U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA.   Term Paper ID:25566 Click to get this paper

Essay Subject: Evolution in 1990s. Cuba's loss of Soviet support, impact of Cuban exiles, Castro's socialist leadership, human rights, politics, laws, economic emargo.... More...

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Paper Abstract: Evolution in 1990s. Cuba's loss of Soviet support, impact of Cuban exiles, Castro's socialist leadership, human rights, politics, laws, economic emargo. Paper Introduction: Fidel Castro's government did not collapse following the U.S.S.R.'s 1990 withdrawal of $6 billion in annual subsidies from Cuba. With the subsequent end of the Soviet Union itself there seemed to be no hope for Castro's revolutionary state. Yet, after almost ten years, the end is still not in sight and Cuba is making a gradual transition into the world economy via internal liberalization and the rapid growth of foreign investment from nearly every industrialized nation--except the U. S. American policy toward Cuba, rather than relaxing, has remained strongly weighted toward isolation and economic sanctions, and has even gone so far as to insist that U. S. allies and trading partners adopt the same stance. The passage of the Helms-Burton, or Libertad, Act of 1996 strengthened American opposition to normalization of relations with Cuba and laid down strict Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. business leaders, andamong Cubans, for whom the government "has translated the law and made itwidely available, deepening its citizens' distrust of the UnitedStates."[18] The Clinton administration has followed the letter of Helms-Burtonexcept in regard to Title III. . This was a significant changesince, following this radical innovation, such remittances have totaledbetween $8 million and $1 billion per year. Fidel Castro's government did not collapse following the U.S.S.R.'s199 withdrawal of $6 billion in annual subsidies from Cuba. Department of State, Assistant Secretary of State forEconomic and Business Affairs, Advancing Human Rights and Property Rightsin Cuba: The Role of Multilateral Coalitions, by Alan P. blockade" have long been two of the "pillars" on whichthe legitimacy of the revolution stood.[31] The notion of opposition hasbecome, partly through Castro's manipulation of the idea, a key to the ideaof Cuban sovereignty. The size of this sector ofthe economy can be seen by comparison with others: in 1995 the sugarindustry, almost in ruins since the U.S.S.R "abrogated sugar-for-oil barteragreements," earned only about $3 million, the nickel mines of theCanadian firm Sherritt International had revenues of approximately $25 million, and tourism accounted for between $7 million and $1 billion.[6] The undesirable impact of adding this stream of American hardcurrency to the aggressively courted foreign direct investment was that,since all Cubans did not have access to such funds or the luck to operatebusinesses such as restaurants which benefit from the combined influx oftourists and the competitive pricing of farm produce, great economicinequalities are rapidly becoming very common. [34]Edelman, 17. [8]Jatar-Hausmann, 88, 96. "Eyes on Cuba." Foreign Affairs, 75 (March-April 1996): 14-18.Helms, Jesse. [16]Rieff, 74. . policytoward Cuba, it could easily do so."[23] The exiled Cubans' lobby has,however, developed into a powerful and influential lobbying force becauseit works with "former major property holders in Cuba such as the NationalAssociation of Sugar Mill Owners of Cuba (NASMOC)and the Bacardi rumcompany" and with right-wing politicians.[24] The considerable forces in U.S. embargo against Cubawould have the eventual effect of bringing about his downfall. [11]Quoted in Rieff, 72. 113 (Winter 1998-99): 87-1 3.Rieff, David. Castro'sresponses to many American initiatives has been largely negative and heseems to have manipulated events in such a way as to force the UnitedStates to stick to its policy of severe economic sanctions. governmentand many business leaders acknowledge that it is perfectly possible that,at any time its suits him, "opportunities for capital investment and marketentry will be arbitrarily curtailed' by Castro and property may even beexpropriated all over again.