AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN USSR.   Term Paper ID:17074 Click to get this paper

Essay Subject: Compares Soviet policy under Khrushchev (1953-64) & Gorbachev (1985-91). Perestroika, central planning & collective farming, reforms, Western reactions, failures & successes, Marxist theory, production, etc.... More...

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Paper Abstract: Compares Soviet policy under Khrushchev (1953-64) & Gorbachev (1985-91). Perestroika, central planning & collective farming, reforms, Western reactions, failures & successes, Marxist theory, production, etc. Paper Introduction: INTRODUCTION This research examines and compares agricultural policy in the Soviet Union for two different periods. These periods are (1) the contemporary period, which began in March 1985, with the election of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee, and Chairman of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) Council of Defense, and (2) the March 1953toOctober 1964 time period, during which Nikita Khrushchev held the office of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Agricultural policy in the Soviet Union is of particular interest in early1989, because it is a part of perestroika, the master policy through which Gorbachev hopes to restructure the country's economic and political systems (Gorbachev, 1987). A Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. Van Nostrand Company. Economic theory in retrospect, fourth edition.London, England: Cambridge University Press. The resulting food shortages caused Communist Party bureaucrats toestablish quotas to provide food for the cities. 3. Oil is leavinga hole in Gorbachev's pocket. Business Week, 49. He hadno respect for them or their work. In the mid-195 s,Nikita Khrushchev introduced significant economic reforms in the SovietUnion, which were terminated by Leonid Brezhnev in the mid-196 s.Elsewhere in eastern Europe, both Yugoslavia and Hungary implementedeconomic reforms in the 196 s, and, in 1979, the Peoples Republic of China(PRC) implemented far reaching economic changes. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. H. the majority of collective farm administrators who arepaid a flat salary won't take any chances for the sake of improvingproduction. If they resisted, they were either jailed or killed. (1984). Talbott (Ed. . G. Second, a large amount ofcentral planning continues to exist. Introduction. Barrett, M. Adding insult to injury, theSoviet union suffered a series of devastating droughts. He held that, given the existing circumstances, some compromisewith capitalism was required, if the country was not to die an economicdeath, after surviving a military attack by 14 countries (including theUnited States) in the aftermath of the First World War and the RussianRevolution (Mazour, 1967). To agreat extent, these reforms simply provided official recognition andapproval of activities which had been occurring in the country'sunderground economy for decades (Coplin & O'Leary, 1986). Yosif Stalin terminated the NEP in 1928. . Output began to rise, and, at long last, thereappeared to be a valid hope that Soviet agriculture would turn the corner.Khrushchev, however, fell into disfavor, as a result of his policies towardthe Chinese. . As was noted earlier in this research, the economic initiatives ofMikhail Gorbachev are not as unprecedented as they appear to be. 124-125). These justificationactions, he further contended, usually retarded productivity. SUMMARY OF WESTERN ASSESSMENT Western assessment of perestroika runs the gamut from fawning praise--the minority--to a highly negative skepticism which holds that it is notlikely to be successful in the long-run--the majority (Galuszka, 1987;Pearson, 1985). (1987). Thus, therevival in the Soviet economy is not likely to suddenly catapult the SovietUnion to the level of an economic super power. (1986, February 8). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press,pp. Norton &Company. A new economic strategyof the USSR, and its social dimensions. 2. In addition the third stage reforms which were applicable toall large enterprises, individual families and workers on collective farmswere authorized to produce goods for their own benefit on designated plots,and to sell such goods in a free market, as long as such activity did notimpinge on their responsibilities to the collective farms to which theywere assigned. Actually,under perestroika, Soviet enterprises will be able to exercise greaterfreedom than will corporate elements in an MBO system. The Initiatives of Mikhail Gorbachev The prime impetus for the economic initiatives of Gorbachev was adissatisfaction with the direction of economic performance. There exists, however, a greatdeal of controversy over the concept, even among Marxist economists (Blaug,1985). Of the Stalinist approach toagriculture, Khrushchev (197 , p. Thus, as theyreceived no other compensation for their work, "they lost interest in thecollective and concentrated instead on their private plots to feed theirfamilies" (Khrushchev, 197 , p. Through this program, he hoped toincrease Soviet agricultural output and overall agricultural productivityby bringing new, fertile lands under cultivation (Khrushchev, 197 ). . 