Michael Schaller, The United States and China in TheTwentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 199 , 2 1. Stoessinger said: as the 193 s drew to a close, the American people's image of China grew to heroic proportions--an image of a dogged, patient, indomitable people fighting with boundless determination against a brutal foreign invader.[5]Given their geopolitical objectives, Japan's militarists had little choicebut to launch its pre-emptive strike at Pearl Harbor after the UnitedStates cut off all American exports of oil to Japan in July 1941, primarilyover Japanese refusal to withdraw from China (and Indochina). Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W. China's tradesurplus with the United States in 1998 was $55 billion[23]. ," Economist, 24 May 1999, 13. During that period, the PRC was preoccupied with two earth-shaking developments: (1) Mao's attempts to energize his revolution, by theGreat Leap Forward (1958-1959) and the Cultural Revolution (1964-1971),both of which threw China into constant turmoil and effectively ruined near-term prospects for economic development; and (2) a deterioratingrelationship after 1959 with the Soviet Union, previously its principalexternal source of economic and military assistance. [25]"Real Democracy-Chinese Style," Economist, 12 December 1998, 4 . New York: Simon & Schuster. ." (24 May 1999). China and theUnited States have dealt with each other for more than two centuries.American foreign policy has fairly consistently supported the emergence ofa stable, less impoverished, less authoritarian and friendly China. [16]Hsu, I. [8]Barbara W. PresidentGeorge Bush, nevertheless, through intermediaries kept the lines ofcommunications open to Beijing. . The Chinese then ended their exercises. "China's Reform: Now Comes TheHard Part." Fortune,, 158-164. D. Schulzinger, Henry Kissinger (New York:Columbia University Press, 1989), 81. [11]Walter Isaacson, Kissinger (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992),335. The United States should stop beating its head against a wall onthis score, which it has been doing without success since at least 1941.To avoid stirring up Chinese xenophobia, future presidents must attempt tomodulate the effects of the demands of China-haters on the left and theright. "I SPY. Mao accused theSoviets of ideological heresy (revisionism) for pursuing possibilities ofdetente with the West. Stoessinger, John G. [2]George F. . (199 ). Kennan, American Diplomacy, 19 -195 (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1951), 39. (1 March 1999). Sino-American relations alsoremained troubled over the future status of Taiwan. Tuchman, Stilwell and The American Experience in China,1941-1945 (New York: Macmillan, 197 ), 531. .. Deng had dangled before Taiwan's leaders his 'One China,two political systems,' formula. Meanwhile, relations between the PRC andTaiwan worsened. New York: Simon & Schuster. War over Chinese shelling of the offshore islands of Quemoy andMatsu in 1954-1955 was avoided by American brinkmanship. After nearly 4 border skirmishes between Chinese and Soviet forces along the borders ofManchuria and Sinkiang province, intelligence sources revealed to Kissingerin 1969 "a relentless Soviet buildup along the entire 4, mile . Tsou, Tang. During the 1992 presidential campaign Bill Clinton criticized Bush forcoddling dictators in Beijing. The PRC encouraged Taiwanese privateinvestment on the mainland which reached $7 to $9 billion by 1993, thusmaking Taiwan something of an economic hostage to Beijing. The Rise of Modern China (New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 199 ), 79 . New York: Simon &Schuster. immune to Chinese authority.[1] The Open Door Policy (1899-1937).In 1899-19 , Secretary of State John Hay articulated the United States'Open Door Policy with respect to China which called for preserving theterritorial integrity of China and the equal (and preferential) treatmentof all foreigners there. Henry Kissinger. [2 ]Nancy B. (1992). New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press. For more than a century after the first Yankee clippersdocked in Canton harbor in the 178 s, American official contacts with Chinawere fragmentary and marginal. The principal irritants in Sino-American relations have beencontinuing American complaints over Chinese human rights abuses which theChinese regard as infringements of their sovereignty; nuclear andconventional arms sales by the PRC to Pakistan and Iran, which have beensomewhat offset by Chinese adherence to the Test Ban Treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the international Missile Technology ControlRegime; reports that PRC companies and officials made about $3 million inillegal political contributions to the Democrats in the 1996 presidentialcampaign; and