[33] If Cuba can survive without a massiveinflux of American capital this will demonstrate that Castro was the rightleader after all. The first reason is the influence of Cuban émigrés andAmerican business interests who want the return of their property in Cubaand an end to Castro's rule. [13]Quoted in Rieff, 73. [23]Smith, 1 9. has become a central pillar of U. In July 1995 CubanMIGs shot down a plane, probably in international airspace, belonging tothe Brothers to the Rescue organization, which regularly leafleted Havanawith anti-Castro propaganda. Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs. By 1994 the official exchange rate of 1 peso to theU.S. [29]Ibid., 8. This law was far more severe than theTorricelli Bill, whose principal agenda was "about building pressure forreform" and took Castro's continued durability into account.[16] Helms-Burton, on the other hand, contained four sections which: increasedsanctions in order to "deepen the isolation of Cuba's economy" (Title I);instructed the president to develop an assistance plan for the transitiongovernment of Cuba, which was not to include either Fidel or Raúl Castro(Title II); demanded return of properties taken over by the revolutionarygovernment and permitted American citizens "to sue anyone who currentlyinvests in these properties" (Title III; and ordered the State Departmentto deny visas to the executives of any foreign companies who benefit fromthe exploitation of these seized properties (Title IV).[17] The lawinspired outrage among America's allies, among U.S. There has also been someliberalization of the economy in terms of the marketing of food by farmers,as nearly 75 percent of state farm lands were turned over to "cooperativesand private smallholders."[5] And, though private industry is stillillegal, individual entrepreneurs (shoe-makers, craftspeople, and others)have been permitted to sell their goods in open-air markets, and others(taxi-drivers, restaurant owners, hairdressers) have been allowed much moreextensive freedom. Larson(Washington, DC: 9 May 1999), available fromhttp://www.usia.gov/regional/ar/us-cuba/ran16.htm [2 ]Ibid. The European Union brought a majorcomplaint against the United States with the World Trade Organization overthis attempted "extraterritorial application of U.S. But the attempts by the United States todethrone Castro "have actually propped up his regime" and in this fact liesthe key to the problematic U.S. Remittances from relatives in the UnitedStates formed an enormous source of hard currency which the governmentcould tap if, largely via government-operated stores, it allowed citizensto spend the money sent them from America. At first the government's chances of survival seemedterrible. law targeting theirfirms."[19]. policy is the weakest. in every respect for many decades. electorate. policiesshould isolate terrorist regimes like . YetCastro has vacillated between a willingness to engage in talks and attemptsto increase Cuban hostility toward the United States. [12]Smith, 11 . But the sudden loss of the Sovietsubsidies resulted in a 66 percent reduction of Cuba's foreign commerce"and the terms of trade for the remaining third deteriorated by 4 percent."[2] The economy went into free-fall as the Cuban government wasfaced with the disappearance of basic imported goods and an increasinglyworthless currency. "Waiting for Fidel: Small Hopes and Great Travails in Havana." Dissent, Fall 1998: 11-17.Falk, Pamela S. .. At the same time the governmentengineered a crackdown on dissidents in which between 45 and 15 Cubanswere detained. But political repression in Cuba hasdeclined considerably in recent years and, in addition to the pressuresbeing applied by some of its major trading partners (such as the EU,Canada, and Mexico), Cuba must also conform to international standards onhuman rights if it wishes, as it does, to "fully participate in theOrganization of American States and hemispheric bodies such as the Inter-American Development Bank."[3 ] But the most important reason for U.S. [7]Edelman, 12. There has also been aserious decline in the much-praised social services and free educationoffered by the government and, overall, Castro's government has been hard-pressed to reconcile its revolutionary claim as the source of socialjustice "with both market freedoms and the inequalities that the marketgenerates."[7] Yet Castro has retained power and, though life is still a terriblestruggle for most Cubans, the nation has managed its new status better thanmost. The Democrats' support of theTorricelli Bill in 1992 did not net them a single extra percentage point ofthe Florida vote in 1992 and if either party wished to "change U.S. [14]Rieff, 73. 