5. Agricultural policy in the Soviet Union isparticular interest in early-1989, because it is a part of perestroika, themaster policy through which Gorbachev hopes to restructure the country'seconomic and political systems (Gorbachev, 1987). W. These large enterprises have also been given the powerand authority to: 1. K. Khrushchev (197 ) also advocated the dismantling of the centralagricultural apparatus. Galuszka, P. Whenagricultural workers would not volunteer to migrate to jobs in heavyindustry, their homes were razed, and they were forced to move toindustrial areas. Universal, free, and high quality medical care, housing for all(albeit not the equivalent of that typical in the US, but, nevertheless,far superior to that available to a significant number of Americans),universal and free daycare, and many other societal assets are credited bythe Soviets to the success of the socialist system (Gorbachev, 1987). . (1986, February 17). Neuberger, E., & Duffy, W. TheVirgin Lands program experienced more successes than it did failures;however, it had important opponents within the CPSU establishment(Khrushchev, 197 ). In early-1989, it remainsfar from certain that perestroika will receive the necessary support fromthe Communist Party establishment. 124-125). ABA BankingJournal, LXXVIII, 28-31. With respect to agriculture, the general assessment in the west isthat centralized planning and collective farming has been a failure, thatSoviet farmers are clamoring for private holdings and less direction, andthat agricultural reform is necessary to preclude a revolution in thecountryside (Medvedev, 1986). Changing the economic mechanismin the Soviet Union. Reform is designed to strengthen the socialistsystem, not kill it (Gorbachev, 1987). Essentially, the two wereproceeding from common ground, when they developed their reforminitiatives. . 12 ). The reduction or elimination of arbitrary deliveryquotas, price restructuring for farmers, improved mechanization, and theVirgin Lands program all played important roles (McCarley, 1987).Unfortunately, those in the upper eschelons of the CPSU who thoughtKhrushchev's reforms ran counter to socialist principles carried the day,and his reforms were largely rescinded subsequent to his dismissal in 1964. As a result, both of these earlierreformers lost their political power (Soviet Union: Nikita's ghost, 1986). . First, theGosplan retains the authority to set prices. (1988). . In the Soviet lexicon,these firms will be placed on a "full cost accounting" basis (Gorbachev,1987, p. . Again, by contrast, all of Gorbachev'sreforms must succeed, if any of them are to succeed, and, if one dies, theyall die. The land, farm equipment, and livestock ofSoviet farmers were transferred from individuals and families to collectivefarms. That'snonsense . The recent economic reforms introduced inmany socialist countries indicate that some influential Marxist economistsare beginning to move away from such rigidity. Mazour, A. When Khrushchev moved to Moscow in 1935, hebecame, among other things, responsible for agriculture in the MoscowRegion. The NEP wasintroduced to boost agricultural out-put, and incentives were implementedto promote private agriculture (Medvedev, 1986). 2. D., & O'Leary, M. Soviet Union: Nikita's ghost. New York:Oxford University Press.----------------------- 28 Soviet economic development, operationoutstrip: 1921-1965. Another of Khrushchev's important agricultural initiatives was theVirgin Lands program. Cost accounting, as the term is applied in the Soviet Union,involves the use by an enterprise of publicly owned means of production,and meeting all expenses and payments to the state budget through profitsthus earned (Gorbachev, 1987). Comparing the Initiatives of__Khrushchev and Grobachev__ With respect to the motivations for agricultural reform, bothKhrushchev and Gorbachev recognized: (1) the sorry state of Sovietagriculture, (2) that, without change, theSoviet political system would likely lose the support of both farmers andthe urban public, (3) that reform could be implemented within the frameworkof the Soviet socialist system, and (4) that agriculture required a higherpriority in the Soviet economic structure. Consolidation, streamlining, anda redefinition of the agencies' responsibilities have been implemented.Gorbachev views these actions as strengthening the center, rather thandiminishing its role. Centralized planning was implemented under Stalin, as a means ofindustrializing the Soviet economy. Rossant, J., & D'Anastasio, M. Lastly, in making this examination and comparison, it must be borne inmind that, as most people in the western countries view communism as thesupreme enemy, only failures of the socialist societies are generallyrecognized. Planning Review, XIV, 34-36. Of greatest significance, however,are the facts that (1) centrally planned economies are characterized bystate monopoly in most economic endeavors, and (2) they are characterizedby centralized planning and control of resource allocation, production, anddistribution (Mazour, 1967). Under full costaccounting, as envisaged by Gorbachev (1987), enterprises are required toself finance expansion and