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Essay Subject: Compromise & conciliation in Clinton's victory in Congress on trade agreement vote. Background, debate, role of Ross Perot, political significance, pork barrel concessions.... More...

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Paper Abstract: Compromise & conciliation in Clinton's victory in Congress on trade agreement vote. Background, debate, role of Ross Perot, political significance, pork barrel concessions. Paper Introduction: Negotiation is an act of compromise. The mere agreement to discuss an issue via the process of negotiation represents a willingness to consider non-aggressive solutions. In the realm of politics, negotiation and compromise are the meat-and-potatoes of daily life. So it has been for the debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement - NAFTA - during the past few months. NAFTA posed, for the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch of the United States government, respectively, an important socio-economic issue in which the two parties found themselves lined up on opposite sides. Negotiation, in the public forum and in classic behind-the-scenes backroom maneuvering, was the key tool that allowed President Bill Clinton his NAFTA victory in the House of Representatives - by compromising on enough minor elements of the proposal to enable a Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. S. 52), the third party tothe agreement, was considered "one of us:" attitudes expounded byRepublican conservative gadfly Patrick Buchanan, who defended his anti-NAFTA-with-Mexico stance as "a moment to define a 'new patriotism' of'America First'" (Samuelson, 1993b, p. As NAFTA was a complex economic package involving a number ofsubtle international trade issues, popular simplifications tended to boildown to two key questions: Would NAFTA cause American business to "runaway" to Mexico? Meanwhile, within the Executive Branch, there was a known splitbetween the political and the administrative factions. workers jobs, the classicDemocratic-union alliance pushed majority-party legislators away fromsupporting the agreement. The NAFTA issue, however,exacerbated the Executive/Legislative split along lines that were largelydefined from outside: honest philosophical differences, old-line Partyalliances (Democratic and Republican), misconceptions and culturalattitudes - and the emergence of Ross Perot as the "eminence grise" of theAmerican political scene. From the United States' perspective, NAFTA was negotiated over aperiod of years beginning in the mid-198 s; Republican Party presidentialadministrations were to firmly dominate foreign policy decision-makinguntil George Bush's defeat by Bill Clinton in November 1992. Canada: But Chrétien may clash with Clinton. Negotiation, in the public forum and inclassic behind-the-scenes backroom maneuvering, was the key tool thatallowed President Bill Clinton his NAFTA victory in the House ofRepresentatives - by compromising on enough minor elements of the proposalto enable a majority of legislators, his nominal opponents on the issue, tosupport a free trade agreement as expounded in NAFTA. 27). As the November NAFTA vote rollednear, the Administration found it convenient to let Congressional budget-cutters slash the $11 billion, Texas-based "Super Collider" Project fromthe Clinton-proposed federal budget (Turque, Thomas & Annin, 1993, p. The negotiation between the ExecutiveBranch and the Legislative Branch over the passage of the North AmericanFree Trade Agreement, as such, has been typical of that political process.If any lessons are to be learned from the experience, it is that, if bothsides are willing to listen, something will eventually come of it in theworld of American politics (Thomas, 1993a, p. 3 .Thomas, R. Newsweek, p. Nor did either side care to admit that, whileboth claimed net job gains/losses as a result of NAFTA, the amounts thrownout were statistically negligible in the overall flow of America's economicactivity (Samuelson, 1993a, pp. J. Standing tall. Newsweek, pp. The Administration's economicteam, particularly budget director Leon Panetta and Treasury secretaryLloyd Bentsen, stood firmly behind NAFTA as the most immediately necessary- and pragmatically "do-able" - policy proposal of the Clinton optionsavailable. From September throughto NAFTA's passage by the House of Representatives in late November, hedefined the Executive Branch's negotiating style with the LegislativeBranch within that context. The President wanted to do everything at once, as was his style(Clift & Cohn, p. Traditionally, the U. In the summer of 1992, when New Democrat Bill Clintonwas nominated his party's candidate for the upcoming presidential election,he had already defeated during the primaries anti-free trade Senator BobKerry; for months