113 (Winter 1998-99): 92. "Cuba's Long Reform." Foreign Affairs, 75 (March-April 1996): 99-112.U.S. The administration, however, has suspended the provisions ofTitle III four times--effectively, if temporarily, nullifying it--anddeveloped an official Understanding with the EU in which, if the Europeanswould withdraw their case, the parties would work on developing a bindingagreement on avoiding investment in the contested properties. would also suspend Title IV, under which, the State Departmentsays that, thus far, "15 executives and their families have been deniedentry into the United States."[2 ] The State Department has also called onthe EU nations and others to join in exerting multilateral pressure on Cubato guarantee the end of human rights abuses. Smith, "Cuba's Long Reform," Foreign Affairs, 75 (March-April 1996): 11 . [33]Falk, 17. Senator Helms assumed that his law meant "farewell Fidel," as he putit, but its effect has been extremely limited and the Clintonadministration is hard-pressed to demonstrate that it has worked at all.As Larson, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairsputs it, "forging a multilateral effort to press for democratic change,respect for human rights, and development of independent civil society . policy toward Cuba.[9] The American response to Cuba since 199 has been characterized asbeing "in a Cold War time warp", for, despite the fact that Cuba haswithdrawn from Africa, ceased the promotion of revolution in Latin America,lost any military ties with the Soviet Union, and begun a very gradualliberalization of its economy, the United States "persists in tighteningthe screws."[1 ] The two principal actions taken since 199 have been theCuban Democracy Act (1992), also called the Torricelli Bill, after itsprincipal sponsor U.S. Helms is equally unafraid to claim that "U.S. [32]Anonymously quoted in Rieff, 75. [27]Quoted in Falk, 15. Available from http://www.usia.gov/regional/ar/us-cuba/ran16.htm----------------------- [1]David Rieff, "Cuba Refrozen," Foreign Affairs, 75 (July-August1996) 66, 71. Advancing Human Rights and Property Rights in Cuba: The Role of Multilateral Coalitions, by Alan P. [3 ]Smith, 1 5. policy toward Cubaremained severe in the 199 s and has only begun to relax slightly in thepast two years. The fact that Castro's Cuba has, thus far, managed some aspects ofthe transition from dependency more smoothly than many of the nationsformerly in the Soviet sphere of influence has not made the United States'position any easier. "What Russia Can Learn from Cuba." Foreign Policy, no. The second is the refusal of many right-wingpoliticians (and their constituents) to give in to a communist governmentthat actively opposed the U.S. [18]Ibid. hegemony--in any form--Americanpolicy is shaped in response to the fact that Americans, unlike the rest ofthe world, are simply not wanted in Cuba. As TomCox, the Council's director said, opposition to doing business with Cubawas based on the fact that "it's throwing Castro a lifeline, plain andsimple."[27] Senator Helms, and other right-wing politicians, areconvinced that "U.S. [4]Ibid. policy."[21] But, while othernations agree in principle to pressure the Cuban government on theseissues, their major concern, and Castro's, is that they continue trading.The assumption is that their presence in Cuba will be sufficient to do thejob. BibliographyEdelman, Mark. [1 ]Wayne S. allies and trading partners adopt the same stance.The passage of the Helms-Burton, or Libertad, Act of 1996 strengthenedAmerican opposition to normalization of relations with Cuba and laid downstrict conditions for the resumption of relations. [31]Edelman, 16. [9]Ibid. But business organizations such as the U.S.-Cuba Business Council,while supporting the claims of the exiles and the businesses whose propertywas expropriated, also object to socialism, communism, or any other systemthat is not committed to laissez-faire capitalism. [3]Ana Julia Jatar-Hausmann, "What Russia Can Learn from Cuba,"Foreign Policy, no. [5]Edelman, 12. [19]U.S. And, as the situation plays out, current American policy"provides Castro a ready-made explanation for any difficulty and ajustification for authoritarianism" on an as-needed basis.