modernization. (1985, November 11). Tucker, R. A comparison ofcontemporary agricultural policy with that of the Khrushchev years isrelevant, because it was under his leadership that the last meaningfulattempt at agricultural reform in the Soviet Union was made (Paxton, 1988). Eklund, R. The current economic reforms in the Soviet Union were implemented in athree-stage process (Pearson, 1985). Further, he had often been frustrated with his inability topersuade the Soviet top leadership of the need for agricultural and generaleconomic reform. Khrushchev (197 , p. Under Khrushchev's leadership, agricultural production in the SovietUnion did improve. Oxford Economic Papers, XXXII, 241-262. Spiegel, H. (1986, February). The more likely reasons are internalresistance, and an absence of external support. Gorbachev's Russia. In the international arena, Sovietinitiatives in the perestroika period are most often met, by westernpolitical writers and government leaders, with suspicion, or are dismissedas empty gestures. advocating material incentives I'mopening myself up to those . New York: McGraw-Hill. In the intervening years, most western economistshave followed suit and abandoned a rigid labor theory of value. Output goalswere seldom reached, and mechanization was always less than promised. New York: St. By the 197 s, Soviet agriculture was also beset with additionalproblems. (1985, November 25). One program was implemented to improvemechanization in agriculture. Paxton, J. INTRODUCTION This research examines and compares agricultural policy in the SovietUnion for two different periods. Lenin held that one must cope with realities, without betraying one'sidealism (Lenin, 1921). Russia under Gorbachev. The importation ofgrains is not the major source of the growing external debt of the SovietUnion. The NEPimplemented by Lenin in 1921 (Mazour, 1967) served, in many ways, as amodel for Gorbachev, in both agriculture, and in the relaxation ofcentralized control over small enterprise. McCarley, M. Within a sector orindustry group, however, full reform was implemented at one time.Importantly, Grobachev has sought to introduce social and politicalrestructuring along with economic restructuring (Medvedev, 1986). Collective farms also were permitted to produce goodsoutside state quotas, and to sell such goods in a free market, as long assuch activity did not impinge on their quota production. (1987, February). It is not. What nonsense! Marx also conceived of economics as an evolutionary science (Hausman,1984). Perestroika: New thinking for our country andthe world. The New Economic Policy (NEP) implemented by Lenin in the USSR in 1921(Mazour, 1967) served, in many ways, as a model for both Gorbachev andKhrushchev. With respect to the development ofheavy industry, the policy was highly effective (Steinberg, 1985). Hausman (Ed.), Thephilosophy of economics. These people are. Western assessment of perestroika has, for the most part, been (1)skeptical, (2) negative, or (3) an open hope and prediction that itssuccess will see the end of the Communist system of government in theSoviet Union. When he was replaced, military build-up, space technology,and further industrial development superseded agriculture on the list ofeconomic priorities. The greatest fault in Stalin's agricultural strategy, other thanthe police tactics, was, according to Khrushchev, the imposition ofcollectivization without proper preparation"--the material andorganizational base of machinery and trained cadres (p. These periods were (1) the contemporaryperiod, which began in March 1985, with the election of Mikhail Gorbachevas General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Chairman of theUSSR Council of Defense, and (2) the March 1953-to-October 1964 timeperiod, during which Nikita Khrushchev held the office of General Secretaryof the CPSU Central Committee. Retain profits for reinvestment. (1985). Many, and perhaps most contemporarywestern economists, however, reject any contention that capitalism willultimately disappear, or, worse yet, that it will ever be replaced with asystem which includes some socialist economic concepts. The initial efforts to reform Stalinist economic policies occurred inthe 195 s and 196 s, under Malenkov and Khrushchev (Mazour, 1967). . Either mostwestern political writers and government leaders are incredibly naive, orthey, if fact, feel that it is necessary to maintain the concept of theSoviet threat, in order to continue to successfully sell their own policiesin their own countries. In point of fact, these societies, the Soviet Union inparticular, have recorded successes of which they are proud (Gorbachev,1987). Classical economics represented the prevailingeconomic theory at the time Marx formulated his original principles. Net Soviet foreign debt increased 17.2 percent in 1986, to a levelapproximating US$3 billion (Rossant & D'Anastasio, 1986). this process inevitably required sacrifices .. M. Khrushchev Remembers: The last testament.S. He also wantedcompensation "for collective farmers . The U.S.S.R.:Don't expect wheeling and dealing. (1987, September). New York: W. Theprincipal goal of the reforms is an increase in economic productivity(Aganbegyan, 1987). Blaug, M. Planning in these