"DISMANTLING THE COLD WAR ECONOMY" (ANN MARKUSEN & JOEL YUDKEN).   Term Paper ID:22194 Click to get this paper

Essay Subject: Critical review of work on Cold War economic problems, impact of arms race on U.S. industry & opportunities for post-Cold War conversion.... More...

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Paper Abstract: Critical review of work on Cold War economic problems, impact of arms race on U.S. industry & opportunities for post-Cold War conversion. Paper Introduction: This study will examine Dismantling the Cold War Economy, by Ann Markusen and Joel Yudken, considering the chief problems associated with the Cold War economy, the impact of the Cold War on U.S. industry, and the possibility and opportunities of economic conversion from Cold War imperatives, as well as the obstacles to that conversion. The argument herein will be that despite the fact that the military domination of the Cold War economy created serious obstacles to post-Cold War conversion, and despite the fact that those obstacles are deeply entrenched despite the end of the Cold War, such conversion is possible. Perhaps the authors are overly optimistic in this regard, but it would still be going too far to argue that conversion is impossible. After all, the conversion to a military-industrial-dominated economy (which had its origins not in the Cold War but Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. . However, in a time of economic crisis,the change is even more difficult and costly. The economic requirements of the 199 s do not get the undividednation's attention as did the military requirements of the 194 s. The authors go on to argue that an economy which was able to adapt tothe sudden needs of the military from the 194 s on could do the same thingin response to the non-defense needs of that same society. Despite these doubts and difficulties and obstacles, the conversionremains necessary, and many opportunities are included in the formula forthe future as well. . The arguments of the authors is that the Cold War economy wasdominated by the military-industrial complex, and that that complex"developed a business culture that favored glitz and gimmickry over costminimization and concentrated marketing efforts on lobbying and negotiatingwith the Pentagon" (xv). BibliographyMarkusen, Ann, and Joel Yudken. Everybody knowsthat this conversion must be accomplished, but there remains greatdisagreement over which path to take. The urgency of adapting toa war economy in the 194 s was undeniable, and the focus of that urgentadaptation was singular---the enemy was at hand and clear militaryobjectives had to be met as quickly as possible. In the first place, as we read, the kind of cooperation betweengovernment and private industry and funding which marked the Cold War eracould be repeated in the post-Cold War conversion of the economy. The impact of the Cold War economy on U.S. The problems created by the Cold War economy are outlined clearly bythe authors. The nation seems to be stuck in the war economy trough (7). This will be a difficult sell to both the people andthe Congress, however, for increased taxation will be the only way to fundsuch support, and increased taxation in this stringent economic era willnot be a popular option. In addition, the economic outlook isnot especially positive, which limits the risks private and public economicplanners are willing to take in creating that inevitably massive and costlyconversion. Another sector---the defense-related industries---relied for upto one-third of its income from the military (37). . But substantial rigidities and adjustment problems are making the transfer of resources from the military- industrial sector to other sectors quite difficult. Perhaps the most consistent argument of the authorsis that the federal government will necessarily have to be the major forcebehind the conversion. The authors are persuasive in their formulation of the"big picture" aspects of the conversion: Striving for a new economic order constructed around environmental, health, and stabilization goals is the only way to ensure that the nation's increasingly problematic military- led industrial policy will be transformed (252). Perhaps the authors areoverly optimistic in this regard, but it would still be going too far toargue that conversion is impossible. This study will examine Dismantling the Cold War Economy, by AnnMarkusen and Joel Yudken, considering the chief problems associated withthe Cold War economy, the impact of the Cold War on U.S. has eroded American market share and humiliated domestic producers. . Not only was the economy dependent on the military-industrial relationship, but the Cold War economy also made some of themost skilled and creative engineers and scientists dependent on an industrywhich focused on the design and construction of weapons and weapons systemof death and destruction (xvi). Even during the drastic military expenditures and defense build-upyears of the Ronald Reagan era---right on the verge of the end of the ColdWar---the employment growth in the defense industry was not enough tooffset the collapsing employment rate of the non-defense sector. industry, and thepossibility and opportunities of economic conversion from Cold Warimperatives, as well as the obstacles to that