BRITAIN IN NAPOLEONIC WARS.   Term Paper ID:20669 Click to get this paper

Essay Subject: Role in defeating France. Strategy, use of sea power & multinational coalitions, economics, specific battles.... More...

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Paper Abstract: Role in defeating France. Strategy, use of sea power & multinational coalitions, economics, specific battles. Paper Introduction: Britain and the Defeat of France in the Napoleonic Wars This paper will discuss the role of Great Britain in the Napoleonic Wars, focusing upon the role of Britain in France's ultimate defeat and the strategy used by Britain in fighting France. Specifically, the discussion will center around the strategy of using sea power and multinational coalitions to fight Napoleon, rather than directly confronting the bulk of his ground forces in campaigns on the continent. The discussion will also analyze how the Peninsular Campaign fit into this strategy and what effects it had upon France. All of the European ruling classes reacted negatively to the French Revolution in the late 1780s; they viewed it as a dangerous precedent for the classes in their own countries who were essentially excluded from the function of governing. Many Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. Although the war was lengthy, Britain suffered comparatively fewercasualties than any of the other combatants and emerged in 1815 asindisputably the world's leading economic power (Weigley, 1991, pp. Rather than directly confront Napoleon in massive landcampaigns in the same fashion as he confronted his opponents, the Britishused economic warfare and attrition to wear him down. Palmer, R. Specifically, the discussion will centeraround the strategy of using sea power and multinational coalitions tofight Napoleon, rather than directly confronting the bulk of his groundforces in campaigns on the continent. Massive land battleswere left up to the continental powers, which Britain actively recruited asallies. A complex plan involving analliance of French and Spanish naval forces was destroyed by the Britishvictory at Trafalgar; with it died any hopes of invasion. 321-331). The French forces under Napoleon were then free to pursuehis dreams of French domination over the Mediterranean and Near East. Such a strategy resulted in alengthy conflict between Britain and France, but cost the British less interms of casualties and finances than the massive land campaigns cost theother European powers. The second part of the British strategy against France involvedalliances. The European countriessubject to it were antagonized by the elimination of irreplaceable Britishproducts from the European market. 331-353; Palmer & Colton, 1984, pp.394-95). Knopf. Ross, S. In fact, France was self-sufficientwithout a navy and naval forces played a very minor role in the Frenchcampaigns after 18 5. Once the other powers in Europe finally realized this, theiropposition to him became implacable (Paret, 1986, p. Britain continued to rely upon naval force to counter the effects ofthe Continental System, implemented by Napoleon after his defeat of theThird Coalition in 18 7. Britain and the Defeat of France in the Napoleonic Wars This paperwill discuss the role of Great Britain in the Napoleonic Wars, focusingupon the role of Britain in France's ultimate defeat and the strategy usedby Britain in fighting France. (1991). After Trafalgar,Britain retained supreme control over the seas and Napoleon was forced toaccept the fact that he could not ultimately end British opposition toFrance. These major powers were Austria, Prussia, and Russia; all threewere capable of raising and maintaining large land forces, although nonewere capable of facing France alone. For example, much energy, effort, and manpower was devoted tosecuring the West Indies, where a rebellion involving ex-slaves hadstarted. 3132). (1969). The end result was ill-feelings towardsFrance and widespread cheating. Krieger Publishing Co. However, thePeninsular Campaign never became the major theater of war which might haveresulted in the defeat of Napoleon; the most debilitating losses weresuffered by the French in Russia and Prussia from 1812 to 1813 (Kennedy,1976, pp. The British, meanwhile, were not seriouslyhurt since they were able to trade everywhere else in the world, especiallyin the Western Hemisphere (Palmer & Colton, 1984, pp. (1984). For example, the British became nervous whenpolitical events led to instability in the Netherlands and pointed toRussian and Austrian expansion in the Balkans (Ross, 1969, pp. The British economy was based in large part upon theimportation of natural resources from various parts of the world. 4 5-4 8). 