CIVIL WAR IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA.   Term Paper ID:24757 Click to get this paper

Essay Subject: Examines economic, political, cultural, religious, ethnic & psycho-emotional roots of conflict among Serbs, Croations & Muslims. History, leadership, issues, negotiations.... More...

9 Pages / 2025 Words 8 sources, 11 Citations, APA Format $36.00 Return to List of Papers

Paper Abstract: Examines economic, political, cultural, religious, ethnic & psycho-emotional roots of conflict among Serbs, Croations & Muslims. History, leadership, issues, negotiations. Paper Introduction: Reports from the former Yugoslavia of civil war, the siege of cities such as Vukovar and Sarajevo, and such atrocities such as ethnic cleansing - another euphemism for genocide - and camps where women are kept with the sole purpose of being raped by their captors, have been recurrent items in the news media. The media have offered little insight, however, into the intricacy of the conflict. The inherent complexity of the situation has been increased by the poorly defined conception of the three parties involved regarding their motives. The Serbs, the Croatians and the Muslims have each been portrayed as both the aggressors and the victims of the conflict. The actions of these three parties have been commonly understood, if not accepted, as the manifestation of centuries-old ethnic tensions exacerbated by, and allowed undisciplined expre Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. He and the media routinely referred to the Croatians in generaland Ivica Racan, leader of the Croatian Communists, in particular, asmembers of the Ustasa. Silverstein, B. Rarely, however, does it erupt into the kind of sustained,organized violence seen in the former Yugoslavia. When Marshall Tito led Communist Yugoslavia, he sought to maintain abalance of power among the various ethnic groups by appointing asubstantial number of administrative positions in all of the regionalgovernments to the minorities of each state. Under the termsof the partition, jurisdiction of each town or region is granted to theethnic majority of that region. Social psychological studies of intergroup and interpersonal conflicthave revealed a negative bias regarding the perception of enemies and theiractions. While these mayhave been merely symbolic acts in the push for independence, they easilycould be read as hostile by a Serb population conditioned by Milosevic'srhetoric to see evidence of Croatian neo-Fascism. In their defense, Yugoslavian Muslims fought on all sidesduring the war for a wide variety of reasons, and they were killed indisproportionate numbers by all opposing sides (Malcolm, 1994, pp. (1996). As is the case with the accusation that theCroatians are members of a revived Ustasa, the association betweenYugoslavian Muslims and Islamic Fundamentalism is simply inaccurate. The actions of these three parties have been commonly understood, ifnot accepted, as the manifestation of centuries-old ethnic tensionsexacerbated by, and allowed undisciplined expression within, the social,political and economic anarchy that followed the collapse of communism.Such tension is not uncommon in places where different ethnic groupscoexist. To achieve this goal, Croatia must rid itself of the oppressivepolicies of Tito's Communist Yugoslavia as well as any subservience toMilosevic's proposed centralist government with its increasing anti-Croatian bias. But the unignorable severity of thereference served to create a dangerous link between the Croatians and theUstasa in the minds of many Serbs. They are not armed battles, but this cannot beexcluded yet. Biases in the perception and cognition of theactions of enemies. Ironically, the religious component of Muslimidentity has strengthened in the wake of the strong anti-Muslim rhetoric ofboth Milosevic and the Croatians. 45, pp. 73). Thesezones are surrounded by territories belonging their respective enemies.Any imported goods or supplies are vulnerable to the looting that hasbecome common practice among both the Serb and Croatian forces. Although theseproposals would not become official until June 1991, Yugoslavia wasbeginning to disintegrate. Bosnia is, therefore, highly desirable. The fall of Yugoslavia. Neither of the two parties willing to employsuch methods has enough might to establish its dominance effectively.Furthermore, the use of military force is, by definition, counterproductiveto the attainment of any peaceful resolution. NewYork: Pantheon Books. The influence of this bias creates the following tendencies. This policy has some inherent flaws,however. 