economies typically occurson a top-to-bottom basis, with an emphasis on domestic considerations, asopposed to foreign trade, in most instances (Neuberger & Duffy, 1985). In the context of food supply, the population of the Soviet Unionremained adequately fed (The World Bank, 1988). A history of economictheory and method, second edition. Discharge inefficient employees. There was not intent under Khrushchev(197 ), and there is no intent under Grobachev (1987) to install acapitalist economic system in the Soviet Union. . The Statesman's year-book, 125th edition. A central feature of perestroika for large industrial firms andagricultural enterprises is that planning will proceed from the enterpriselevel, as opposed to proceeding from the central planning level (Gorbachev,1987). The failure of the Khrushchev reforms to gain long-term party acceptance is often cited as a precedent with respect to thecontemporary reforms. In many instances, thequotas left absolutely nothing for the farmers themselves. He wanted to adopt the most efficientmethods, such as mineral fertilization, regardless of the fact that suchmethods originated in the west (McCarley, 1987). He wanted greater mechanization, and he wanted a lowerproportion of the Soviet workforce engaged in agriculture. (1987, January). Chick, V. Of his specific order to concentrate onagriculture, he said that he "knew better than to disobey Stalin's orders"(Khrushchev, 197 , p. 4.Individual workers could be discharged for inefficiency. Karl Marx also viewed economics as merely a part of the broadersocietal processes (Eklund & Hebert, 1983). . Supply and demand in Ricardian PriceTheory: A re-interpretation. With respect to agriculture, an all consuming concern of Khrushchevwas productivity improvement. Rankin, S. This feature does not mean, however, that central planning isended. The Economist,CCXCVII, 21-25. Ricardo appeared tobelieve that, in most instances, labor inputs were to prime determinants ofvalue (Rankin, 198 ). Further, if perestroika can besuccessful without destroying the country's system of government, mostwestern political writers and government leaders appear to have littleinterest in its ultimate success. Gorbachev's economic reforms.Banker, VIII, 15-17. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Khrushchev, as did Grobachev later on, came from a background inthe administration of Soviet agriculture. The third, and most significant, of the economic reform programsimplemented under the Gorbachev leadership is that directed at primaryindustry (including agriculture) and large enterprise. The legacy ofStalin. In the mid-195 s, Nikita Khrushchev introduced significant economicreforms. At times, "just transporting produce from the collectivefarm to the state collection center cost more than the farmers received fortheir goods" (Khrushchev, pp. Business Week, 2984, 44-45. 88). Praeger. In reallife, however, different outcomes do occur. Minard, L., & Brimelow, P. Significant improvements in labor productivity resulted from theseefforts; however, improvements required in the Soviet economy demanded muchmore than that which could be achieved through labor productivityimprovements alone (Galuszka, 1987). have taken a Stalinistposition with regard to collectivization . The large enterprises themselves have an incentive to become moreproductive, because, in most instances, the state, under the reformpolicies, will be prepared to permit inefficient enterprises to fail. & Trans.). Under Stalin,farmers were paid less for their goods than it cost them to produce(Brumberg, 1962). Stalin's economic plan accordedpriority to heavy industry, at the expense of consumer-oriented industry.In such an economy, there would be few consumer goods to induce the farmersto produce for exchange. Initially, Gorbachev sought anincrease in labor productivity. In March 1985, when Gorbachev assumed power in the Soviet Union, hewas already a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Lenin was pragmatic aboutthe NEP. Medvedev, Z. He alsorequired additional workers for the development of the country's heavyindustry. For socialism to be victorious, a country mustget the most out of every worker. The wide spectrum of opinion between the extremes of thecontinuum most often contends that perestroika is the result of communism'sfailures, and that whether or not perestroika is successful, the communistsystem will not survive (Minard & Brimelow, 1986). Euromoney, 473-474. Second, Khrushchev's agricultural reforms were not implemented as apart of a cohesive program. This approach remains, in the 198 s, as a primary theoreticaltenet of Marxian economics (Blaug, 1985). While the gross national product in the SovietUnion is only two-thirds that in the United States, the Soviet populationis about 1 -percent greater than that of the United States. Profits could be retained by the enterprises, rather than beingtransferred to the state. None of these goals were wrong. London:Macmillan. New York: Harper & Row. A comparison of contemporary agriculturalpolicy with that of the Khrushchev years is relevant, because it was underhis leadership that the last meaningful attempt at agricultural reform inthe Soviet Union was made (Paxton, 1988). The