already Clinton had argue persuasively against theprotectionist paranoia of the right-wing Republican primary candidate PatBuchanan, who was allowed a full night of dominance at the RepublicanConvention by an ill-considered Bush campaign management team. having an "international tradedeficit" is largely bogus, based upon statistical analysis procedures thathave not been updated to reflect the contemporary international marketplace(Levinson, 1993, pp. Thoseprovisions did not persuade extremists on the opposition - Greenpeace andthe Ralph Nader lobbies rejected the side agreements as "not enough" - butfor the mainstream of public perception there was now a 1993 ClintonAdministration answer to criticism of NAFTA as negotiated by the 1992 BushAdministration. For all that behind-the-scenes activity, it was still the publicforum - and a Congress afraid of the Ross Perot-led anti-NAFTA popular vote- that stood in the way of a successful Legislative Branch/Executive Branchnegotiation of the final NAFTA resolution. To the chagrin ofHouse Democratic leadership, Republicans received the pledge from thePresident, the head of the National Democratic Party, that a pro-NAFTA votewould not be used against them by Democratic opponents in the upcoming 1994elections (Clift & Cohn, p. 37.Clift, E., & Cohn, B. Ostensiblypro-business, it was the George Bush presidency that concluded the tri-country negotiations that resulted in the North American Free TradeAgreement. 3 ). Economics: Why all the numbers miss the boat. The misconceptions developedrapidly. With all three major candidates pro-NAFTA, free tradebecame a non-issue for use against any one of them. Still, as the Legislative-Executive negotiation had been allowed toslide into the muddled ground of the public opinion forum, the Clinton sidedecided to exploit the legislators' misgivings with traditional political"concessions." Opposition to NAFTA, the President's advisors perceived,was largely based on a "protect me first" attitude among voters. (1993, June 14). 3 ).The message to congressional legislators was clear: why should we fight toprotect our opponents? Perot's emergence as a national political figure is disturbing to thestatus quo of American politics in several ways. 28. 37). By September 1993, however, the political landscape had changed.Politicians were now running for office for the year 1994. 54-55). Louis: Giving Clinton an earful on KMOX. The public forum is not theplace for negotiation; negotiation requires compromise and concession toreach mutually acceptable agreement; the public forum is the place fordebate, rhetorical stance and, at its worst, demagoguery. Republicans, meanwhile, could feel no solace insupporting the package, even though it was set-up according to their ownpro-business political platform, as long as it was being pushed throughCongress by a Democratic president (Clift & Cohn, 1993, p. Honest philosophical difference can, of course, exist: manyintelligent politicians, Congressional leader Richard Gephardt, forexample, firmly oppose free trade agreements in the belief that they willresult in a lowering of the American domestic standard of living(Samuelson, 1993b, p. As a "negotiation," obviously, the provisions of the North AmericanFree Trade Agreement were never on the table: a matter of trilateralagreement, those elements had been handled exclusively by the ExecutiveBranch as the foreign policy representative of the United States governmentand were presented to Congress for its acceptance/rejection in toto; tochange any of NAFTA's provisions would have entailed returning to thebargaining table with Mexico and Canada - an unworkable option (Padget,1993, pp. Reality check: It's attacked for problems it will not cause and praised for benefits it will not produce. Newsweek, pp. By the same token, there isnever any "final agreement" to be negotiated: the settlement of todaymight be the debate of tomorrow. Now he takes on race, education and health care. The great fog over NAFTA. The great trade hoax of '93. That both questions were largely beside-the-point in terms of thereality of the U.S.-Mexican-international trade environment did not stopopposition forces from rallying around the implications of a negativeanswer (Samuelson, 1993a, pp. 29-3 ). 3 ). 29). As each of the nationsinvolved has its own traditions, culture and form of democratic government,so, too, do the barriers to foreign imports/protectionism of domesticindustry reflect those factors. (1993a, November 8). Thus, whenthe North American Free Trade Agreement with Mexico and Canada wasfinalized by the Bush Administration during the period immediatelypreceding the November presidential election, Bill Clinton was alreadypositioned to steal the thunder from the incumbent's accomplishment bystating publicly that he would support it - with the exception of minorreservations in the areas of environmental protection, labor rights andenforcement procedures. Phony populism: NAFTA's foes think they can make the world go away. In the realm of politics, negotiationand compromise are the meat-and-potatoes of daily life. S. It was, in fact, this clear challenge from his own party thatapparently spurred President Clinton into deciding to make passage of NAFTAthe defining moment of his first year's presidency. 