the finding of the Christopher Cox House Select Committee onIntelligence that the PRC has engaged in large scale espionage of Americannuclear and other secrets since the early 198 s and that American satellitecompanies may have voluntarily provided the Chinese with classifiedAmerican missile technology. The Rise of Modern China. The United States should focus more of its attentionon dealing with Chinese international behavior and less in trying to shapeits internal affairs, over which, as the history of Sino-American relationsshows, American policy has little influence. theSoviet Union and China were more afraid of each other than they were of theUnited States -- an unprecedented opportunity for American diplomacy wouldcome into being."[12] In ending their isolation from the West, the Chineseleaders had mixed motivations. Schulzinger, R.D. Policy Recommendations All nations spy on each other, but there is little excuse for therecently reported security lapses by recent American administrations. Summing up the steady deterioration of theNationalist regime, its collapse in 1948-1949 and the correspondingdisenchantment of the United States government with its former ally,Tuchman said "China was a problem for which there was no Americansolution."[8] 1949-1971. The United States and China in TheTwentieth Century. [5]Stoessinger, 31. Clinton's capitulation, however, signaled to the Chinese that he could be pushed around, that they had strong allies among American business executives, that human rights abuses would not determine the boundaries of Sino-American relations, and that, in the end, their intractability would have no consequences.[21] Tensions intensified after Bush agreed to sell 15 F-16 jet fightersto Taiwan in September 1992. .Chinese border."[1 ] 1971-1988. America's Failure in China 1941-195 . [4]Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China 1941-195 (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1963), 15. Onpolicy, the Economist commented recently: "to engage with this rival [thePRC] -- to trade, talk, consult -- is essential. [23]Stanley Crock, "China and the U.S.: Sparks May Start Flying."Business Week, 16 November 1998, 223. Deng waswell-received during his visit to the United States in January 1979.Reagan reciprocated by going to Beijing in April 1984. byLin Bao's ambitions" [the PRC's Defense Minister whom Mao had called uponto curb the Cultural Revolution and who had aspirations to succeed Mao];and Schulzinger said Zhou "believed that an opening to the West would . Tsou said "America's relations with China were more strainedthan with those with any other ally."[6] Despite accumulating evidence thatmuch of the military and economic assistance sent by the United States toChina was wasted in a sea of corruption, the United States, PresidentFranklin Roosevelt in particular, persisted until well into 1944 with whatTsou called "the policy of making China a great power and treating her asone of the Big Four for the purpose of building a postwar political orderin the Far East."[7] General Joseph Stilwell, American military chief inChina and Burma, placed faith in reforms in the Chinese army. During the mid-198 s the flowering of the Sino-American relationship was marred bynumerous flaps and disagreements: over human rights abuses in China;increasing not decreasing American arms shipments to Taiwan which Schallersaid reached $7 million by 1988; the PRC's sales of nuclear technology toPakistan and missiles to Iran and other countries in the Middle East; andcomplaints by American firms about the wholesale piracy of theirintellectual property by Chinese firms.[18] From Tiananmen Square to the Current Situation 1989-1999.According to Hsu, Deng was "a curious mixture of economic progressivism andpolitical conservatism."[19] Deng made it clear in his Four CardinalPrinciples (1979) that the PRC would, despite his ambitious economicreforms, which introduced many elements of free market capitalism, stay onthe socialist path under the dictatorship/leadership of the ChineseCommunist Party (CCP). [13]Spence, 628; and R. (16 November 1998). . Despite frictions over continuing Chinese trade barriers, whichdelayed Chinese admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO), Sino-American trade and investment have continued to expand. Chinamight be plunged into further internal convulsions or it might evolvetoward less authoritarian rule over time. Historical Background 1784-1898. Stilwell and the American Experience inChina, 1941-1945. [3]John G. The United States and China. [9]Jonathan D. After lengthy negotiations, fulldiplomatic relations were established as of January 1, 1979. "Real Democracy-Chinese Style." Economist, 12 December 1998, 3-18. W.Norton, 199 ), 53 . Over the next 4 years, it would be invoked