major differences between the reforms of Khrushchev and Gorbachevlie in two areas. Naylor, T. Stalin's rule in the Soviet Union was not so much socialist incharacter, as it was repressive and dictatorial--two words which becamesynonymous with communism, as a result of Stalin's rule in the SovietUnion. W. (Ed.). And when I say "get the most," Idon't mean by force (p. . In an overall context, however, the potential benefits for Sovietagriculture of the Gorbachev reforms are greater than were those of theKhrushchev reforms, because of their comprehensive character and theirinterdependent character. The importation of grain created a significant drainon Soviet hard currency reserves, and inadequate food quality and varietygenerated consumer discontent. The greatest resistance comes from (1) bureaucratsand managers in all sectors of society who feel their positions will beundercut by reform, and (2) Communist Party hardliners who feel that thereforms will undercut socialist ideology. Prices, to a great extent, could be established by theenterprises. What will Gorbanomics bring? In this context, it is a comprehensiveprogram which has, from theoretical and technical perspectives, everyopportunity to succeed. If it does not succeed for theoretical andtechnical reasons, the Soviet Union may be required to take a closer lookat the underlying socialist system. On perestroika's political side, the general assessment in the westappears to be that its domestic success will mark the end of the Communistsystem of government in the Soviet Union. It is probable thatnone of these opinions is particularly close to the mark. International Labor Review, XX, 95-1 9. In the context of rigidity, however, most western economists are notmuch better (and they may be worse) than their Marxian counterparts.Western economic thought has witnessed several significant evolutionarydevelopments in the twentieth century. One requirement imposed by the state was that suchendeavors must not impinge on the regular employment of any individual. W. The examination andcomparison policy in the two periods are then presented. G. First, Marx perceived that economicphenomena did not exist within a static equilibrium (Speigel, 1952).Keynes later incorporated the idea of non static equlibrium into histheories, as, indeed, did the neoclassicists (Chick, 1983). Norton & Company. (Ed.). (1988). Economicgrowth in the Soviet Union had become stagnant. New York: FrederickA. The World Bank. At the theoretical level, Marxist economics is relatively close toclassical economics. Russia under Khrushchev. He is either the appealing tourist at Disneyland, thegenial visitor to Iowa farms, the scowling representative who hammered hisUnited Nations (UN) desk with the heel of his shoe during an address by theBritish prime minister, the political leader who rudely revealed Americanlies over the U2 spy plane incident, or the man who blinked in the Cubanmissile crisis. Consumer demands were notbeing met, and productivity was declining. (1986, December 1). As was true in 1921, Grobachev (1987) also recognizedserious problems in the Soviet economy; problems which were leading toeconomic stagnation. Gorbachev's reforms, by contrast, are but one segmentof a societal reform which includes not only all sectors of the economy,but the political system as well. Rather, the system will work something on the order ofa management-by-objectives (MBO) system in a large American firm, whereplanning proceeds from the bottom, within a framework of objectivesestablished at the top, and in which planning goals developed at lowerlevels are agreed to at higher levels, following consultation. Inside the Soviet debt machine.Euromoney, 46-54. Thereform policies were somewhat timid, and the results were somewhatunimpressive (Gorbachev, 1987). While Gosplan, thestate's central planning agency, will continue to play a major role,individual enterprises will be permitted to make major decisions related toproducts to be produced, quantities to be produced, and product quality(Gorbachev, 1987). Pringle, R. Martin's Press. Labor productivity did, however,improve in excess of five percent (Orr, 1986). Importantly, however, through this approach, Marx focused theattention of his contemporary economists on factors from which value may bederived, other than land and other natural resources. A. The enterprises covered by these reforms were quite small. The economic restructuring whichoccurred did not move these countries away from socialist ideology orgoals, nor were they intended to cause such a move. AN EXAMINATION AND COMPARISON OF SOVIET AGRICULTURAL POLICIES: GORBACHEV AND KHRUSHCHEV Neither the reforms of perestroika under Grobachev, nor the earlierreforms under Khrushchev were without precedent in either the Soviet Union,or within the wider community of socialist states. In this sense, thewestern economists are worse than their Marxian counterparts, because theyhave witnessed evolution in their own camp. The changes initiated in Yugoslavia and Hungary in particular,together with those implemented in the PRC, serve to illustrate the secondfactor which must be considered in making these analyses. Khrushchev and Khrushchevism. Cambridge,Massachusetts: The MIT