53). People tend to expect hostility from groups perceived as dangerous(Kelman, 1965, p. Like Milosevic, he is singularly motivated by hispolitical ambition. Peopleare more likely to pay attention to, interpret and remember any threateningactions of their enemies than when perceiving non-enemies. Bosnia, a short history. The official position, as presented by Tudjman, is that his reformsare a necessary element for the development of a Croatian free marketeconomy. In fact, the basic perceptualprocess becomes a matter of simply assuming the worst about the enemywhenever any ambiguity exists. Journal of Social Issues. 213). Chicago: News and Letters. He has repeatedly shown an insensitivity in hispolicies that have done little to negate the Serbian accusations ofCroatian fascism. The inherent complexity of the situation hasbeen increased by the poorly defined conception of the three partiesinvolved regarding their motives. In their place, signs were put up withonly the Roman script. While the ethnictensions exist and have certainly played a part, they were not a self-sufficient cause for the violence and atrocities that have taken place. New York. When he came to power, hismain ambition had been to rewrite the federal constitution to establishSerbian dominance and then rule a united Yugoslavia through the existingcommunist structures. Once a group or an individual is identifiedas an enemy, any trust, defined here as the assumption that the other willnot act with malevolence, is rescinded. The Serbian response to his address was overwhelming andconvinced Milosevic that the most powerful tool that could be used toconsolidate his power lay in the fomentation of Serbian nationalism.Milosevic became a master at stirring up hatred and violence against non-Serbs, even in those areas where there had been little or no recent historyof ethnic tension (Wermouth, 1996, p. The perceived role of situational pressure is minimized as amotivational factor for the enemies' hostile actions and emphasized withregards to their friendly actions: in other words, friendly actions arenot seen as proof that the enemy is genuinely conciliatory, whileaggressive actions will serve to prove that the enemy is hostile. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. When communication breaksdown, however, the cycle of mistrust and non-cooperation can escalateunchecked until it reaches a destructive level of aggression. Devoid of passion,Milosevic has never shown any affection or concern for the populace to whomhe owes his position (Glenny, 1992, p. Thelooting, if practiced persistently, combined with the dissatisfaction ofthe leaders concerning their thwarted goal of dominance over Bosnia, may beperceived, by either party, as a justifiable reason to resume thehostilities. xxi). Milosevic initiated a similar campaign of anti-Muslim rhetoric byclaiming that the Serbs must be on guard against the forces of IslamicFundamentalism. The Serbs, the Croatians and the Muslimshave each been portrayed as both the aggressors and the victims of theconflict. The Bosnian Muslims are one of the mostsecularized Islamic populations in the world. Although this flag is thetraditional banner of Croatia, it was flown as a symbol of Croatiannationalism by the Ustasa and has since become associated with Fascism inthe minds of most Yugoslavians. Acloser look into the psychology of the involved parties and their leadersshows that the hostility was based on economic and political motivations,rather than those of ethnicity or religion (Malcolm, 1994, p. Given the incompatibility of the official Croatian position of anecessary independence from Slobodan Milosevic's Serb-dominated, centralistYugoslavia, the Serb position of a powerful, unified Yugoslavia which musteither absorb, or protect itself from, the nationalist Croatia of FranjoTudjman and the perceived necessity of both parties to gain political andeconomic control of Bosnia, the most important question is: How will thewarring parties resolve the conflict? The official Muslim position is to advocate for the preservation ofthe unique multinational and multicultural character of the republic ofBosnia as well as for that of the other states of the former Yugoslavia(Helsinki Watch, 1992, p. The catalyst for overt hostility stemmed from the irreconcilabledesire of both parties to gain jurisdiction of Bosnia. Bosnia-Herzegovina: Achilles heel of Westerncivilization. The defining characteristics of Islamic Fundamentalisminclude political extremism and a fierce political and cultural hostilityto any Western influence. Negotiation has been attempted, with intermittent