'Yesterday's Man' is back. 27). 3 .Thomas, R. While privately most members of Congress recognized NAFTA'svirtues - or, at least, the non-substance of the criticisms levelledagainst it - all were under-the-gun from constituencies that had beenbombarded for months with detrimental commentary on the free tradeagreement (Carroll, p. Big brawl. Newsweek, pp. Once again - this time trade's the battlefield - Clinton is betting his presidency on a last-minute victory. It did not help theChief Executive that key Congressional leaders in his own party werevocally anti-NAFTA: to successfully enact the agreement as U. Leadership: Clinton gambled and won on NAFTA. President cliffhanger: NAFTA. It was a masterful political stroke, for third-party candidate Ross Perot had already come out in principle for a NAFTA-type arrangement. (1993, November 1). The mere agreement to discussan issue via the process of negotiation represents a willingness toconsider non-aggressive solutions. Ross Perot and his Peoplefor the American Way organization pledged themselves to support anti-NAFTAlegislators - and punish pro-NAFTA votes: it was a promise/threat he wasknown to be able to deliver. NAFTA: More winners than losers. (1993, November 22). To the programs proposed by BillClinton throughout 1993, Ross Perot provided the voice of popular cynicism(McCormick, 1993, p. (Congress thinksahead in terms of two-year employment contracts.) Less than a year inoffice, Bill Clinton had overwhelmed the nation with a flurry of proposals- BTU taxes and budget battles, Somalia and Boznia, national vocationalservice, many more - all of which he announced with great sincerity ofinterest, but few of which he followed-up on with equal consistency.Indeed, during the same period of late summer that the North American FreeTrade Agreement came out of committee and onto the agenda of the House ofRepresentatives for debate and vote, the Administration introduced withintense fanfare a Vice-President-studied program for "Re-inventinggovernment" and the First Lady-developed specter of massive governmentinvolvement in the health care system. Tocounter that, the Executive Branch utilized the full power of presidentialgift-giving to "protect" the interests of congressional districts wheretheir legislators straddled the NAFTA fence (aka "pork barrelling"): sugarsubsidies for Louisiana, citrus growers' protection in Florida, an "inter-American" bank worth $225 million for another district - a Representativewho voted for NAFTA, if his negotiation with the Chief Executive wasspecific enough, could tell the voters back home that, whatever the outcomeof NAFTA, they were going to benefit (Carroll, p. Even when the majority is from the same party as thepresident, the Legislative Branch does not like to appear subservient tothe Executive Branch - particularly when the president has less popularsupport than any given elected congressman. Ross Perot was willing to put his money and evolving grassrootspolitical machine where his mouth was: in June he put his efforts behindRepublican Party candidate Kay Hutchison (for Texas' U.S. So it has been forthe debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement - NAFTA - duringthe past few months. (1993, November 8). 48-5 .McCormick, J. Few negotiations begin from clean-cut, black/white positions ofopposition: particularly when the parties involved are so numerous, or theissues involved are so wide-ranging. (1993b, November 22). Opposition to NAFTA was almostexclusively targeted against the intent to expand economic ties withMexico; Canada, according to Watson & Kay (1993, p. 26-29.Elliott, M. Because of a division of presidential priorities and the emergence ofthird-party voices, as NAFTA settled into its final stages of Executive-Legislative negotiation in September of 1993, the points of contention werelargely defined in terms advantageous to the opposition forces (Clift &Cohn, p. S.political system has not been comfortable with third-party entities:conservative and liberal movements, if they were to have any lastingexistence, have generally merged with the existing Republican andDemocratic parties, using their voter-bloc power bases to wield influencewithin the platform-building apparatus of the larger, more moderateorganizations. 