Press. TheStalinist policies, however, shortchanged the Soviet consumer, on the onehand, and failed to prepare the Soviet economy for the transitions requiredin the late-twentieth century, on the other hand (Minard & Brimelow, 1986). It is probable, however, thatindustrial and agricultural productivity will be significantly improved bythe reforms implemented. There appears to be an attitude in the west that theonly acceptable change on the part of the Soviet Union will be (1) acomplete acquiescence to western policy, and (2) a public recognition thatno western actions constitute a threat to the Soviet Union. After years of neglect, the productivity of the country'sagricultural soil was badly depleted. Khrushchev (197 ) said that, for "Stalin, peasants were scum. . (1987, January-February). Hewas, thus, intimately acquainted with the problems in that sector of theeconomy. A net external debt of US$53 billion would not be a worrisome levelfor an economy the size of that of the Soviet Union. Inthe wake of this activity, Soviet agricultural output plummeted. While providing sufficientcalories, however, the state often was required to supplement Sovietagricultural production with imported grains, and food quality and varietywas often inadequate. Orr, B. Nevertheless, significantimprovement can be anticipated. While these opinions are widely expressed,however, there exists the nagging fear in the United States (US) and Canadathat successful agricultural reform in the Soviet Union will deal a heavyblow to North American grain exports (Minard & Brimelow, 1986). Karl Marx, however, felt that labor inputs were the sole determinantsof value. Although the westernpress goes to great lengths to emphasize the radical departure ofperestroika policies from those of the past, Gorbachev (1987) emphasizestheir relevance to the policies of Lenin. Although contemporary Marxist economists continue to view economicsas an evolutionary process, many are, also, somewhat rigid, in that theyfeel, the only direction such an evolution will follow is from capitalismto a somewhat utopian socialism. Hausman, D. In the US, politics--domestic or international--tendsto be perceived in the context of a professional football game, where (1)there must be a winner and a loser, and (2) where our side is always madeup of the good guys. . 128). CONCLUSION This research examined and compared agricultural policy in the SovietUnion for two different periods. Macro economics after Keynes. Khrushchev's reforms wereterminated by Leonid Brezhnev in the mid-196 s. Therestructuring is meeting with resistance from the more conservativeelements of the CPSU, and from members of the bureaucracy who feelthreatened (Gorbachev, 1987). Agricultural policy in the Soviet Union is of particular interest inearly-1989, because it is a part of perestroika, the master policy throughwhich Gorbachev hopes to restructure the country's economic and politicalsystems (Gorbachev, 1987). . In the post-Stalin era, under Khrushchev, reforms were introduced intothe agricultural sector. (1983). F. .saying that collectivization represented a historically inevitable periodof transition from capitalist production in the countryside to asocialist economy . 26). In the early-192 s, Lenin facedsome problems similar to those encountered by Gorbachev in the mid-198 s.Yosif Stalin terminated the NEP in 1928. Gorbachev (1987) has emphasized that the reformsof perestroika will, in no way, cause the Soviet Union to deviate fromsocialist idealism. For small-minded political reasons (particularly in theUnited States), however, attempts may be made in the western economies toblock the interaction required to insure the success of perestroika. Forbes, CXXXVIII, 156-16 . In this context, Gorbachev's reforms, asstrange as it may appear, have both a greater chance to succeed than thoseof Khrushchev, and a greater chance to fail. The development of economic thought.New York: John Wiley. Princeton, New Jersey: D. Overall, however, thepotential impact of the reforms were limited by an absence ofcomprehensiveness and connection. Nevertheless, social, political, andeconomic perestroika are occurring simultaneously in the USSR (Aganbegyan,1987). The Soviet Union,however, opposes on principle external debt for itself. In 1987, itrose yet another 16.7 percent, to approximately US$35 billion (Shirreff,1987). 119) said that the "difficulties in providingfood were a direct result of Stalin's victory over his opponents in thecampaign to collectivize agriculture. In the application of reform, both Khrushchev and Gorbachev recognizedthe need for (1) mechanized modernization, (2) monetary incentives, (3)reduced centralized planning, and (4) reduced centralized direction inagriculture. (1986, January). The following discussion presents a brief summarization of thetreatment of perestroika in the west, and of comparisons (when they havebeen made) with past reform in the Soviet Union. Parts of Khrushchev's reforms could have(theoretically) survived while other parts died. (1986). Similarly, the changesintroduced in the Soviet Union by Khrushchev were made within the existingsocialist system, and those introduced by Gorbachev are being made withinthe existing socialist system. Stalin forced collectivization onour farmers by police methods." Khrushchev (197 ) contended that Stalin'sagricultural policies were "an utter perversion of the principles" ofLenin. (1978). 