[34] BecauseCastro is determined to hold on to power, and because the Cuban peoplelargely remain firmly opposed to U.S. The plane carried one Cuban resident of theU.S. S.American policy toward Cuba, rather than relaxing, has remained stronglyweighted toward isolation and economic sanctions, and has even gone so faras to insist that U. Yet, after almost ten years, the end isstill not in sight and Cuba is making a gradual transition into the worldeconomy via internal liberalization and the rapid growth of foreigninvestment from nearly every industrialized nation--except the U. "Cuba Refrozen." Foreign Affairs, 75 (July-August 1996): 62- 76.Smith, Wayne S. As Edelmannotes, the "singular charisma and wiliness of Fidel Castro," acknowledgedeven by his enemies, and the long-term "confrontation with Washington, inparticular the U.S. Castro himself has made excellent use of anti-American feelingin the midst of severe economic hardship in the 199 s and has often takendefiant actions counter to American interests and scornful of internalattempts at political liberalization, the backbone of American demands.Castro has, in fact, "fetishized [Cuba's] political independence from theUnited States" and may look to "securing a place in history as a hero whoresisted the Americans to the end" as his principal legacy.[1] TheAmerican government's position, therefore, is based in very large part onthe strong belief that Castro's anti-Americanism is unlikely to disappearof its own accord and that any cooperative efforts (economic or political)would be subject to failure as soon as Castro perceived some practicalpolitical advantage in defying the U.S. Both laws were based on the assumptionthat Castro's fall was imminent and that the U.S. The United States, whichordinarily favors engagement over ostracism "with most other authoritariancountries," stands alone and in a 1995 U.N. The "Cuban exiles" explanation for currentU.S. response. Representative Robert Torricelli (D-NJ), and theCuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act (1995), known as theHelms-Burton law, after its sponsors Senator Jesse Helms (R-SC) andRepresentative Dan Burton (R-IN). Thethird reason is Castro's continued refusal to allow democratic governmentand cease human rights violations. Department of State. The Torricelli Bill, despite its confirmation of the embargo, alsoincluded important so-called Track II provisions such as a call for"assistance, through appropriate non-governmental organizations, for thesupport of individuals and organizations to promote nonviolent democraticchange in Cuba."[13] Thus the Clinton administration adhered to theembargo concept but simultaneously designed an alternative by building intoits policy encouragement for "humanitarian relief organizations and humanrights groups to step up their activities in Cuba"--a plan that "alarmedthe Castro regime more than the original passage" of the Act.[14] In response to this growing change in Clinton's policies Castro'sgovernment tried to avoid increasing internal opposition by taking twoactions guaranteed to provoke a hostile U.S. In returnthe U.S. From 1972, when Cuba entered the Council for Mutual EconomicAssistance (the Soviet-backed common market), until 1985 Cuba's economygrew by almost 6 percent annually. TheTorricelli Bill assumed that Castro's regime had been exposed as "a failedmodel of government and development" and that the situation in Cuba"provided the United States and the international democratic community withan unprecedented opportunity to promote a peaceful transition to democracyin Cuba."[11] The attempt to include the rest of the world in the Americaninitiative was, however, a monumental failure. The average monthly wage in Cuba was 16 pesos, which was "notenough to buy a pound of pork," and the black market in dollars and goodsgrew so rapidly that it was beyond government control.[3] The governmentcould have cut demand through massive devaluation of the peso to its black-market level but the devaluation and the accompanying depreciation of realsalaries would have been even more disastrous than the existing situation.A similar move by Russia in 1992 had produced a year-end inflation rate of2,5 percent and the Cuban economy could not absorb such shocks withoutimmense support from the International Monetary Fund or some otherinternational source--support that would not be forthcoming in light of theAmerican economic embargo.[4] The Cuban government had already opened the country to increasedforeign direct investment in tourism and mining and had liberalized someaspects of the society--including the reinstatement of religious freedom--as part of the effort to attract investors. and three American citizens. [28]Jesse Helms, "What Sanctions Epidemic?" Foreign Affairs, 78(January-February 1999): 5. [6]Rieff, 64. There are several important reasons why U.S. Cuba" and deplores theindifference to human rights violations committed by Castro.