"RISE TO GLOBALISM" (STEPHEN AMBROSE).   Term Paper ID:23776 Click to get this paper

Essay Subject: Critical review of work on irrationality of Cold War-based U.S. foreign policy, 1938 to early 1990s.... More...

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Paper Abstract: Critical review of work on irrationality of Cold War-based U.S. foreign policy, 1938 to early 1990s. Paper Introduction: Stephen E. Ambrose, in Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938, argues that the foreign policy of the United States since before World War II and into the 1990s has been based on largely irrational factors, rather than on any coherent vision of global reality or this nation's proper place in that reality. Changes in presidents from Truman through Bush had minimal effect on the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, especially with respect to the number one goal of that policy---the containment of Soviet Communism. Containment as a policy became so increasingly entrenched through the Truman and succeeding administrations that it carried the strength of an addiction for the leadership of the country. The very basis of U.S. foreign policy in this period was the ideology of the Cold War which saw the world controlled by two forces---the U.S. and its evil enemy Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. foreign affairs for almost fifty years (and may againshortly, considering the instability of the former Soviet states), was"upset" when he read the speech Truman was to give to Congress spelling outthat policy. continues to torture that poor island'speople out of a refusal to adopt effective policy rather than admit pastmistakes. With his assassination (a result, in part, of just thatflexibility?) and the ascension of Lyndon Johnson, strict Cold War ideologywas re-established, with the Vietnam War its major consequence. Bush's Desert Storm was likely a one-time phenomenon, andClinton's downsized involvement in Africa and the Middle East seems toreflect that improvisational, realistic trend. or theSoviet Union) could have in the past. Kennedy certainly entered office under the pall of thesame Cold War ideology and its containment policy, as evidenced by his"missile gap" rhetoric, his increase in advisors in Vietnam, and the Bay ofPigs invasion of Cuba. policy, though his test-ban treaty with the Soviets, his denunciationof the CIA after the Bay of Pigs disaster, and his plan to withdraw fromVietnam indicate at least a willingness to consider more flexibility inthat policy. It was a general realization that, given the twin restraints of fears of provoking a Russian nuclear strike and America's reluctance to use her full military power, there was relatively little the U.S. power in that nation. . For example, almost forty years after the Castro-led revolution inCuba in which our corrupt puppet dictator, the Mafia-backed Batista, wasoverthrown (Ambrose 167), the U.S. President Reagan showed an awareness of these limits in Poland, Afghanistan, and even Central America, and in withdrawing from Lebanon (xv). foreign policy,especially with respect to the number one goal of that policy---thecontainment of Soviet Communism. If we criticize Reagan on the right, we also must criticize Kennedyon the left, in terms of the willingness of every President from Trumanthrough Bush to profit politically from the exaggerations of Cold Warcontainment policy. We will never know whether he would have alteredU.S. Certainly Ambrosehimself offers no clear path for U.S. Presidents from Eisenhower through Johnsonhad to have deliberately ignored such information which made clear thatrevolutions in Third World nations were not inspired by Soviet intrigue butwere expressions of indigenous rage at repression from within and without. Clinton's slapdash approach, including a willingnessto pull out of a nation (Somalia, for example) when the policy proves to bedisastrous and counter-productive, may be the wisest policy the U.S. Bush'sDesert Storm was perhaps the last gasp of Cold War policy, a throwback tobattling the "evil empire," with Saddam Hussein and radical Islam replacingStalin and communism. The change inLebanon policy was a matter of public horror at the Marine deaths from aterrorist bombing, and not any well-considered realization of the limits ofU.S. His point is more wisely that these presidents were in effectenthralled captives of a policy much bigger than they or their advisers. Perhaps this is the scholar's habitually calm tone. . power in shaping the world in an era of globalism.Globalism includes the realization that no nation, no matter how powerful,can control the world as it was at least imagined a nation (the U.S. In the context of this charge and massive supporting evidencestaring us in the face as we look back over the last fifty years, it wouldseem that Ambrose should be coming to more drastic conclusions than hedoes: At the end of 1992, following Clinton's victory in the election, the nation was still groping for a policy to guide its foreign relations in the post-Soviet union, post-Cold War era (397). needs in an era ofglobalism. However, for a foreign policy to be sane, at the very least, and, atbest, effective in achieving desired goals, that policy must be based onthe latest accurate information. Ambrose, in Rise to Globalism: American Foreign PolicySince 1938, argues that the foreign policy of the United States sincebefore World War II and into the 199 s has been