conversion. In these industries, stiff competition from abroad . Today, however,alternatives and options with respect to the economy's conversion arenumerous and tend to dilute both public and private policy. . " (11). Incrementalism silts up the truly innovative impulse. Nevertheless, the authors simply do not provide the kind of specificsthe reader hopes for. While it is alsoundeniable that the economy must be adapted to post-Cold War needs, theurgency to convert simply does not appear as great today as it did in the194 s. Whatever the benefits of the Cold War economy, then, the costs were---and are---great. The plant shutdowns andmilitary base closures are signs of the continuing costs of the Cold Wareconomy and the difficulties associated with a conversion to a post-ColdWar economy. industry, then, has beenthe imposition of severe limitations on that industry, concentrating itsenergies on the production and refinement of military weaponry which forthe most part was never used and never will be used. This nation "hasdemonstrated its ability to combine teamwork, technological expertise, andplanning, all under the auspices of the public sector, to accomplish acomplex mission" (11). is the major reason forthe failure of the nation's industry to take the lead in industrial andtechnological innovations globally: The preemption of resources for military-industrial missions, particularly precious and scarce scientific and technical labor, has ill served purely commercial industries such as machine tools, industrial equipment, steel, autos, and consumer electronics. . After all, the conversion to amilitary-industrial-dominated economy (which had its origins not in theCold War but before and during the American involvement in World War II)took place in a relatively short time. The conversion is necessary and inevitable, but itis certainly not yet clear how that conversion will be established, eitherin terms of programs or funding. To make such a drastic change would bedifficult at any time, considering the heavy costs of altering theindustrial infrastructure of the country and retraining workers whose focushas been in the defense industry. Nevertheless, there are clear signs that such a conversion ispossible. . . . The militaristic economy of the U.S. The chief negative impact of the Cold War economy on industry hasbeen the creation of a dependence of that industry on the military for itssurvival and prosperity. . Therefore, there is no reason tobelieve that a committed nation could not once again transform its economyto fit post-Cold War requirements. . . In addition, the focus of the 194 s was singular---the enemy had tobe met with military weaponry as quickly as possible. It is economically suicidal to consider keeping theeconomy on the same track it was on during the Cold War, and not even themost conservative politician would suggest such a thing. Theauthors write that their "version" of the new economy "encompasses publicas well as private commitments to environmental, health, housing, andinfrastructure programs. Key features include a responsive science andtechnology policy and incentives to firms, workers, and their communities.. The authors argue, however, that this has not been theactual case. In addition, the ColdWar economy has made it extremely difficult to bring about the kind of post-Cold War economic conversion about which the authors write. While there is no doubt that the United States is capable of adaptingand converting its economy to the needs of the post-Cold War society, thequestion remains whether it will in fact do so. It is as if the nation were an addict addicted to the drug of themilitary-industrial complex. Most of the major inventions that distinguished the nuclear and aerospace age have not been succeeded by others of similarly revolutionary impact, despite the billions of dollars poured into military research (12 ). The question isnot whether a conversion is needed, but only how it is to be accomplished.It will be difficult and painful and will take tremendous effort and muchtime: To support such an about-face, the nation's infrastructure and human capital would need considerable refurbishing and retraining. Dismantling the Cold War Economy. It has been a traditional argument of defense industry supportersthat the Cold War economy has at least brought about innovations in defense-related technology which were then successfully adapted to the non-defenseneeds of the nation. The argumentherein will be that despite the fact that the military domination of theCold War economy created serious obstacles to post-Cold War conversion, anddespite the fact that those obstacles are deeply entrenched despite the endof the Cold War, such conversion is possible. As we read: Military [Research and Development] achievements, even over the past decades, are disputed by many. . One can appreciate the severity of this dependencewhen the statistics are considered for a year some four decades after thestart of the Cold War: "These defense-dependent industries all had 4 percent or more of their capacity committed to the Department of Defense by1985" (36). The [armed] services are inveterately slow adopters and poor agents of invention. NewYork: BasicBooks, 1992.----------------------- 7 (2). If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.