28-29). Perot and his self-initiated/financed movement has at timesappeared to accept that reality and tried to be a power player in theRepublican Party, with which his successful entrepreneur's inclinations aremore naturally in sync. Through his efforts of concession, coercion and public appeal in hisnegotiation with Congress, President Clinton was able to persuade the Houseof Representatives to pass the North American Free Trade Agreement by atwenty vote safety margin (Klein, 1993, p. The latter course was chosen. 26). 26-27). (1993b, November 22). Nevertheless, the positions staked out by the pro-/anti-NAFTA supportgroups were generally along traditional lines throughout the early monthsof 1993 - until Ross Perot and his "People for the American Way" movemententered the picture in opposition. 29-3 ). (1993, November 15). Newsweek, p. 54-55.Samuelson, R. resolve to shape the world order. Newsweek, p. Enforcement of law, protection of thebusiness community and environmental concerns vary as well (Elliott, 1993,pp. (1993, November 15). (1993, November 15). Fitting hand-in-glove with thefearful answers to these misperceived simplifications was an ugly realityundercutting whatever legitimate claims for consideration the opposition toNAFTA attempted to make: a strong element of anti-Mexican cultural biasflavored the entire opposition argument to congressional approval of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement. Few legislators with an eye to re-electioncould afford to put their political careers on the line for an issue thatthe President might or might not back up to the hilt. Perot: Playing both sides badly. But the Texas billionaire, whose ego matches hisbusiness accomplishments, has often felt rebuffed by the Republicans;indeed, there was a strong personal animosity between Perot and formerPresident George Bush, both from Texas. Free trade: Many see NAFTA as the test of U. Terminated in Texas. (1993, November 15). Traditional political considerations aside, the opposition to theNorth American Free Trade Agreement that dominated the popular imagination- and filtered into congressional thinking - was based largely uponmisconceptions and cultural prejudice. It was not brought out, forexample, that the entire issue of the U. Short of civil war, which has occurred once, there are no"walk away" options available to the parties. Newsweek, p. It was not all pork barrel concessions in the negotiation forCongressional approval. In terms of presidentialleadership, as the time drew near for Congress to confirm the ExecutiveBranch's approval of NAFTA, there were no clear signals from the Mr.Clinton on how strongly he felt about an issue that, bluntly speaking, hecould deny at any moment as the brainchild of a deposed Republicanadministration. Is this any way to run a White House? Pragmatically, the Clinton Administration had theforesight to defuse certain elements of opposition to NAFTA by negotiating"side agreement" provisions that addressed specific criticisms of itsenvironmental, enforcement and labor-wage arrangements with Mexico. Newsweek, p. In a colorful encounter illustratingall of the misconceptions and gross exaggerations that had accumulatedaround the NAFTA issue, Vice President Al Gore "debated" Ross Perot on theissue via the popular forum of the "Larry King Live" cable television show. ReferencesCarroll, G. Traditional party ties made many legislatorsreluctant to support NAFTA: as trade unions believe that free trade withan economy such as Mexico's will cost U.S. The North American Free TradeAgreement, in simplistic terms, encourages the evolution of tariff-freetrade among the North American continental nations sharing common borderswith the United States: Mexico and Canada. NAFTA posed, for the Executive Branch and theLegislative Branch of the United States government, respectively, animportant socio-economic issue in which the two parties found themselveslined up on opposite sides. 48-5 ). 29). Thus, although in 1992 Ross Perot's original impulse was to supportthe Bush-originated North American Free Trade Agreement, his populistperceptiveness noticed in the incumbent's presidential defeat a popularrejection of the "what's good for business is good for America" reasoningof the Republican platform (Thomas, 1993b, pp. The battle lines would appear to have been fairly clearly drawn inthe presidential elections of 1992 - a Republican president obsessed withforeign affairs to the detriment of the homefront situation, versus aDemocratic Party candidate stressing domestic concerns - save for the factthat candidate Bill Clinton promoted himself as a self-proclaimed "NewDemocrat." In theoretical terms, the "New Democrat" movement grew out of acoterie of youngish Democratic politicians, led by then-Arkansas GovernorClinton in the 198 s, who sought to move their party to a firm middle-of-the-road position that would allow it to recapture huge blocks of themiddle class vote that had been lost to their opposing