based on largely irrationalfactors, rather than on any coherent vision of global reality or thisnation's proper place in that reality. It is not surprising, after World War II and the division of Europeinto West and East, that Truman adopted George Kennan's containment policy.The Cold War, with all its paranoia and military build-ups, seems inretrospect almost inevitable in the wake of the horrors of World War II. Ambrose effectively argues, then, that American foreign policy in theperiod under study was often more a reaction to past events than to currentsituations. To Kennan, Truman (and, by extrapolation, every succeedingPresident through Bush who stood firmly on containment) went way too far inbasing containment on military means (81). The very basis of U.S. If this is true, and U.S. If anything, Ambrose is tookind and generous to American Presidents and foreign policy makers,granting them a flexibility in places where it seems that they alteredcourse simply because it was unavoidable, rather than as a result of anywisdom or rational analysis. BibliographyAmbrose, Stephen E. Ambrose, in fact, notes thatGeorge Kennan, the father of the basic containment-of-communism policywhich dominated U.S. For example, Ambrose writes that Ronald Reagan, perhaps the mostideological of the Cold War Presidents, had to face the rising evidence ofthe limits of U.S. The Cold War andcontainment policy led to massive economic costs created by military build-ups, and finally to the division of the country over Vietnam, which inretrospect was an insane war for which the nation is still payingeconomically, psychologically and spiritually. Rise to Globalism. Ambrose correctly does notplay the "blame game' in assessing responsibility for the costs of thispolicy. Ambrose is absolutely correct,and convincing in his well-reasoned and thoroughly documented thesis, whenhe argues that the United States has proved to be a bumbling giant gropingits way half-blind into the future and into its role in a world shaped byglobal rather than national powers and events. foreign policy. Containment as a policy became soincreasingly entrenched through the Truman and succeeding administrationsthat it carried the strength of an addiction for the leadership of thecountry. Perhaps Clinton's approach, so denounced as aimless, is after alla sign that at long last American leaders have begun to learn the lessonsof history and have accepted the limits of U.S. Once this policy was in effect, it had a life of its own, and noleader of the U.S. It may be precisely what the U.S. policyabroad. had the courage or wisdom or political independence totry to alter that policy in any significant way. And even in those instances where policy wasre-designed to reflect global reality, the leaders too often expressedregret that they had to abandon previous policy. power in designing aprofoundly downsized and much more realistic foreign policy. leaders will simply have toimprovise a policy from crisis to crisis, as Bush and Clinton seem to havebeen doing. foreign policy in this period was theideology of the Cold War which saw the world controlled by two forces---theU.S. Changes in presidents from Trumanthrough Bush had minimal effect on the conduct of U.S. From Truman through Bush,Presidents followed a policy which erroneously and disastrously assumedthat all political and economic reform movements in Third World nationswere not indigenous but were inspired instead by the evil Communist leadersof the Soviet Union. leaders continue to deal increasinglypragmatically with foreign affairs, it may not be the disaster some believeit will prove to be. However, it is also true that Reagan tried to install a harebrainedmissile defense in the heavens, saw the Soviet Union as an "evil empire,"and referred to the Vietnam nightmare as a "noble" war. Itseems reasonable that some aggressive policy toward the perceived enemy---the Soviet Union---was adopted (82-83). could accomplish by force of arms. and its evil enemy the Soviet Union. Stephen E. New York: Penguin, 1993.----------------------- 7 This philosophy of fear, hatred and ignorance was atthe heart of the containment policy of the U.S. canmuster in a world where it still has some clout, but must ration that cloutto retain it and to be able to wield it effectively in the future. The point Ambrose makes, and with which this reader concurswholeheartedly, is that all these American leaders and their foreign policymakers were controlled by an ideology which in the long run hurt the UnitedStates, even considering the collapse of the Soviet Union. Part of Ambrose's thesis is the argument that it was the failure ofAmerican policy makers to even acknowledge past mistakes, much less try tocorrect them, that was the basis of much if not most of failed U.S. . And can we say Reagan accepted limits of U.S.power in Central America simply because he did not invade El Salvador orNicaragua outright? The point here, and in Ambrose's book, is not to attack Reagan or anyother individual leader or policy-maker. policy in the post-Cold War era.Perhaps there simply is no clear path, and U.S. As Ambrose writes with respect toReagan and the lingering lesson of Vietnam: The failure of containment in Indochina led to another basic shift in attitude toward America's role in the world. Clinton's apparently makeshift approach to foreign affairsreflects, after all, a complete rethinking of U.S. If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.