127). (198 , July). and . C. Improvements in labor productivity werepursued through programs ranging from a reduction in alcoholism to thedismissal of inefficient industrial managers (Russia under Gorbachev,1985). His contention was that every "bulky administrative apparatus must somehowjustify its existence" (Khrushchev, 197 , p. Planning Review, XIV, 3 -37. The principalelements of these reforms applied to small enterprises were as follows: 1. was justified as long as it was on the altar of socialistprogress. Gorbachev noted that "paymentsto the state budget" would be "reduced accordingly" (p. First, the Khrushchev reforms were limited to theagricultural sector. M. Under perestroika, the center will deal with higherlevel issues, while the enterprises will deal with nuts and bolts, anddaily bread and butter issues (Gorbachev, 1987). The contemporary economic reforms implemented in the Soviet Union arenot likely to create a market based economy in that country. What was wrong was the meanswith which they were pursued. (1983). The economic initiatives of Gorbachev have been universally applied,as they have been implemented. The NEP was ended by Stalin in 1928. He favored a degree of central planning; however,he was opposed to a central planning office for each sector of the economy. He wanted toprovide farmers with the necessary material incentives to cause them toplant the highest yield crops, and to devote an optimal effort tocollective agricultural enterprises (Khrushchev, 197 ). 3. (1962). In D. (1987, February 2). By 199 , it has been projected that Soviet external debt couldreach a level of US$53 billion--a further 51.4 percent over the three-yeartime period. Business Week,292 , 82-88. 1-5 . 119). Effective soil management, and soilregeneration procedures were badly needed. The character of centrally planned economies differs inmany ways from a market based economy. Wage levels, where only family members were involved, could beestablished by the enterprises. Improve productivity through incentive compensation. In thesomewhat more than four years that he has been the nation's leader, he hasintroduced far reaching social, political, and economic initiatives. How the west could win forGorbachev. Comparative economic systems,third edition. Khrushchev, N. Steinberg, B. References Aganbegyan, A. Further, the Soviet economy, to reallythrive, needs greater interaction with the western economies. (Ed.). (197 ). (1986, October). Comparisons of contemporary agricultural reform in the Soviet Unionwith those of the Khrushchev years (when such comparisons are made) aremost often a part of an effort to justify a proposition that the currentreforms are doomed to failure; that the apparatchik of the Communistestablishment will not permit perestroika to succeed (Minard & Brimelow,1986; Galuszka, 1987). Khrushchev, however, was not prepared to permit collectivefarms to fail financially, while Gorbachev is prepared to permit theinefficient collective farms to die. The main thing in the struggle for socialism is theproductivity of labor. Following theseseparate examinations, the two sets of initiatives are compared, again,with respect to the content, character, motivation, and derivation of eachset. More oftenthan not, they employed only family members, and they were often part-time,after hours endeavors. The Initiatives ofNikita Khrushchev Americans tend most often to remember Nikita Khrushchev inromanticized terms. B., Jr., & Hebert, R. New York: W. Theyare proud of these successes, and, while they are pursuing economic reform,they have no intention of dismantling the existing socialist system. Sovietagriculture was little more than slave labor under Stalin. In 1921, Soviet agriculture was in a shambles (Mazour, 1967). With respect to this latter goal,Khrushchev said that: I realize that by . Shirreff, D. 12 ) said that: Certain theoreticians . In examining and comparing the agricultural policies of Gorbachev andKhrushchev, they are first considered separately. In this context, reforms for smallbusinesses, as an example, were implemented throughout the country at onetime, and all decentralization prerogatives were delegated simultaneously.The incremental aspect of perestroika lies in the fact that reform forsmall enterprises and large enterprises, and for industry and agricultureas sectors were implemented at different times. As a part of perestroika, major restructuring has been effected at thecentral planning level (Gorbachev, 1987). (1952). World Development Report. C. While the reforms of perestroika do not represent ashift away from socialism, they will likely radically change the Sovieteconomic mechanism (Barrett, 1987).Prior to his assumption of the responsibilities of General Secretary,Gorbachev had been the minister responsible for Soviet agriculture. Sovietfarmers simply were not cooperating with collectivization. It is in thebest interests of both the Soviet and the western economies that suchinteraction occur. 