MARSHALL PETAIN & VICHY REGIME.   Term Paper ID:24010 Click to get this paper

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Paper Abstract: Life & career of WWI French hero & historical/political forces leading him to be despised puppet of Nazis during WWII. Paper Introduction: Marshal Pétain and the Vichy Regime This paper will discuss the leadership of Marshal Henri-Philippe Pétain in Vichy France during the Second World War. The first part of the paper will briefly look at the development of Pétain's reputation among the French people during the First World War. The second part of the paper will examine how Pétain was selected to lead the French government in the wake of the military defeat by the Germans in 1940. The third part of the paper will discuss the Vichy government and its effect on France during the war. Marshall Henri-Philippe Pétain became one of the most notable heroes of the French nation in the Twentieth Century during the Great War of 1914-1918. His fame erupted during the siege of Verdun in 1916, when French troops under his command halted a massiv Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. Pétain would later write that government control of the pressand propaganda was vital during wartime in order to maintain civilianmorale, and that the maintenance of civilian morale was vital to themaintenance of troop morale.[5] By 194 , Pétain was the paramount living hero in France. The highest-ranking militaryleaders thought it more honorable to accept an armistice than to continuefighting an invader. Armistice allowed the Germans to believe that they had not reallylost the war and laid the foundation for German revenge in the next war.Ironically, this belief eventually led Pétain to believe that the Armisticein 194 was not a true defeat for France.[4] Moreover, the mutiny of 1917 deeply affected Pétain. [7]New York Times, June 12, 1945. The collaboration of the Vichy government with the Germanoccupiers was not universally popular amongst the French. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1983), 147-49. The Americans especially wishedto commence with an invasion as early as possible, worried that the Germanswere about to deliver a mortal blow to the Soviet Union. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1983.Stokesbury, James L. General Weygand, the commander-in-chief of theFrench forces, declared this unacceptable, for outright surrender wouldbring shame to the French Army. Moreover, the French and British could not muster enoughmilitary strength to retake France; only the United States could do so, andthere was no sign that Americans were willing to enter the war anytimesoon.[12] The second problem with carrying on the fight from North Africa wasthe British. The third part of thepaper will discuss the Vichy government and its effect on France during thewar. [9]Robert Aron, The Vichy Regime, 194 -44 (New York: The MacmillanCompany, 1958), 27-32. [13]Aron, 23. He had objected to the prewar military doctrine whichemphasized offensive action above all else. He had acquired some notoriety within theFrench Army as an advocate of armored warfare and as a commander of thefirst French armored units. It was the more junior officers, such as de Gaulle,who wished to continue the fight. His fame erupted during the siege of Verdun in 1916, when Frenchtroops under his command halted a massive German offensive in one of thebloodiest battles in human history. French civilians were watching events in Russia, readingleftist propaganda, and reacting to the letters from their loved ones atthe front. and the Origins ofthe C.I.A. No one in the Vichy government was comfortable with collaboratingwith the Germans who had defeated France. Hispessimistic nature was naturally suited to the circumstances facing theFrench in the Summer of 194 . [2]Jean-Raymond Tournoux, Sons of France: Pétain and De Gaulle, trans.Oliver Coburn (New York: The Viking Press, 1966), 18-21. After the invasion of North Africa, the Germans occupied VichyFrance; Pétain was eventually arrested by the Germans in August 1944 andplaced in custody on a chateau. They reasonably believed that theAllies would be unable to quickly liberate France and that the Germanswould retaliate by occupying all of France, including the southern portioncontrolled by the Vichy government. The Frenchpopulation listened to his ruminations on virtually any subject put to him. The creation of the Vichy government effectively divided the Frenchpopulation. He was ordered to take overcommand of French units in 1917 when they mutinied against orders to takethe offensive. Many joined theResistance movement, secretly cooperating with the Allied military attacksupon the Germans in France. They also feared the return of thephysical ravages of war to French soil.[16] More likely than an Allied operation in France in 1942 was aninvasion of North Africa. The Allied invasion of North Africa exposed the divisions existingwithin the Vichy government and the remaining armed forces controlled bythe Vichy government. [15]Paxton, 291-98; John F. Our Vichy Gamble. He had seen whole battalions mowed down by German machine gunsin 1914 because the reigning doctrine adhered to by the French High Commandsaid that morale would always triumph in the end. Major-General Sir Edward Spears in Two Men Who Saved France:Pétain and De Gaulle (New York: Stein and Day, 1966), 69-128. Lasting for nine months, the battlecost the Germans approximately 434, casualties, the French 542, . However, some members of theVichy government, led by Pétain, were committed to carrying out their endof the "bargain" with the Germans. The Vichy Regime, 194 -44. President Reynaud had argued for just thiscourse of action. [19]Smith, 149. Pétain was shunted aside as a pessimist and defeatist, until thehorrific French casualties of 1914 and 1915 proved him right.