383). Many in England also viewed the events in Francewith distaste, especially after the experience of the American Revolution afew years earlier. There, the Britishdecided to actively support the Spanish rebellion against the governmentset up by Napoleon by sending large numbers of British troops to thepeninsula. In the end, Britain survived and Napoleonic France did not. (1976). This, in turn, caused anger againstthe French to rise, as most of the countries blamed their economic problemson the Continental System, forcibly imposed by Napoleon. By thattime, Napoleon had crowned himself Emperor of France and had become openabout his ambition to establish French hegemony over all of Europe. After Napoleon's seizure of power, Britain would establish itselfas France's principle opponent. Once the Royal Navy defeated the French Navy andcontrolled the sea trade routes, the British implemented a blockade whichplaced the trade in European imports in the hands of British merchants,strangling the continental economies. Combined withBritish diplomatic efforts, this anger resulted in the final coalitionwhich defeated Napoleon in 1814 and 1815. In P. French military actions managed to remove Spain from thecoalition arrayed against France and to deprive the British of severalItalian bases. A major campaign personally led by Napoleon failed to defeatthe Spanish guerrillas or drive the British regulars out of the peninsula.When Napoleon turned his attention to the invasion of Russia, he still hadsubstantial forces committed in Spain. Protection of this trade was thenatural responsibility of the Royal Navy, which received a lot of money andattention from the government (Kennedy, 1976, pp. 136). However, many saw the newconflict with France as an opportunity to further secure trade routes andenhance Britain's economic power by eliminating French naval bases aroundthe world (Kennedy, 1976, p. Whenhe tried to carry out these designs, however, Napoleon was thwarted by theRoyal Navy, which defeated the French naval forces and drove them out ofthe Mediterranean (Weigley, 1991, pp. 367). By the time a truce was signed with the leader of the rebellionin 1799, nearly 1 , British men had become casualties while the wareffort against France had been helped not at all (Kennedy, 1976, p. The Revolution alsoinspired the Irish, who sought any available opportunity to weaken theBritish (Palmer & Colton, 1984, p. There were strong elements in England which weresympathetic to the Revolution, especially among businessmen who wanted toreshape Parliament in order to increase their representation and decreasethe established influence of the Church of England. 539-4 ). Bloomington: Indiana UniversityPress.----------------------- 1 Some of his most notable operations wereconducted against forces comprised of the armies of two or more countries,such as in 1814 (Paret, 1986, p. InJanuary of 1793 England entered into war with the French Republic for thefirst time when the French invaded the Netherlands provinces (Ross, 1969,p. These coalitions were not permanentuntil 1813, however, as all three of the continental powers were given todropping out of the coalitions and allying themselves with France.Napoleon was able to accelerate this process by decisively defeatingAustria in 18 5 and 18 9, and Prussia in 18 7. A history of the modern world(6th ed.) . F. On the other hand, French troops managed to hurt British seapower inthe Mediterranean in the late 179 s by depriving the Royal Navy of basesand allies. 133-34). The action which finally ended the open naval war between Britain andFrance was, of course, the Battle of Trafalgar in October of 18 5. Thus, while Britain's existence was not threatenedafter 18 5, it could not effectively counter French moves on land (Kennedy,1976, pp. Inthis respect, the British leaders saw the war against the French Republicas an extension of the traditional British-French commercial rivalry.Consequently, there was little strategic direction aimed at defeatingFrance outright through the end of the 18th Century (Weigley, 1991, p.32 ). TheContinental System was supposed to close off European markets to theBritish, thereby strangling the British economy. And eventually, Napoleon'sambitions in Europe brought all of these powers together in a permanentalliance. Around the protection of this vital interest developed a school ofthought which not only emphasized sea power as the protector of the Britisheconomy but also visualized sea power as the key to defeating majorcontinental powers while limiting British casualties. The long campaign in Spain imposeda persistent drain on French manpower and resources and provided the RoyalArmy with valuable experience (Ross, 1969, p. The discussion will also analyze howthe Peninsular Campaign fit into this strategy and what effects it had uponFrance. New York: Alfred A. Aware that the French could not be quickly defeated by seapower alone, British leaders concentrated their diplomatic efforts atbuilding and maintaining coalitions of major continental powers hostile toFrance. Unfortunately for theFrench, the system also partially strangled the European economies whichwere supposed to integrate with the French economy. His strategic vision of striking at the core of an opponent'spower with overwhelming force excluded the idea of limited wars for limitedpurposes. 