[29] While Helms' claims are somewhat disingenuous the problem of humanrights in Cuba is not inconsiderable. dollar no longer disguised the exchange rate on the streets--13 pesosper dollar. Larson. Russia's gross domestic product (GDP), for example, shrank by anearly incredible 42.5 percent between 1989 and 1997 while Cuba's GDP,after a 35 percent drop in 1989-1993, "has managed to recover and growevery year since then"--with a projected 1999 growth rate of fourpercent.[8] The country is still a police state and basic rights aredenied on almost every front. Falk, "Eyes on Cuba," Foreign Affairs, 75 (March-April1996): 18. [22]Pamela S. And they resentCastro's survival--which seems to undermine their own arguments. As one anti-Castro Cuban dissident said, Americanscriticize Cuban policies but "were we to choose another way, we would haveto compromise our sovereignty [which means] we would have to give youAmericans too much of a say in our affairs."[32] Thus the U.S. With thesubsequent end of the Soviet Union itself there seemed to be no hope forCastro's revolutionary state. S. The fourth reason, however, is the mostimportant. [24]Jatar-Hausmann, 98. Thus activegovernment policy toward Cuba has not relaxed significantly, despite agrowing chorus of criticism from American business interests, fearful ofbeing shut out of the developing economy, and many others who feel thatnormalization of relations is the only way to effect a transition todemocracy and an open economy. And many American business leaders, seeing a potential boom in Cuba,now claim as well that "the U.S. [21]Ibid. [15]Quoted in Rieff, 74. [25]Ibid. Cuban exiles' opposition to any leniencytoward Castro and insistence on the return of property seized by thegovernment has had a disproportionate political effect considering thenumbers of Cuban exiles in the U.S. S. [17]Jatar-Hausmann, 89. policy is that Castro simplywants as little to do with the United States as possible. Washington, DC: 9 May 1999. Although PresidentClinton signed the bill, his administration has often taken a softer linetoward Cuba and has made overtures with offers of extensive aid for atransition government that would ensure democratic government, humanrights, and the return of American property seized in the revolution. General Assembly vote on theembargo the result was 117 to 3.[12] Only Israel and Uzbekistan voted withthe United States--and both countries trade with Cuba. [2]Mark Edelman, "Waiting for Fidel: Small Hopes and Great Travails inHavana," Dissent, Fall 1998: 11. [26]Quoted in Jatar-Hausmann, 89. politics and business that opposehaving anything to do with Castro or a socialist government in Cuba onideological grounds worked with former property holders in Cuba (such asNASMOC and Bacardi) and various exile-oriented lobbying groups "in draftingpunitive legislation such as the Helms-Burton law."[25] This explains theheavily claims-oriented nature of that law, which might, however, never beput into practice even if Castro is overthrown by his own people because,as Ricardo Alarcón, president of Cuba's National Assembly, noted, it wouldnever be possible to pay "the estimated $1 billion we supposedly owe tothose who left [because] its represents for us 5 years of exports."[26]. As Castro's brother, General Raúl Castro announced, "ourconception of civil society is different from that of the Americans."[15] Within two weeks Congress voted to make Helms-Burton law andPresident Clinton signed the bill. "What Sanctions Epidemic?" Foreign Affairs, 78 (January- February 1999): 2-8.Jatar-Hausmann, Ana Julia. sanctions helped bring down the Soviet Union [by]play[ing] a pivotal part in forcing communist Poland to release politicalprisoners and legalize Solidarity--sparking the collapse of communism."[28] This position, which seems to go counter to the equally common right-wingclaim that Soviet communism collapsed on its own because it simply couldnot work, retains immense political importance with some sectors of theU.S. But the 1994 crisis could be most easily met with officialratification of what had become unofficial policy, i.e., the legalizationof the use of American dollars. business community has been a force fordemocratic change in other countries in the past" and the same will be truein Cuba.[22] In review, none of the rationales for American policy holds up--except for the undying opposition of Castro to American political oreconomic hegemony over Cuba. 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