success. (1996). Milosevic began to use and encourage the use of anti-Croatianrhetoric. TheSerbs also implemented a sustained program of terror and militaryintimidation against the Croatians. Withoutnegotiation, the situation worsens, and escaping further conflict becomesincreasingly difficult. This includes the organized campaign of "EthnicCleansing" as an attempt to eliminate the Muslim presence altogether. Tudjman's acts have served only to increase the furor ofanti-Croatian sentiment among the Serbs who felt justified in their beliefthat they were being severely discriminated against. In the early 198 s, hepublished a book titled Islam Between East and West in which he praisedsuch facets of Western culture as the Renaissance, European literature,Christianity, Anglo-Saxon philosophy and culture and the social democratictradition. War crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Serbs and Croatians, or at least their leaders, Milosevicand Tudjman, simply have no desire to end the hostilities until theirobjectives are met. Slobodan Milosevic is arguably the most dominant figure in theYugoslavian conflict. Upon coming to power in the spring of 199 , Tudjman enacted policiesthat could easily be interpreted as anti-Serbian. A policy of partitioning Bosnia has been implemented. The red and white checkered flag of Croatia was re-introduced and flown from every state building. 31). As a result, the image of the enemy will beheavily biased by this assumption. vol. Milosevic addressed the crowd. Furthermore, the fact that Izetbegovic was nominated andelected as a leading member of the Party of Democratic Action, or SDA, themain Muslim political party in Bosnia, is an indication that no organizedfundamentalist movement existed to oppose him. With both sides firmly entrenched in their belief that the other washostile and therefore an enemy, military actions would soon replacerhetoric. On June 28, 1989, a gathering of thousands of Serbs met outside of theKosovor capital, Pristina, to celebrate the 6 th anniversary of thehistoric battle of Kosovo. But hisaddress had a dark twist to it: "After six centuries, we are again engagedin battles and quarrels. Thompson, M. WhileTudjman has no claim to innocence regarding his role in the conflict, hispolicies seem to stem from a misguided and careless naiveté rather than acalculated viciousness. As stated above, when a party is identified as an enemy, any trustthat would otherwise be extended to that party is withheld. Wermouth, P. Friendlyactions may be attributed to hostile motivations, such as the intent todeceive or manipulate (Silverstein, 1989, p. In October 1989, Slovenia responded to Milosevic's rise to power bydrafting a new Slovenian constitution and explicitly declaring its right tosecede. New York: McGraw Hill. (1989). He assumed the leadership of the SerbianCommunist Party in September 1987, after carrying out the politicalassassination of his one-time mentor, Ivan Stambolic. A paper house: The ending of Yugoslavia. Nobody must ever again dare to beat this people" (Malcolm,1992, p. Another key personality in the conflict is the President of Croatia,Franjo Tudjman. (1965). 44). Furthermore, the reluctance or refusal tocooperate deepens the level of mistrust. The use of force, however, isobviously not going to work. In fact, the majority of themore than 2 million Bosnian Muslims are actually converted Slavs who do notthink of themselves as religious believers and follow some of the Islamicpractices only as a matter of respect to their culture and tradition(Malcolm, 1994, p. New York: Penguin Books,USA. Myers, D.G. This distrustimpedes the cooperation necessary for negotiating with the enemy. There havebeen periods of relative peace, each of which has been followed by renewedfighting. Accusationsagainst enemies are awarded more credibility than statements that denyenemy wrongdoing. In addition, A discontinuity ofterritory exists for substantial number of the partitioned zones. Glenny, M. Croatia soon proposed its own plans for secession. But, more often, thesource of information comes in the form of interpreted reports of theenemy's actions or statements. The media have offered little insight, however, into theintricacy of the conflict. 8 ). As is usuallythe case with patriotic celebrations, the speech glorified the virtues ofthe homeland, creating a feeling of pride among the celebrants. The partition is viewed as an unacceptable compromise to theSerbs and the Croatians, both of whom have forcibly expressed their desirefor the complete control of Bosnia. It is a statement has an impact similar tothat of seeing a swastika flying above Berlin's City Hall. Racan'sfamily had actually been killed by the Ustasa; therefore, this associationwas completely unjustifiable. 