byAmerican statesmen to protest efforts by the European powers, Russia, andJapan to carve up the tottering Manchu Empire and its successors after theChinese Revolution of 1911. However, FDR was forced to withdraw Stilwell at Chiang'sinsistence in late 1944. envoy George Marshall failed in 1946 to mediate theconflict between the nationalists and the communists, the United States cutoff all aid to Chiang. Schaller, Michael. In any event, internal politicsin China cannot bemuch influenced by outside powers, if 5, years of Chinese history is anyguide. Chicago:University of Chicago Press. The United States might well face amilitary challenge from the PRC over Taiwan within the next decade andshould get ready for it, by keeping American naval and air forces in a highstate of preparedness and by strengthening defense ties with Japan,including theater anti-missile defense. The visits by Kissinger and President Richard Nixon toBeijing in July 1971 and February 1972 represented a new phase in Americanpolicy, the opening to China, which led to full normalization of relationsduring the administration of President Jimmy Carter. Often,those policy hopes were not firmly grounded in Chinese reality, but ratherreflected a peculiarly American view of how China should conduct itsaffairs. Stoessinger, Nations in Darkness: China, Russia, andAmerica (New York: Random House, 1971), 4 . To drop one's guard,even for a moment, could prove fatally wrong."[24] The United States should vigorously pursue its trading and investmentinterests in the PRC and insist on reciprocity in the form of lowered tradebarriers, proper legal protections, etc. [6]Tsou, 91. . (197 ). FOREIGN POLICY AND CHINA This research paper summarizes the historical background of Americanforeign policy toward China, the present state of relations between theUnited States and China and recommendations for the future. [21]Ibid., 244-245. (1963). (1994). [19]Hsu, 883. sawthemselves as the benevolent guardians of China," but they were not soregarded by the Chinese, who looked upon themselves as morally superior toall 'foreign barbarians.'[3] During the 193 s, growing Chinese nationalismand Japanese strategic and economic interests in China came into sharpconflict over Japan's conquest of Manchuria (1931) and its militaryincursions into northwestern China (1931-1936). New York: Macmillan. After special U.S. Although there have been some encouragingdevelopments, such as the emergence of multi-candidate elections at villagelevels, there are no signs the CCP is willing to give up control, nor isthere necessarily any direct correlation between economic prosperity andpolitical democracy, as Nazi Germany of the 193 s should remind us. He and otherAmerican officials urged Chiang to cooperate with the communist forces ledby Mao Zhedong (Mao) which were tying down large numbers of Japanesetroops. Kissinger, Henry. It is time tostrip away all the illusions and gear up for a long period during which theinterests of the United States and China in East Asia will sometimes runparallel and sometimes conflict. New York: Oxford University Press. During the late195 s and 196 s, Sino-American relations remained in the deep freeze,confined to isolated (134) ambassadorial meetings in Warsaw between 1954and 1968. . American Diplomacy, 19 -195 . Tucker, Nancy B. Between 1979 and1997, China's GDP increased from $43.6 billion to $9 billion with anannual growth rate in excess of 8 percent, exports increased 52 percent perannum and foreign investments in China stood at $22 billion at the end of1997, including at least $17 billion American FDI[22]. Ambrose, Nixon Volume Three (New York: Simon &Schuster, 1991), 516. Nixon Volume Three. Chicago:University of Chicago Press. That formulation was placed in jeopardy (in thejudgement of the PRC's leaders) by the pro-democracy movement of the springof 1989. However,growing sentiment for complete Taiwanese independence derailed desultoryreunification talks. The United States became the principal financier of the French effortto defeat the Vietminh in Indochina. Only the United States with Japanese helpcan keep those tensions within manageable limits. [18]Schaller, 223. From the time the Chinese communists proclaimed thePeople's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949 until Henry Kissingerlanded in Beijing in July 1971, Sino-American relations were characterizedby unremitting hostility. Kennan, George. The United States wasunwilling to go to war over Japan's full scale of invasion of China in 1937because, according to Tang Tsou, American "policy continued to reflect theview that China was not important enough to risk embroilment withJapan."