party during the"Reagan Revolution" years. As the newDemocratic president settled into office, Perot's personal feeling of beingslighted, of not being given the attention he felt he deserved as a man whogarnered almost 2 % of the popular vote for president, hardened into an "ifit ain't my way, it's no way" attitude. What do voters want? In practical terms, to be a New Democratinvolved marrying traditional Democratic Party social welfare concerns withmoderate Republican Party pro-business programs - including free trade ingeneral principle. Rather, the Administration'sstrategy was to neutralize the influence of Ross Perot by making the manhimself the weak link in the anti-NAFTA argument. The White House felt spurned by Texas voters, whohad overwhelmingly voted for George Bush in 1992, then had listened to RossPerot in giving a landslide victory to anti-NAFTA Republican Senatorialcandidate Kay Hutchison in June 1993. S.legislation, Bill Clinton would have to negotiate a coalition of freemarket Democrats and Republicans without the participation of theDemocratic Party apparatus in Congress. NAFTA: Jarred by election returns, and with nothing left to lose, the White House gambles on a TV debate between Al Gore and Ross Perot. 54-55). Smashing the Super Collider. At the same time,Clinton's advocacy of the agreement reassured moderate voters in thebusiness community; enough, at least, to enable the Democratic candidate tosqueak by with his narrow, non-popular-majority electoral victory overGeorge Bush. Newsweek, pp. To the extent that Bill Clinton is in Washington both as Presidentand as an "outsider" from the Beltway political environment, on any issuehis presidency would find natural opposition from the "insider" apparatusof Congress. Senate seat) -and helped her to win handily in an open rebuff to Bill Clinton'spresidential policies (Carroll, 1993, p. Newsweek, p. Samuelson, R. The isolationist illusion. St. Based on this foundationof belief, Mr. Bush's team was able to bypass a traditional isolationisttendency inherent in the American political psyche; in this they wereencouraged by President Bush, who was well known to be more interested inthe international scene than in domestic concerns. 28), from wisecracks about setting up a "presidentialhaircut service" to the more substantive turnaround of becoming an opponentto NAFTA. Would American workers lose jobs to low-wage earners inMexico? Republican Kay Hutchinson swipes a Senate seat. The word "debate" is used with reservation: neither side addressed thefacts with much attention to accuracy. At its most basic, the American political system represents an on-going negotiation process between the constitutional branches ofgovernment. Congress: Cutting its losses on a megabuck pork chop. Particularly from the Ross Perot broadside of attack:Vice President Al Gore, designated point man for the pro-NAFTA publicdebate, was fully armed with valid documentary argument to dissuade middle-grounders from accepting the flip-flopping populist's contradictoryaccusations (Fineman & Cohn, 1993, pp. 29-3 .Fineman, H., & Cohn B. 29). In this they apparentlysucceeded: building upon the volatile Texan's largely unflatteringappearance, they orchestrated the "conversion" of a few fence-straddlingCongressmen to take place immediately following the debate. 29-3 .Levinson, M. J. (1993a, November 29). 3 ). 26-28.Klein, J. Whatever else the debate accomplished - and no known anti-NAFTAproponents appeared to make the conversion after hearing Mr. Gore - the pro-NAFTA sway of public opinion for middle-grounders was enough to carry theday. 28-29.Turque, B., Thomas, R., & Annin, P. Newsweek, pp. As long as RossPerot dominated the public forum of debate on NAFTA, the pro-NAFTA forceswould have to negotiate with him - or neutralize his influence. 52.----------------------- 16 3 .Watson, R., & Kay, L. Newsweek, pp. Newsweek, pp. Moreover, with the wily skill ofthe excellent salesman he has always been, Ross Perot is a born grassrootspopulist - and populism has traditionally been the source of manyDemocratic Party political philosophies. As its guiding principle, President Bush's negotiating teammaintained the classic conservative stance that any reduction of governmentinvolvement in commerce - particularly the reduction and/or elimination oftrade barriers - is to the ultimate good of the business community and, byextension, the economy of the nation as a whole. Yanquis, come here. 28). Negotiation is an act of compromise. With several majorproposals on the table, political advisors such as James Carville andGeorge Stephanopoulos urged the President to concentrate on his health carepackage, which enjoyed the active support of the Democratic party andseemed much more of a "no lose" situation. (1993, November 29). If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.