33). In 199 , Alija Izetbegovic was elected President of Bosnia, making himone of the most prominent Muslims in the Balkans. New York:Human Rights Watch. 576). He is an unscrupulous man who is motivated primarilyby his political ambition. Social psychology experimentshave shown that communication can restore trust when it allows opposedparties to learn each other's real motivations and to come to a mutuallysatisfying agreement (Myers, 1996, p. Milosevic used strong anti-Croatian and anti-Muslim rhetoric in order to create this unity and to harness it as a sourceof political power. (1992). The opinion held by the few people who know both menis that Tudjman is noticeably less intelligent that Milosevic. By August 1991, the cycle of Serbaggression and Croatian retaliation had escalated into to the level of afull scale war. Sincethe highly uncooperative parties cannot have complete control over theregion, both the Serbs and the Croatians have sought dominance through theuse of military force. The actions of enemies are interpreted as more hostilethan the similar actions of non-enemies. International behavior: a social psychologicalanalysis. Reports from the former Yugoslavia of civil war, the siege of citiessuch as Vukovar and Sarajevo, and such atrocities such as ethnic cleansing- another euphemism for genocide - and camps where women are kept with thesole purpose of being raped by their captors, have been recurrent items inthe news media. The widely accepted belief among the Serbs now is thatthey must fight to protect themselves from a fascist Croatia. This perception can be used to unify a populationagainst the perceived enemy. Helsinki Watch (1992). He was and is, however, universally loathed in everyYugoslavian state except Montenegro and Serbia. People assume that enemies willact with hostility in the future. As a result, adisproportionate number of Serbs were employed in the Croatian government.Tudjman reassigned these positions in favor of the Croatian majority,thereby consigning thousands of Serbs to unemployment. The image of an enemy should ideally be constructed by directperceptions of the enemy's actions or statements. Kelman, H.C. References Malcolm, I. (1992). 51-71. Their rights andinterests were being curtailed by a Croatian government whose actionsconveyed a deepening hostility. The bilingual signs,seen throughout Croatia, that featured both the Serb Cyrillic script andthe Roman script of the Croatians were removed from all public use such asstreet signs and railway stations. Social Psychology. The Ustasa were a group of extreme Croatiannationalists who collaborated with both the Nazis and Mussolini's Italianforces in their occupation of Yugoslavia during World War II. 222). (1994). 189-192). While isolated incidents of violence have been perpetrated byindividual Muslims, little or no evidence of any organized fundamentalistmovement, antagonistic or otherwise, has surfaced in the recent history ofthe Balkans. Milosevic has capitalized on this beliefto further unify the Serbs against the Croatians and strengthen hispolitical power. No fundamentalist could have written anything so antitheticalto the cause. Bosnia is too great a prize and the preservation ofhuman life, whether Serb, Croatian or otherwise, has never been the primaryconcern of either of the two leaders. Muslim extremism does have a precedent in the Balkans in the form ofthe Handzar Division, an all-Muslim volunteer group that joined Hitler's SSin World War II. In all probability, the conflict will not be resolved until one of thefollowing happens: the combatants have destroyed one another and theirmeans of continuing the conflict; one of the sides establishes dominance;Milosevic, Tudjman and the other motivating personalities have left theirpositions of power and influence and in their place are those whoseinterests are aligned with a more harmonious situation; outsideintervention enforces a peaceful coexistence; or all of the warring partiesrealize that a peaceful resolution, however compromising and conciliatory,is better than a continued state of war. This region hasproven valuable both economically and as a home to a roughly equal numberof Serbs, Croatians and Muslims, each of which has as much claim to theterritory as the others. Even among the Serbs inBosnia, he was viewed as one in whom one should not invest any real hope(Glenny, 1992, p. New York: New YorkUniversity Press. If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.