129;Ross, 1969, pp. The British government had another reason for reacting negatively tothe Revolution. References Kennedy, P. Its geographical positionalso forced its merchant class to build up a thriving sea trade, whichbecame vital to the overall economy. Russia was willing toabandon its alliance with Britain in 18 7 when its forces were defeated inPrussia (Kennedy, 1984, pp. 135-36). All of the European ruling classes reacted negatively to the FrenchRevolution in the late 178 s; they viewed it as a dangerous precedent forthe classes in their own countries who were essentially excluded from thefunction of governing. By the end of the 18th Century, Britain was the premiercommercial power of the world and had an interest in maintaining the statusquo throughout Europe, especially when political changes threatened itscommercial interests. M. But British naval force could not ultimately defeat the French byitself. Malabar: Robert E. 123-142. European diplomatic history 1789-1815: Franceagainst Europe. 189-9 ). Britainrelied upon a peripheral strategy which involved sea power and allianceswith land powers. 66). The age of battles: The quest for decisivewarfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo. Weigley, R. Paret(Ed.) , Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age.Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. The rise and fall of British naval mastery.London: Ashfield Press. Theoverwhelming fear of the British leaders was that enemies, namely France,would attack Britain through its colonies, cutting off the vital imports.In turn, the British leaders assumed that the colonies comprised a similarweak point of France; interrupting the trade between France and itscolonies should weaken the French ability to fight on the continent. From the beginning, the British ministers relied upon a maritimestrategy to fight the French. Britain simply couldnot support a large army, although its relative geographical isolationprotected it from enemies with large armies. Paret, P. Although many argued that naval power could strangle land power,between 1793 and 1815 this theory was never proved. The British leaders also recognized theircountry's weakness as a land power and therefore continuously sought tobuild coalitions against France. 129). 13 ). Consequently, he could not avoid having to react to Britishactions in Europe (Weigley, 1991, pp. A delay could enable him to face only one army at a particulartime, defeating it before the army of the other ally was ready to fight.If he happened to face the combined armies of two or more allies, hedisplayed an amazing ability to capitalize on the command and controlproblems of allied armies. Frenchsupplies and communications depended upon land transport, rather than seatransport, and manufactured goods necessary for the French war effort andeconomy did not need to travel by sea. Although preeminentin British strategic thought since early in the 17th Century, this theoryproved unsuccessful during the 18th Century, when Britain was forced tocommit large ground forces on the continent. The natural reason for this virtual preoccupationwas economics. T. 12829). The most important direct confrontation between British and Frenchground forces occurred in Spain from 18 8 to 1814. Of all thepowers in Europe, Britain was probably the first to recognize the danger ofa France led by Napoleon. 352-53). In conclusion, Britain fought France indirectly, through sea andeconomic power. Hedecided that he could only eliminate Britain as an enemy by invading theBritish Isles and occupying the country. R., & Colton, J. Napoleon and the revolution in war. In fact, Napoleon became adept at playing on the interests ofindividual countries in order to disrupt or delay the formation ofalliances. 13233; Weigley, 1991, pp. But the British were not eager toengage the French in a land war on the Continent and in the 179 s theFrench government did not openly display the expansionist policies whichwould later become the trademark of Napoleon (Palmer & Colton, 1984, 368). The main feature of Britain's maritime strategy was an emphasis uponactions in the colonies. (1986). The Royal Navy wasable to defend, and expand, British colonial interests, but it was unableto hinder the huge French Army in its continental operations. The British had imposed a blockade on Europe,aimed at limiting the trade in European imports to British merchants. They realized that the geographical positionand the limited population of the British Isles restricted their ability toconfront enemies in land battles on the continent. Clearly, however, France could not defeat the combined land forces ofAustria, Prussia, and Russia; it could not even hope to fight them to adraw if they chose to maintain their alliance. If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.