[2] Many have argued that Pétain's prewar reputation was actuallydeserved, although not for the reasons for which it was originally earned.He was inherently cynical and viewed all events with a strong sense ofskepticism. New York: W.W. He publiclyaccused Marshal Foch and the French political leaders of ending the warbefore it was won. Some colonialists alsofeared that an invasion would stir up unrest amongst the native populationin North Africa and reduce the French influence in the region. The Allies wanted to gain Vichy collaboration in the upcoming invasion ofMorocco and Algeria, collaboration which would ensure quiet landings.[17] The Allies made contact with both pro-Axis and pro-Allied Vichyelements in an effort to hedge their bets. As direct commander ofthe French Army in 1918, his strategy was to hold on to the status quountil the American troops arrived.[3] His cynicism and pessimism only grew after the war. His cynicism was only reinforced by his experiences in theGreat War. [8]William Langer, Our Vichy Gamble (New York: W.W. [16]Paxton, 3 1-3 2. The top military leaders announced that they preferredan armistice to continuing the fight from abroad. These fearsled to considerable opposition to secret Allied proposals for negotiations. Oliver Coburn. Theycould not field enough troops and equipment to defeat a concerted Germandefense of the invasion sites. And he revelled in the position of teacher. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958.Langer, William. [5]Pétain, 119-23. The second part of the paperwill examine how Pétain was selected to lead the French government in thewake of the military defeat by the Germans in 194 . Smith, The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.Tournoux, Jean-Raymond. The Resistance fightersaccused the Vichy of bowing to the German oppressors, giving up allhonor.[15] The ultimate break between the pro- and anti-Vichy camps camewith the Allied plans for the invasion of North Africa, in the Fall of1942. [18]Bradley F. As a result, theFrench Army was in no shape was in no shape to undertake offensive actionthe following year.[1] Pétain's role in the Battle of Verdun was more than just that ofmilitary commander. Trans. This distrust was reinforced by the Dunkirk evacuation,when the British pulled most of their forces out of France two weeks afterthe German invasion, and by the British refusal to commit any more militaryforce to France.[13] Reynaud suggested another alternative. Norton & Company Inc., 1947.Paxton, Robert O. The French, British, and Belgian armies wereeffectively defeated less than twenty days after the initial invasion. The death sentence and itscommutation personalized the continuing divisions in France concerning theFrench collaboration with the Germans. And "bargain" is an apt term, for theydid not believe that France had truly surrendered to Germany; it had simplyreached an armistice in order to avoid a long-term defeat. [2 ]Tournoux, 211-13. [4]Tournoux, 69, 117-18. He believed that the only victorious outcome could havebeen the complete defeat of the German Army and the occupation of Germanyitself. More than anything else, this was indicative of thepoor morale infecting the French military. "Une Crise Morale de la Nation Francaise en Guerre [A Crisis of Morale in the French Nation At War] (1926). [3]Tournoux, 25-34; Stokesbury, 227-37, 259-6 ; Robert O. Moreover, even as masses of Americantroops began arriving on French soil, he still feared defeat during thesurprise German offensives in the Spring of 1918. He blamed therevolts on a loss of morale on the part of the whole country. De Gaullewas virtually the only person in the government willing to leave forEngland; therefore, his eventual status as leader of the Free French forceswas natural.[1 ] Despite the fact that de Gaulle was the only member of the governmentwilling to leave France, he was not the only one who had argued that theFrench military should regroup in the North African colonies and continuethe fight against the Germans. However, Pétain argued that abandoning French soil wasunacceptable and that the French leaders must accept an armistice and guidethe French people through the upcoming trials and tribulations.[8]Pétain's standing with the French people eventually ensured that hisarguments won the day. and the Origins of the C.I.A.. Those French commanders and officials who appearedamenable to cooperation with the Allies wanted assurances that they wouldpersonally retain control over the administration of North Africa after theinvasion.[19] The 1942 negotiations between the Allies and certain Vichyauthorities in North Africa illustrated the permanent divisions in VichyFrance. De Gaulle was relatively unknown tothe French public at this time. The Allies werefurther motivated by the basic weakness of their forces in 1942. He argued that developments intechnology had made weight of firepower all important in combat and heasserted in 1914 that a French Army without much heavy artillery or adoctrine which emphasized the use of machine guns was unprepared for modernwarfare. [6]Paxton, 37. [17]Paxton, 3 2-3 3. [1 ]Spears, 131-32. Certainly, many French feared the expected "SecondFront" opened by the Western Allies. His response to the mutinous units was to summarily executethe mutiny's leaders and then tend to the demands of the French troops, whowere physically and psychologically exhausted after three years ofslaughter with no victory in sight. His units had performed valiantly during theinvasion but they had been greatly outnumbered by the Germans andunsupported by the French. Major-General Sir Edward Spears. When defeat occurred in 194 ,he readily assumed the task of teaching the French people how to survivethe imposed armistice and the seemingly chaotic times ahead. A Short History of World War I. An armistice, on the other hand, would bea political act, preserving the Army's honor.