127). Khrushchev's interest in agriculture stemmed from his assignment byStalin to the Ukraine. Under this system, the state fundsexpansion and modernization of production facilities. Gorbachev planted the seeds, butwill they grow? Gorbachev, M. To solve this dilemma, Stalin implemented aruthless policy of forced collectivization in agriculture (Medvedev, 1986). . Thisfeature is truly new to the Soviet economic system. (1987). The concept is an essentialunderpinning for the economic reforms introduced by Gorbachev in the SovietUnion (Pringle, 1987). 1 3). He wanted to provide thedegree of mechanization required to make Soviet farming a productiveenterprise in the contemporary world (Khrushchev, 197 ). The Economist,CCXCVIII, 5 -51. The economicchanges in Yugoslavia, Hungary, and the PRC were made within the structureof the socialist economic system. . These periods are (1) the contemporaryperiod, which began in March 1985, with the election of Mikhail Gorbachevas General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)Central Committee, and Chairman of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics(USSR) Council of Defense, and (2) the March 1953-to-October 1964 timeperiod, during which Nikita Khrushchev held the office of General Secretaryof the CPSU Central Committee. Brumberg, A. . What a foolish rationalization of murderand the perversion of Lenist policy. In the Soviet Union (and, indeed, in most other socialist states),central planning became a hallmark of its implementation of Marxisteconomic theory. (1967). With respect to agriculture, Stalin wanted to modernize Sovietagriculture. In such a scenario, all parties cannot win, and oneparty cannot see anything good in the actions of another party. It will be interesting to seewho prevails. Gorbachev. Perestroika in the Soviet Union is not, at this time (early-1989),hampered by any of the timidity and half-way measures which characterizedearlier reforms in the country. He thought the only way to get farmersto produce was to put pressure on them" (pp. Pearson, J. Gorbachev's reforms inthe Soviet Union have been accompanied by reforms of various stripes inother countries in Eastern Europe. determined by theirproductivity" (Khrushchev, p. He was, of course some of all of these romanticimpressions, but he was also a pragmatic domestic political leader andgovernment administrator, who attempted to introduce reform into the Sovietsystem of agriculture. The second stage of economic reform introduced by Grobachev involved aloosening of central control over small enterprise (Naylor, 1986). . Marx built on theRicardian theory that labor inputs created value. For the agricultural sector, the third stage reforms held additionalimplications. who will say our people should bemotivated not by money but by ideological considerations. By the mid-198 s,the state of Soviet agriculture was dreadful. The Marx-Engels Reader, secondedition. He, thus, came to the office of General Secretary with areform agenda. Where voluntary cooperation was not attained, force was used. This tenor of thought is stronger in the US than in otherwestern countries. The theories of Karl Marx also marked a significant departure frommany of his contemporary economists, when he divorced the concept of valuefrom land and other natural resources (Tucker, 1978). Gorbachev (1987) also emphasizesthe consistency of the policies of perestroika with the principles ofCommunism, and with the Communist system of government in the Soviet Union. Karl Marx, in his writings related to economics, contributed severalinsights to the study of economics. . (1985). Coplin, W. All aspects of the reform are implementedsimultaneously, and all aspects of the reform are directly related to everyother aspect of the reform. Under Stalin, the Soviet Union was not a dictatorship of theproletariat; it was simply the dictatorship of one man. The more likely reasons for a failure of perestroika, however, areneither theoretical nor technical. KarlMarx adapted classical economic theory, and, through the ensuing years,particularly since the creation of the Soviet Union, later-day Marxisteconomists have further refined the theory. In these separateexaminations, the content of the economic initiatives, their character,their motivations, and their derivations are identified. The greatest support for perestroika comes from the general populationof the Soviet Union. The culprit is the soft world crude petroleum market.Nevertheless, agricultural imports are viewed as a part of the debt problemwhich may be dealt with effectively within the Soviet economy. Decisions concerning products offered or withdrawn could bemade by the enterprises. (1985, November 16). Independently of this program, Khrushchevreduced delivery quotas to the extent possible, and, in another effort,introduced monetary incentives into agriculture--again to the extent thathe was able to persuade the Central Committee of the CPSU in that regard.The Virgin Lands program, another aspect of Khrushchev's reforms, was alsopursued as an essentially separate effort from other agricultural reforms.By contrast, Gorbachev's agricultural reforms are a part of a singlecomprehensive program. Reforming the Soviet economy.Fortune, CXII(12), 9 -12 . If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.