[4] 1938-1969. Tucker added, Clinton's choice on MFN was the right one . Hsu, I.C. . [1 ]Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994),722. As George Kennan noted, the difficulty withthe Open Door Policy was that: time after time we would call upon other powers to make public confession of their adherence to these principles, [but] in no instance would we be prepared to use force to compel compliance with them.[2] According to Stoessinger, "Americans since the Open Door... The Joint Communique on Taiwan,therefore, downplayed Taiwan as an issue. Crock, Stanley. In response, the UnitedStates dispatched two aircraft carrier battle groups to the area butoutside the Taiwan Straits. Themassacre had profoundly negative effects on American (and world) publicopinion and temporarily disrupted the relationship between the UnitedStates and the PRC. lessen the excesses of the upheavals of the [Cultural] revolution."[13] Apart from the atmospherics and the establishment of consularrelationships, little substantive resulted from the 1971-1972rapprochement, largely because of Watergate and the disarray in the Chineseleadership after the death of Zhou and Mao. Tucker, "Clinton's Muddled China Policy," Current History97 (September 1998): 243. Traditionally a hawkon China policy, Nixon signaled a change when he said in an article inOctober 1997: "taking the long view, we cannot afford to leave Chinaforever outside the family of nations."[11] By opening up a dialogue with Mao and Zhou Enlai, Nixon and Kissingersought to play the Chinese card, -- i.e to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet schism and thereby to induce the Soviet Union and the PRC to be morecooperative and particularly to nudge the North Vietnamese toward asettlement of the Vietnam War. "China and the U.S.: Sparks MayStart to Fly." Business Week,, 223 Fairbanks, John King. Tensions remainedover Taiwan, but on August 17, 1982, the second Shanghai Communique wasissued under which the United States pledged to reduce gradually its saleof arms to Taiwan and to keep them at or below the 1979 level. The first treaty between the two countries(in 1844) followed the pattern set by the unequal treaties imposed by theBritish after the Opium Wars of 1839-1842, which incorporated the principleof extraterritoriality, which, according to Fairbanks, became a powerful tool for the opening of China because it made foreign merchants and missionaries, their goods and property . In the 2 th century, they were repeatedly dashed -- by theJapanese invasion in the 193 s, the Chinese civil war, the Chinese militaryintervention in Korea, the internal convulsion of the Cultural Revolution,the Tiananmen Square massacre of June 1989 and other actions by the Chineseinimical to American interests, including the recent revelations of Chineseespionage in the United States. [22]Richard Tomlinson, "China's Reform: Now Comes The Hard Part,"Fortune, 1 March 1999, 158-159. Another consequence was that Jiang Zemin, who hadhandled demonstrators in Shanghai more adeptly, became CCP GeneralSecretary and became China's President after Deng died in 1997. China is now a regional great power, but with six nuclear warheadsagainst the thousands possessed by the United States and with vastlyinferior military-industrial technology, it poses no direct military threatto the United States. (1989). [24]"I SPY. Before the war ended, theChinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) suffered nearly one millioncasualties in Korea.[9] The immediate impact of the Korean conflict was a hardening ofAmerican attitudes toward the PRC, whom the Americans regarded as a Sovietally and a threat to their interests in East Asia, and a strengthening ofdiplomatic, military and economic ties with the Nationalist regime onTaiwan with which the United States entered into a mutual defense treaty in1954. (1971). Norton. New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 199 . Since relations were normalized in the 197 s, American foreign policytoward China has been more firmly grounded in reality; nevertheless,relations between the United States and China have remained troubled, areasof mutual cooperation co-existing with areas of rivalry and tension. [7]Tsou, 32. Nations in Darkness: China, Russia, andAmerica. Spence, Jonathan D. . American policy has at times been weak oruncertain, such as during the 193 s, the mid-197 s and at times during the199 s. After much hesitation and internal disagreements within the CCPand the government, on June 3-4, 1989 armored forces of the PLA crackeddown on student demonstrators assembled in Tiananmen Square in Beijing.Hundreds of them were killed and thousands wounded. Cambridge:Harvard University Press. (1971). The Clinton administration justifies its policy of engagement withChina on the grounds that close political and economic ties will lead toeventual democracy in the PRC. 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