[14] In retrospect, Reynaud had no chance of persuading the government tofollow his course. The first part of thepaper will briefly look at the development of Pétain's reputation among theFrench people during the First World War. [12]Langer 31-32. Pétain had harbored a deep distrust of the British since theGreat War, when he believed that the British had not shouldered enough ofthe war effort. He gave lessons to the French on the basicvalues of social stability, telling them that these would get them throughthe bad times ahead.[6] The German campaign in northern France in May/June 194 resembled theGreat War not at all. Moreover, the Allies hadshown no capability of beating the Germans in battle, much less defeatingGermany in the war. Therefore, they sought out Vichy military commandersand civilian officials who could take command of the French forces duringthe invasion and ensure cooperation with the Allied forces.[18] The main problem with this plan was that Pétain and the Vichyauthorities in France viewed such cooperation with the Allies and treason.Not only were Pétain and the others committed to cooperating with theGermans, but their attitudes had been hardened by the British attacks onFrench naval forces in North Africa in 194 . He readily accepted theinvitation and instructed a delegate to ask the Germans for armisticeterms.[9] By the time Pétain's government asked for an armistice, GeneralCharles de Gaulle had fled to London. Sweets, Choices in Vichy France: TheFrench under Nazi Occupation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 137-69. Not onlywere the French soldiers affected by the general conditions at the frontand the apparent uselessness of their efforts, the French people wereaffected by the unending nature of the war and by Communist/Socialistpropaganda. The top field commandersthen declared that they felt obligated to follow Pétain and Weygand andaccept an armistice. [14]Aron, 23-24. He said that a surrender bythe military would affect only the military; the government could flee toNorth Africa and take control of the military forces there and officiallykeeping France in the war. After the war, he was tried by the newFrench government and sentenced to death, although the court immediatelycommuted the sentence to life imprisonment. Marshal Pétain and the Vichy Regime This paper will discuss the leadership of Marshal Henri-PhilippePétain in Vichy France during the Second World War. Quickly, Frenchmen began killing Frenchmen.Vichy sympathizers accused the Resistance of assisting the Allied airattacks which were killing French civilians. Sons of France: Pétain and De Gaulle. As Pétainargued, this would appear to the French civilians as abandonment. Knopf, 1972.Pétain, General Philippe. Paxton,Vichy France: Old Guard and New order, 194 -1944 (New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 1972), 35-37; General Philippe Pétain, "Une Crise Morale de laNation Francaise en Guerre [A Crisis of Morale in the French Nation At War](1926); trans. Under this plan, the French forces in the colonies wouldbe able to take advantage of French naval power which, in combination withBritish naval forces, would be able to attack German forces whereverpossible.[11] Opponents of this course of action saw two main problems with it.First, and most important, the government and the military would be leavingthe French civilian population at the mercy of the Germans. Marshall Henri-Philippe Pétain became one of the most notable heroesof the French nation in the Twentieth Century during the Great War of 1914-1918. In Edward Spears, Two Men Who Saved France: Pétain and De Gaulle. TheGerman forces crossed into Belgium, Luxembourg, and France on May 1 ; byJune 11, Paris had been abandoned by the French government. They were also worried that they wouldsustain heavy casualties if the French forces in North Africa decided toresist the invasion. Choices in Vichy France: The French under Nazi Occupation. New York: William Morrow & Co., Inc., 1981.Sweets, John F. TheGermans nearly achieved their objective of bleeding the French Army white,but almost did the same to their own army. WinstonChurchill made a trip to Tours in an effort to keep the French fighting,telling the French leaders that Britain would never give up the fight.[7]Some of the French ministers were willing to lead the fight from bases inNorth Africa. On June 16, Paul Reynaud resigned as President andPétain was asked to form a new government. Vichy France: Old Guard and New order, 194 -1944. With a larger population,Germany could better afford such losses than France. There were too many French who,like Pétain, had decided that collaboration was the better course thanactive or passive resistance.[2 ] BibliographyAron, Robert. Trans. New York: Alfred A. Norton & CompanyInc., 1947), 26-27. He was unable tomaterially reduce the slaughter at Verdun, even though he technically heldthat advantage of being on the defensive. Such an event threatened retaliation by theGermans in the form of occupation of Vichy France. Stokesbury, A Short History of World War I (New York:William Morrow & Co., Inc., 1981), 14 -48. After the destruction of his units, he had beenbrought into the French government just as it was fleeing Paris. The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. New York: Stein and Day, 1966.Smith, Bradley F. Inaddition, the population would be subjected to reprisals for actions takenby the military. [11]Langer, 23-26. New York: The Viking Press, 1966.----------------------- [1]James L. They refused toaccept what everyone else did: that France had been decisively defeated.Their refusal to accept this and their subsequent collaboration with theGermans ultimately placed them on a collision course with the majority ofthe French people, with the resulting collision taking place after theAllied liberation of France in 1944. If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.